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Since his first term, President Evo Morales has made the reestablishment of the state as a priority. This article analyzes the soft power in foreign policy and the introduction of bolivian logic citizen-centric in speeches concerning the maritime theme of president Evo Morales and foreign minister David Choquehuanca to various international forums, the context in which the integration is set to support the bolivian maritime claim. This research takes some characteristics of the peripherical realism, coined by the Argentine political scientist Carlos Escudé, for deal with the maritime issue that divide Bolivia and Chile, conceptual framework that, been addressed in the Prebisch's and CEPAL's center-periphery, allows an analysis with a regional focus. ; Desde su primer gobierno el presidente Evo Morales ha asumido la refundación del estado como una prioridad. El presente artículo analiza el soft power en la política exterior boliviana y la introducción de la lógica ciudadano-céntrica en los discursos referentes al tema marítimo del presidente Evo Morales y del canciller David Choquehuanca ante diversos foros internacionales, contexto en el que la integración se configura como soporte de la reivindicación marítima boliviana. Este estudio toma algunos elementos de la teoría del realismo periférico acuñada por el politólogo argentino Carlos Escudé para tratar el tema marítimo que divide a Bolivia y Chile, marco conceptual que, al tratarse de la perspectiva centro-periferia de Prebisch y CEPAL, permite un análisis con enfoque regional. ; A partir do primeiro governo do presidente Evo Morales assumiu a refundação estado como uma prioridade. Este artigo analisa o poder brando na política externa boliviano ea introdução da lógica nas demonstrações centrados no cidadão relativa ao tema marítimo e presidente Evo Morales ministro das relações exteriores, David Choquehuanca aos vários fóruns internacionais contexto em que a integração é ajuste estão as crédito marítimo boliviano. Este estudo toma alguns elementos da teoria do Realismo Periférico, acunhada pelo cientista político argentino, Carlos Escudé, para tratar o tema marítimo que divide a Bolivia e o Chile, marco conceptual que, sendo da perspectiva centro-periferia de Prebisch e a CEPAL, ele permite uma analises com uma aproximação regional

Since his first term, President Evo Morales has made the reestablishment of the state as a priority. This article analyzes the soft power in foreign policy and the introduction of bolivian logic citizen-centric in speeches concerning the maritime theme of president Evo Morales and foreign minister David Choquehuanca to various international forums, the context in which the integration is set to support the bolivian maritime claim. This research takes some characteristics of the peripherical realism, coined by the Argentine political scientist Carlos Escudé, for deal with the maritime issue that divide Bolivia and Chile, conceptual framework that, been addressed in the Prebisch's and CEPAL's center-periphery, allows an analysis with a regional focus. ; Desde su primer gobierno el presidente Evo Morales ha asumido la refundación del estado como una prioridad. El presente artículo analiza el soft power en la política exterior boliviana y la introducción de la lógica ciudadano-céntrica en los discursos referentes al tema marítimo del presidente Evo Morales y del canciller David Choquehuanca ante diversos foros internacionales, contexto en el que la integración se configura como soporte de la reivindicación marítima boliviana. Este estudio toma algunos elementos de la teoría del realismo periférico acuñada por el politólogo argentino Carlos Escudé para tratar el tema marítimo que divide a Bolivia y Chile, marco conceptual que, al tratarse de la perspectiva centro-periferia de Prebisch y CEPAL, permite un análisis con enfoque regional. ; A partir do primeiro governo do presidente Evo Morales assumiu a refundação estado como uma prioridade. Este artigo analisa o poder brando na política externa boliviano ea introdução da lógica nas demonstrações centrados no cidadão relativa ao tema marítimo e presidente Evo Morales ministro das relações exteriores, David Choquehuanca aos vários fóruns internacionais contexto em que a integração é ajuste estão as crédito marítimo boliviano. Este estudo toma alguns elementos da teoria do Realismo Periférico, acunhada pelo cientista político argentino, Carlos Escudé, para tratar o tema marítimo que divide a Bolivia e o Chile, marco conceptual que, sendo da perspectiva centro-periferia de Prebisch e a CEPAL, ele permite uma analises com uma aproximação regional

