Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article develops a model in which market structure is determined endogenously by the choice of intermediation mode. There are two representative modes of intermediation that are widely used in real‐life markets: one is a middleman mode where an intermediary purchases inventory from the wholesale market and resells to buyers; the other is a market‐making mode where an intermediary offers a platform for buyers and sellers to meet and trade. We show that a marketmaking middleman, who adopts a mixture of these two intermediation modes, can emerge in a directed search equilibrium and discuss implications for the market structure.

In many markets in developing countries, especially in remote areas, middlemen are thought to earn excessive profits. Non-profits come in to counter what is seen as middlemen's market power, and rich country consumers pay a fair-trade premium for products marketed by such non-profits. This paper provides answers to the following five questions. How exactly do middlemen and non-profits divide up the market? How do the price mark up and price pass-through differ between middleman and non-profits? What is the impact of non-profits entry on the wellbeing of the poor? Should the government subsidize the entry of non-profits, or the entry of middlemen? Should wealthy consumers in the North pay a premium for fair trade products, or should they support fair trade non-profits directly?