Suchergebnisse

This chapter deals with the question of whether labour standards are less relevant or more relevant for the new world of work which is vastly different from the old world of work when most labour standards were first established. The various rationales for labour standards are first outlined. This is followed by a discussion of the changing pressures in the labour market that emanate from various forces: the pressures affecting employers and hence their demand for labour; the changing nature of the supply of labour; changes in forms of employee representation and the legal and regulatory environment in which the parties operate; and changes in the workplace and human resource practices within firms. These pressures lead to a changing role and need for labour standards, generally increasing the need, but also tending to reduce the ability of governments to provide such standards. Some illustrative evidence of the impact of specific labour standards is outlined, followed by a discussion of labour standards in developing and emerging economies. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible elements of smart regulation in this area to deal with the difficult trade-off between the increased need for labour standards confronting the reduced ability of governments to provide such standards.

Core labour standards defined by the ILO in 1998 are universal, but applied very differently across countries. Compliance is much higher in high income countries. However, the causality between improved labour standards and economic growth remains a controversial issue. Export-led growth strategies might encourage developing countries to curb the process of standards improvement. In this way, they can raise the volume of their unskilled labour endowments (child and/or forced labour) in order to strengthen their comparative advantage over compliant countries and pursue "social dumping" strategies, which aim more directly at increasing competitiveness. We use a gravity model to assess the trade impact of curbing the level of compliance with core labour standards, distinguishing the effects on bilateral trade (geographical specialization) from the multilateral effects on all exports and imports. We show that, other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to trade more with each other, while non-compliant countries tend to trade more with compliant countries. These effects are identified mainly with respect to child labour and freedom of association. All other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to be less open than non-compliant countries, but differently depending on the standards, with a non-linear relationship for some of them. Less compliant countries, frequently the poorest ones, may simultaneously step up their trade and labour standards. For median countries, mainly the emerging countries, the level of compliance with labour standards is "optimal" from a mercantilist point of view. For the most compliant countries, the developed ones, their strict compliance with labour standards implies a trade shortfall. ; Les normes de travail fondamentales définies par l'OIT en 1998 sont universelles, mais différemment appliquées dans les pays. Leur respect est beaucoup plus élevé dans les pays à haut revenu. Toutefois, la causalité entre l'amélioration des normes ...

Core labour standards defined by the ILO in 1998 are universal, but applied very differently across countries. Compliance is much higher in high income countries. However, the causality between improved labour standards and economic growth remains a controversial issue. Export-led growth strategies might encourage developing countries to curb the process of standards improvement. In this way, they can raise the volume of their unskilled labour endowments (child and/or forced labour) in order to strengthen their comparative advantage over compliant countries and pursue "social dumping" strategies, which aim more directly at increasing competitiveness. We use a gravity model to assess the trade impact of curbing the level of compliance with core labour standards, distinguishing the effects on bilateral trade (geographical specialization) from the multilateral effects on all exports and imports. We show that, other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to trade more with each other, while non-compliant countries tend to trade more with compliant countries. These effects are identified mainly with respect to child labour and freedom of association. All other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to be less open than non-compliant countries, but differently depending on the standards, with a non-linear relationship for some of them. Less compliant countries, frequently the poorest ones, may simultaneously step up their trade and labour standards. For median countries, mainly the emerging countries, the level of compliance with labour standards is "optimal" from a mercantilist point of view. For the most compliant countries, the developed ones, their strict compliance with labour standards implies a trade shortfall. ; Les normes de travail fondamentales définies par l'OIT en 1998 sont universelles, mais différemment appliquées dans les pays. Leur respect est beaucoup plus élevé dans les pays à haut revenu. Toutefois, la causalité entre l'amélioration des normes ...