This research paper scrutinizes the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) of China, and its associated initiatives that affect the geopolitics with regards to the Horn of Africa. China's OBOR initiative connect countries like Somali, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti through Maritime Silk Road that promotes political ties between Africa and China and enhancing the geopolitical interests of Beijing. The statistical data analysis on the Geopolitics of China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative as well as the reintegration of the Middle East and Africa into China's System of Accumulation has led to GBM (government business media) complex. This allows for regional and transactional relations between the governments of countries within the Horn of Africa and the Chinese government. China's One Belt, One Road studies show that those above five central countries located in the Horn of Africa have been impacted as they have infrastructural developments such as railways, Maritimes, and pipelines that connect them to Chinese ports clusters in countries such as Sudan. This has also left military connections and foreign debts between the countries. Article visualizations:

This research paper scrutinizes the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) of China, and its associated initiatives that affect the geopolitics with regards to the Horn of Africa. China's OBOR initiative connect countries like Somali, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti through Maritime Silk Road that promotes political ties between Africa and China and enhancing the geopolitical interests of Beijing. The statistical data analysis on the Geopolitics of China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative as well as the reintegration of the Middle East and Africa into China's System of Accumulation has led to GBM (government business media) complex. This allows for regional and transactional relations between the governments of countries within the Horn of Africa and the Chinese government. China's One Belt, One Road studies show that those above five central countries located in the Horn of Africa have been impacted as they have infrastructural developments such as railways, Maritimes, and pipelines that connect them to Chinese ports clusters in countries such as Sudan. This has also left military connections and foreign debts between the countries.

Cover -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Maps -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part I Bridging the Sea -- The beginnings: Phoenicians and Greeks -- Thalassocracies: Athens, Alexandria, Carthage and Rome -- Wheat, wine and precious stones -- Handbooks and travel accounts -- Disintegration or reintegration? -- Part II North Sea, Baltic Sea and Black Sea: The Vikings -- Trade routes -- Swords, jewellery and runestones -- Part III Red Sea, Arabian Sea, South China Sea: The Maritime Silk Road -- The preconditions: Winds, ships and navigation -- Ibn Battuta and Marco Polo: Merchants and ports -- The Maritime Silk Road -- Part IV Mediterranean: The Rise of the Maritime Republics -- The rise of the Maritime Republics -- The new trading power in the Levant -- The galley: A safe but costly mode of transport -- Emporia and networks -- Pirates: Robbery and ransom -- Part V Metropoles on the North and Baltic Seas -- The Hanseatic League: A powerful confederation of trading cities -- North Sea metropolises: Bruges, Antwerp and Amsterdam -- The Dutch are the 'Carryers of the World' -- Farmers, cloth-makers, entrepreneurs and artists: The Netherlandization of the Baltic region -- Part VI Indian Ocean: Europe meets Asia -- Conflict and cooperation -- Silver for cotton fabrics -- Merchant dynasties -- Life at sea -- Europe meets Asia -- Part VII Atlantic: Expanding horizons and exchanges -- Crossing the Atlantic Ocean -- The rivalry between the Spanish and the Portuguese -- Sugar, slaves and furs: The Dutch, English and French -- Black Atlantic -- Indigenous Atlantic -- Seamen, buccaneers and pastors -- Perceptions of the Atlantic -- Part VIII Pacific: Exploration and Encounter -- Encounter -- Sandalwood, sea cucumbers and sea otters -- Between Canton and California -- Missionaries and scientists.

Foreword / Mark Matthews -- Preface / Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser -- Introduction / Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser -- Irregular maritime migration as a global phenomenon / Marie McAuliffe and Victoria Mence -- Placing Sri Lankan maritime arrivals in a broader migration context / Dinuk Jayasuriya and Marie McAuliffe -- The root causes of movement: Exploring the determinants of irregular migration from Afghanistan / Craig Loschmann, Katie Kuschminder and Melissa Siegel -- Seeking the views of irregular migrants: Decision-making, drivers and migration journeys / Marie McAuliffe -- Leaving family behind: Understanding the irregular migration of unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors / Ignacio Correa-Velez, Mariana Nardone and Katharine Knoetze -- Indonesia as a transit country in irregular migration to Australia / Graeme Hugo, George Tan and Caven Jonathan Napitupulu -- The process of Sri Lankan migration to Australia focusing on irregular migrants seeking asylum / Graeme Hugo and Lakshman Dissanayake -- Applications for asylum in the developed world: Modelling asylum claims by origin and destination / Tim Hatton and Joseph Moloney -- Assisted voluntary return and reintegration of migrants: A comparative approach / Khalid Koser and Katie Kuschminder -- Media and migration: Comparative analysis of print and online media reporting on migrants and migration in selected countries / Marie McAuliffe, Warren Weeks and Khalid Koser -- Environmentally related international migration: Policy challenges / Victoria Mence and Alex Parrinder -- Conclusions / Khalid Koser and Marie McAuliffe.

