Suchergebnisse

part Part I Classical Natural Law Theory -- chapter 1 John Finnis (1990), 'Natural Law and Legal Reasoning', Cleveland State Law Review, 38, pp. 1-13 -- chapter 2 John Finnis (1986), 'The -- chapter 3 Mark C. Murphy (2003), 'Natural Law Jurisprudence', Legal Theory, 9, pp. 241-67 -- chapter 4 Brian Bix (2000), 'On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism', Notre Dame Law Review, 75, pp. 1613-24 -- part Part II The Separability Thesis -- chapter 5H.L.A. Hart (1958), 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals', Harvard Law Review, 71, pp. 593-629 -- chapter 6 Hans Kelsen (1960), 'What is the Pure Theory of Law?', Tulane Law Review, 34, pp. 269-76 -- chapter 7 David Lyons (1982), 'Moral Aspects of Legal Theory', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 7, pp. 223-54 -- chapter 8 Joseph Raz (2003), 'About Morality and the Nature of Law', American Journal of Jurisprudence, 48, pp. 1-15 -- part Part III Constructive Interpretivism -- chapter 9 Ronald Dworkin (1982), 'Law as Interpretation', Texas Law Review, 60, pp. 527-50 -- chapter 10 Joseph Raz (1986), 'Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain', California Law Review, 74, pp. 1103-19 -- chapter 11 John Finnis (1987), 'On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire', Law and Philosophy, 6, pp. 357-80 -- chapter 12 Kenneth Einar Himma (2003), 'Trouble in Law's Empire: Rethinking Dworkin's Third Theory of Law', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 23, pp. 345-77 -- part Part IV Inclusive Legal Positivism -- chapter 13 Joseph Raz (1985), 'Authority, Law and Morality', Monist, 68, pp. 295-324 -- chapter 14 Scott J. Shapiro (1998), 'On Hart's Way Out', Legal Theory, 4, pp. 469-507 -- chapter 15 Jules L. Coleman (1998), 'Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis', Legal Theory, 4, pp. 381-425 -- part Part V Morality and Conceptual Methodology -- chapter 16 Joseph Raz (1996), 'On the Nature of Law', Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 82, pp. 1-25 -- chapter 17 Brian Leiter (2003), 'Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence', American Journal of Jurisprudence, 48, pp. 17-51 -- chapter 18 Stephen R. Perry (1998), 'Hart's Methodological Positivism', Legal Theory, 4, pp. 427-67 -- chapter 19 Brian H. Bix (2003), 'Raz on Necessity', Law and Philosophy, 22, pp. 537-59.

Lawyers who write about responsibility tend to focus on criminal law at the expense of civil and public law; while philosophers tend to treat responsibility as a moral concept,and either ignore the law or consider legal responsibility to be a more or less distorted reflection of its moral counterpart. This book aims to counteract both of these biases. By adopting a comparative institutional approach to the relationship between law and morality, it challenges the common view that morality stands to law as critical standard to conventional practice. It shows how law and morality interact symbiot

Powerful emotion and pursuit of self-interest have many times led people to break the law with the belief that they are doing so with sound moral reasons. This study, a comprehensive philosophical and legal analysis of the gray area in which the foundations of law and morality clash, views these oblique circumstances from two perspectives: that of the person who faces a possible conflict between the claims of morality and law and must choose whether or not to obey the penal code; and that of the people who make and uphold laws and must decide whether to treat someone with a moral claim to disobey differently from ordinary lawbreakers. In examining the extent of the obligations owed by citizens to their government, Greenawalt concentrates on the possible existence of a single source of obligation that reaches all citizens and all laws. He also discusses techniques of amelioration of punishment for conscientious lawbreakers, asking how far legal systems should go to accommodate individuals who break the law for reason of conscience. Drawing from numerous examples of conflicts between law and morality, Greeawalt illustrates in detail the positions and predicaments of potential lawbreakers and lawmakers alike. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1229/thumbnail.jpg