Core labour standards defined by the ILO in 1998 are universal, but applied very differently across countries. Compliance is much higher in high income countries. However, the causality between improved labour standards and economic growth remains a controversial issue. Export-led growth strategies might encourage developing countries to curb the process of standards improvement. In this way, they can raise the volume of their unskilled labour endowments (child and/or forced labour) in order to strengthen their comparative advantage over compliant countries and pursue "social dumping" strategies, which aim more directly at increasing competitiveness. We use a gravity model to assess the trade impact of curbing the level of compliance with core labour standards, distinguishing the effects on bilateral trade (geographical specialization) from the multilateral effects on all exports and imports. We show that, other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to trade more with each other, while non-compliant countries tend to trade more with compliant countries. These effects are identified mainly with respect to child labour and freedom of association. All other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to be less open than non-compliant countries, but differently depending on the standards, with a non-linear relationship for some of them. Less compliant countries, frequently the poorest ones, may simultaneously step up their trade and labour standards. For median countries, mainly the emerging countries, the level of compliance with labour standards is "optimal" from a mercantilist point of view. For the most compliant countries, the developed ones, their strict compliance with labour standards implies a trade shortfall. ; Les normes de travail fondamentales définies par l'OIT en 1998 sont universelles, mais différemment appliquées dans les pays. Leur respect est beaucoup plus élevé dans les pays à haut revenu. Toutefois, la causalité entre l'amélioration des normes ...

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect. ; Ces dernières années, la relation entre normes du travail et commerce international s'est intensifiée. Nous utilisons une approche basée sur les incitations pour évaluer l'efficacité des instruments de politiques commerciales et des mécanismes privés pour la promotion des normes internationales du travail dans les firmes du Sud. Nous montrons que les instruments de politiques commerciales peuvent appliquer les normes minimales. Cependant, nous trouvons que les mecanismes privés peuvent dépasser les normes minimales si et seulement si, il existe un contrat exclusif entre l'entreprise multinationale et le sous-traitant, due à l'effet de passager clandestin.

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect. ; Ces dernières années, la relation entre normes du travail et commerce international s'est intensifiée. Nous utilisons une approche basée sur les incitations pour évaluer l'efficacité des instruments de politiques commerciales et des mécanismes privés pour la promotion des normes internationales du travail dans les firmes du Sud. Nous montrons que les instruments de politiques commerciales peuvent appliquer les normes minimales. Cependant, nous trouvons que les mecanismes privés peuvent dépasser les normes minimales si et seulement si, il existe un contrat exclusif entre l'entreprise multinationale et le sous-traitant, due à l'effet de passager clandestin.

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect. ; Ces dernières années, la relation entre normes du travail et commerce international s'est intensifiée. Nous utilisons une approche basée sur les incitations pour évaluer l'efficacité des instruments de politiques commerciales et des mécanismes privés pour la promotion des normes internationales du travail dans les firmes du Sud. Nous montrons que les instruments de politiques commerciales peuvent appliquer les normes minimales. Cependant, nous trouvons que les mecanismes privés peuvent dépasser les normes minimales si et seulement si, il existe un contrat exclusif entre l'entreprise multinationale et le sous-traitant, due à l'effet de passager clandestin.

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect. ; Ces dernières années, la relation entre normes du travail et commerce international s'est intensifiée. Nous utilisons une approche basée sur les incitations pour évaluer l'efficacité des instruments de politiques commerciales et des mécanismes privés pour la promotion des normes internationales du travail dans les firmes du Sud. Nous montrons que les instruments de politiques commerciales peuvent appliquer les normes minimales. Cependant, nous trouvons que les mecanismes privés peuvent dépasser les normes minimales si et seulement si, il existe un contrat exclusif entre l'entreprise multinationale et le sous-traitant, due à l'effet de passager clandestin.

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect. ; Ces dernières années, la relation entre normes du travail et commerce international s'est intensifiée. Nous utilisons une approche basée sur les incitations pour évaluer l'efficacité des instruments de politiques commerciales et des mécanismes privés pour la promotion des normes internationales du travail dans les firmes du Sud. Nous montrons que les instruments de politiques commerciales peuvent appliquer les normes minimales. Cependant, nous trouvons que les mecanismes privés peuvent dépasser les normes minimales si et seulement si, il existe un contrat exclusif entre l'entreprise multinationale et le sous-traitant, due à l'effet de passager clandestin.

This book was published by the Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC) at Loughborough University. ; Globally, the construction sector is one of the largest employers of temporary workers and the development of infrastructure can be a major contributor to poverty reduction and labour rights. Through the International Labour Organisation (ILO) there exist agreed international conventions on labour standards which cover employment conditions and rights. The underlying problem is not a lack of labour law, rather it is the lack of effective mechanisms to ensure that labour laws are applied and monitored. This sourcebook provides guidance on the collaborative process and contractual issues involved in implementing labour standards. It is based on experience gained from implementing labour standards in infrastructure construction projects in Ghana, India and Zambia. Three different contexts for construction are considered: formal or conventional contracting; community contracting; and self-help schemes using unpaid labour.