After enjoying long-term prosperity since the end of the Asia-Pacific War (1945), Japan seems to be suffering economic globalization in the Asia-Pacific realm, weakened domestic socioeconomic stability & increasing political unrest at the turn of the twentieth century. Along with these uncertainties, the New Right ideology, which advocates neoliberalism (free economy) & neoconservatism (strong state), is gaining ground in Japan. While neoliberal economy decreases the role of the state, the state needs to be a "strong" competitor in the international political economy. In Japan, this contradictory situation of the state appears as a series of neoconservative policies such as the regularization of the national flag & anthem, maritime defense action, the reinforcement of state surveillance & the reintegration of Okinawa. Drawing on the concept of the state as container & territoriality, this paper explores the rise of neoconservatism in Japan. 4 Tables, 2 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

In late 2013, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) requested that the World Bank and UNSOM jointly conduct a public expenditure review of the security and justice sectors (SJPER). An SJPER is a tool to assist policy and operational decision-making, analyze tradeoffs, and provide options on critical financially-related issues in defense, as well as criminal justice and policing. Three years later, Somalia is undergoing yet another political transition with the election of a new parliament and ultimately a new president. These steps will augur in a new government in 2017 that will be charged with finalizing some of the key issues around the constitution, including the relationship between the federal state and its federal members, as well as leading the country to democratic elections in 2020. Security and justice issues are hinged to many of these overarching political questions; these are two fundamental 'public goods' that are central to the (re)building of the Somali state and the transition from war to peace. In this context, the SJPER is a technical tool to assist the FGS, the federal members, and their international partners in placing these critical security and justice policy questions within a public finance perspective. As a tool, rather than a one-off report, it should be used by the authorities and partners going forward in terms of testing the critical policy questions against the key dimensions studied here, including affordability, efficiency and effectiveness and accountability.

Irregular maritime migration from Bangladesh to Malaysia presents serious risks for Bangladeshi laborers who seek work overseas to change their precarious living conditions. Survivors' voices are often unheard and their motivation and experiences are largely undocumented. This study details the accounts of 25 survivors of labor trafficking, all men, from three major trafficking hubs in Bangladesh. Interviews with selected stakeholders provide insights into this industry and its business model. The study seeks to understand how and why decisions to undertake the journey were made. It details the multi-faceted consequences for survivors, including loss of key assets (e.g., land, livestock, cash and future work opportunities). Most of the survivors never reached their planned destination and only two persons secured work for more than six months. As a direct result of migration, most moved from living marginally below the poverty line at pre-departure to extreme poverty. Migration, precarity and motivation theories help explain the perspectives and migration decisions of the research participants. These insights can inform policymakers to develop more holistic prevention, prosecution and reintegration measures.

