Suchergebnisse

'Regime' is often used to describe behaviour in international political economy. Focuses on a new definition of the auto trade regime based on 4 fundamental rules that have persisted since the 1950s. Concludes that the auto industry case illustrates the tendency of analysts to underestimate protectionist elements in industry trade regimes and to overestimate the amount of changes that take place in their fundamental rules. (Abstract amended)

Analysis of auto imports on a region-by-region basis, 1955-83. Principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures that guide international auto trade; a critique of "the conventional model of regime collapse and protectionist resurgence."

Der internationale Handel und Investitionsregime können sich verändern ohne zu kollabieren, da Regime Regeln enthalten, die sowohl protektionistisch als auch liberal sind, und damit eine große Anpassungsflexibilität an veränderte Rahmenbedingungen aufweisen. Die Normen, Regeln und Entscheidungsstrukturen werden anhand des internationalen Automobilhandels ausgewiesen. Die Regimeziele waren konstant - Wachstum und Stabilität -, lediglich die Mittel veränderten sich. Empirische Daten des Automobilhandels belegen eine regionale Ausrichtung und legen eine Unterschätzung der protektionistischen Elemente in Industrieregimen nahe und ein Überschätzen der Veränderungen der fundamentalen Regimeregeln.(SWP-Tth)

Internet regulation and International Trade Law -- Internet regulation under the WTO agreements -- Re-considering the legitimacy of internet regulation : a perspective from the general exceptions -- Re-considering the legitimacy of internet regulation : a perspective from the security exceptions -- Internet regulation and the application of TBT Agreement -- Internet regulations and international law : a Chinese perspective.

The concept of a "regime" is frequently used to describe and explain behavior in international political economy. Peter Cowhey and Edward Long, attempting to test theories of surplus capacity and hegemonic decline, advanced a version of a regime governing international trade in automobiles which was fundamentally liberal from 1966 to 1975, but then collapsed into protectionism. Their diagnosis is mistaken, however, because the trade regime for autos was neither as liberal as they assert during the 1950s and 1960s, nor as protectionist as they believe it has become in the 1980s. The discussion focuses on a new definition of the auto trade regime based on four fundamental rules that have persisted since the 1950s. By examining data on auto imports since 1955 on a region-by-region basis, it becomes clear that the trade expansion of the postwar years was not based on a global liberalization of the trade regime, but on carefully managed regional arrangements that favored imports within the region, or extra-regional imports that did not threaten domestic producers. The flurry of restraints on Japanese imports in recent years is not a collapse into protectionism, but a reinforcement of the fundamental regime rules. The auto industry case illustrates the tendency of analysts to underestimate protectionist elements in industry trade regimes and to overestimate the amount of changes that take place in their fundamental rules.

Regimes such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which require constant management by diplomacy, must deteriorate over time. They are bound by precedent, but their precedents, created by negotiation rather than by law, are unprincipled and cumulatively erode the foundations of the regime. To enshrine the objectives of the GATT more precisely in national law would make private property rights more secure against arbitrary government manipulation, and would serve the logic of democratic constitutionalism. Finally, reform of the GATT should be directed to (a) reducing permissible protection to tariffs, (b) securing nondiscrimination, and (c) providing negotiating and legal opportunities for the binding of tariff schedules.

ABSTRACT
Energy subsidy and pricing reform is widely heralded as a necessity to transition to sustainable development and keep global warming below 2°C. Energy pricing policies and subsidies are also at the heart of the energy–trade–climate nexus, but progress has been slow within the international trade regime. This is unlike other international organizations or networks, where progress has been more substantial. This article investigates the lack of legitimacy to regulate or coordinate pricing reform and links it to fundamentally divergent interests between fuel producers and importers. The article discusses the regulatory and coordinative potential of the World Trade Organization and preferential trade agreements. It finds that at the World Trade Organization, the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, case law, Ricardian theory, and negotiation history all preempt the consideration of most pricing policies as subsidies. As a result, subsidy notification within the World Trade Organization is low and while other options for improving transparency via the Committee on Trade and Environment and Trade Policy Review Mechanism have been suggested, not much has actually happened because producers protect their comparative advantage. Therefore, support for fuel pricing reform remains on a general level via Ministerial Statements or through general provisions in preferential trade agreements that reconfirm the G-20 and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation commitments to fuel subsidy reform. The only real advancement has been made within bilateral trade negotiations where heavyweights such as the European Union can push trading partners to abandon dual pricing policies.

This article contributes to the analysis of the effects of globalisation on Africa's economy, on the basis of discussions of emerging trends in the industrial organisation of present‐day capitalism, and in the nature of the international trade regime emerging from the Uruguay Round. On this basis, recent and current developments in the Africa clothing and horticulture sectors are described. The paper argues that certain aspects of the current international trade regime provide scope for Africa to play a heightened role in the global economy in the these two sectors. However, the emergence of the global 'contract manufacturing' phenomenon, and the institutionalisation of process‐based food safety standards, implies that the main winners in this scenario will be large‐scale transnational enterprises.

AbstractThe global economy is experiencing the digitalization of production, exchange, and consumption of goods and services. The internet and cross-border data flows are becoming important channels of trade as more products are traded through the web or integrate features that rely on digital connectivity. Reflecting the autonomy states have to enact such policies, national variations in internet governance have expanded over the previous decade, with states increasingly looking to use internet and data policies for economic and trade objectives. These dynamics are having important implications on the international trade regime through challenging existing trade rules and creating demands for new rules. This has resulted in growing debates in the trade arena around "digital trade," as a number of states, led by the United States, push for rules as a way to discipline national internet policies and support trade in digital goods and services. This paper examines the political economy of this campaign. We argue that the objectives of this campaign go beyond updating rules to better fit the "Internet age" into achieving further liberalization of trade in goods and services. We highlight the technological contingency of existing international rules and show how technological shifts have been a driver of competitive regime creation and forum shifting contributing to processes of fragmentation of the international trade regime.

Regional economic organizations such as the European Union (EU) & the World Trade Organization (WTO) have significantly affected the international trade regime. Of particular note is France's influence over the EU with respect to the agriculture trade discussion of the Uruguay Round. France, as a middle power, gained significant bargaining ability by attracting other lesser powers within the EU to its cause. Power sharing of this type has worked to transform the international trade regime. The current international system is now distinguished by its multilateral & multipolar nature. Forced liberalism has resulted in cooperation & stability. As a result of these changes in international trade, a paradigm shift in international relations is essential. K. A. Larsen