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Constitutionalism is the modern philosophy of constitutive democracy and the reason for this conclusion has been analysed in this article taking in to account that it is the philosophy that protect the minority in the system of political constitutional democracy. It has been described constitutionalism and the importance of this concept in state formation. As the state is built upon a large social deal, the social contract is treated widely considering that is the main state forming thesis.

Abstract:The article examines the conceptual category of semi-liberal constitutionalism and offers some thoughts on the unique normative challenges that arise in the resolution of human rights conflicts in semi-liberal constitutional systems. Under the definition offered a semi-liberal constitutional system is a system that meets two conditions: first, it exhibits a simultaneous dual normative commitment to liberal rights and principles and to other values or interests that result in enduring and significant restrictions on some of these rights; second, this dual normative commitment is constitutive and is expressed in the basic elements of the system. Describing the problem of shaping and interpreting normative commitments in a semi-liberal constitutional regime, the article argues that an insufficient understanding of semi-liberal normativity may result in skewed reasoning by both courts and policymakers trying to resolve human rights conflicts in semi-liberal constitutional regimes, because the application of liberal rights reasoning in semi-liberal settings neglects the power differentials inherent in such systems and tends to overprotect the rights of some at the expense of the rights of others. Offering Israel as an example of a semi-liberal constitutional system and using one aspect of its semi-liberal nature – the structure of its religion–state relations and specifically of its religious personal laws – the article analyses three decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court, pointing to the special difficulties arising in such settings and offering critiques and corrections to the Court's rulings where applicable.

Introduction -- The search for sovereignty : law, language, and the beginnings of modern constitutionalism -- Consent how? : challenges to Lockean constitutionalism -- Constitutional language and the possibility of binding commitments -- Consent to what? : exclusivity and completeness in constitutional and legal language -- The question of substance : morality, law, and constitutional legitimacy -- The defense of constitutional language.

This book explores two basic questions regarding constitutional theory. First, in view of a commitment to democratic self-rule and widespread disagreement on questions of value, how is the creation of a legitimate constitutional regime possible? Second, what must be true about a constitution if the regime that it supports is to retain its claim to legitimacy? Howard Schweber shows that the answers to these questions appear in a theory of constitutional language that combines democratic theory with constitutional philosophy. The creation of a legitimate constitutional regime depends on a shared commitment to a particular and specialized form of language. Out of this simple observation, Schweber develops arguments about the characteristics of constitutional language, the necessary differences between constitutional language and the language of ordinary law or morality, as well as the authority of officials such as judges to engage in constitutional review of laws