The origins of East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) can be traced to a number of sources. Firstly, the ETDF is a product of East Timor's war of resistance against Indonesian invasion. After the Indonesians withdrew from East Timor in 1999 and the UN arrived to build the state of East Timor, resistance leaders demanded that a defence force be created, and that their resistance fighters be incorporated into it. Secondly, the ETDF is a product of the atrocities committed by pro-Jakarta militias, after the 1999 referendum in East Timor demonstrated an overwhelming level of support for independence. The violence unleashed by the militias convinced even those East Timorese leaders who had originally been opposed to the idea, that an East Timorese defence force should be raised to ensure that such atrocities would never happen again. finally, the ETDF is also a product of a study, commissioned by the UN and undertaken by the King's College of London, which was tasked with, firstly, addressing the future of the former resistance fighters in East Timor, and secondly, with formulating a workable structure for a future East Timorese defence force - the ETDF was formed based on the recommendations of that study. The 2000 King's college study did not, however, question whether the country actually needed a defence force to protect it from external threats - that was simply assumed. External threats to East Timor' s security are divided into conventional and nonconventional threats for clarity of analysis. The conventional threats to East Timor' s security are assessed as low to negligible, with East Timor' s status as a sovereign state and as a product of UN state-building, acting as a deterrent to foreign aggression. Given the geostrategic significance that Australia and Indonesia have historically placed on East Timor - during the Pacific war in Australia's case and during the Cold War in Indonesia's - it is also likely that Australia and/or Indonesia would defend East Timor if a conventional threat were to emerge from the broader region or beyond. In the unlikely event that a conventional threat did emerge, the ETDF could do little to counter it. East Timor has only two neighbours, Indonesia and Australia, and both are far larger than East Timor in economic, geographic and demographic terms. East Timor simply lacks the resources as a society to build a defence force capable of defeating, or even significantly delaying, either of those neighbours through conventional warfare. While a guerrilla strategy may appear an attractive option for the ETDF, a guerrilla campaign would do little to counter any conventional threat to East Timorese statehood - the East Timorese waged a guerrilla campaign against their Indonesian occupiers for 24 years without prompting a withdrawal. The Indonesian withdrawal was only secured with formidable international backing. The only means available to East Timor to defend itself from external threats are its diplomatic efforts - an area of the East Timorese budget which is, at present, receives little funding. · Non-conventional threats are far more likely to affect East Timor's security. Smuggling, illegal fishing, piracy and, to a far lesser extent, maritime terrorism, all present credible threats to East Timor's economic interests. However, securing East Timor from these threats is not a role for the ETDF. Aside from being more expensive to employ in a border security capacity than police, there is also a question of whether the ETDF is the appropriate organisation for protecting East Timor's borders. As a conventional military trained in the use of lethal force in accordance with the laws of armed conflict, the ETDF is not the appropriate organisation to conduct border policing tasks - something that is essentially a policing role which requires the use of minimum force consistent with the rule of law. There is also a possibility that replacing border police with ETDF troops may incite tensions in the border region - firstly between the ETDF and the Indonesian military, who control the Indonesian side of the border, and secondly, between the ETDF and local East Timorese who, given the regionally based conflicts which have taken place in East Timor in recent years, may feel a sense of animosity toward the troops. Evidence suggests that the ETDF does little to protect East Timor from external threats. Thus, the East Timor Defence Ministry's proposed response to the (unlikely) conventional and non-conventional threat - an exponential increase in the size, budget and capabilities of the ETDF and the militarisation of East Timor' s borders - would be an unnecessary expense which would do little to improve East Timor' s security and may in fact incite tensions in some parts of East Timor. The second major argument for an East Timorese defence force - namely, the need to deal with the demands of the veterans of East Timor' s war of resistance - is equally flawed. When the ETDF was formed, only around one-third of the country's resistance fighters were incorporated into it. The remainder, around 1,300 fighters, were left without work in a country of soaring unemployment where they received little assistance from the UN or the government of East Timor. Nonetheless, East Timor's greatest security problems in the years since independence have not been caused by those unemployed resistance fighters. They have been caused by deserting and serving members of the ETDF. The first incident occurred in the 2006 when a protest, held by a group of ETDF troops who had deserted their barracks, instigated violence in the streets of Dili, a political crisis and a second international peacekeeping intervention into East Timor. The second incident occurred in 2008 when a group of former ETDF personnel, who had deserted, attempted to assassinate the president and prime minister of East Timor. Thus, neither the justification that East Timor requires a defence force to defend it from external threats, nor the explanation that the ETDF is essential in appeasing and placating the country's former resistance fighters, provides sufficient grounds for an East Timorese defence force. Nonetheless, any plans to reduce or demobilise the ETDF would need to be well considered - disgruntled former ETDF personnel have already caused sufficient turmoil in East Timor; adding their numbers could prove disastrous for East Timor's security. Recommendations to the government of East Timor 1. Halt any plans to implement Defence Ministry recommendations that the ETDF be upsized, its equipment upgraded and its role expanded. 2. Freeze ETDF recruitment and consider consolidating the ETDF into a single battalion. 4, Ease the. minimum criteria for the veterans' pension (and lower the rate of payment if necessary) and formulate a comprehensive long-term reintegration program to assist veterans of the resistance, and other ETDF members, in finding civilian employment. 5. Recognise East Timor's diplomatic efforts as its most powerful means of defending itself from conventional threats and, in future budgets, allocate funding accordingly.