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This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record ; We develop a new theoretical framework of trade agreement (TA) formation, called a 'parallel contest', that emphasizes the political fight over TA ratification within countries. TA ratification is inherently uncertain in each country, where anti- and pro-trade interest groups contest each other to influence their own governments' ratification decision. Unlike prior literature, the protection embodied in negotiated TA tariffs reflects a balance between the liberalizing force of lobbying and inherently protectionist government preferences. Moreover, new international political externalities emerge that are not internalized by governments that just internalize terms of trade externalities.

We develop a new theoretical framework of trade agreement (TA) formation, called a 'parallel contest', that emphasizes the political fight over TA ratification within countries. TA ratification is inherently uncertain in each country, where anti- and pro-trade interest groups contest each other to influence their own governments' ratification decision. Unlike prior literature, the protection embodied in negotiated TA tariffs reflects a balance between the liberalizing force of lobbying and inherently protectionist government preferences. Moreover, new international political externalities emerge that are not internalized by governments that just internalize terms of trade externalities.

Abstract
New international agreements often recycle language from previous agreements, using boilerplate solutions alongside customized provisions. The presence of boilerplate in international agreements has important implications for understanding how international rules are made. The determinants behind boilerplate in international agreements have not previously been systematically evaluated. Using original data from a sample of 348 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) adopted between 1989 and 2009, we combine novel text analysis measures with Latent Order Logistic (LOLOG) graph network techniques to assess the determinants behind boilerplate in labor and environmental provisions commonly found in PTAs. Our results indicate that whereas boilerplate can be used for both efficiency and distributive purposes, international boilerplate is used primarily for efficiency gains and power-distribution considerations are not systematically important.

"The book Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements is a selection of published articles examining how policy externalities motivate and can be addressed by international trading institutions. The studies provide groundbreaking evidence of the role of international market power and policy uncertainty as motives for trade agreements and on the potential clash between preferential trade liberalization (e.g. European Union, NAFTA) and multilateral agreements (WTO). The studies presented in this book not only identify and estimate how different policies interact with each other and across agreements, but also examine how international trading institutions can be used to limit redistribution towards special interest groups and enforce better cooperation across issues, such as labor and the environment, and between developing and developed countries."--

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Lessons from History -- 2. The Risk of Breakdown in the International Trade System -- 3. Modem Trade Agreements: The GATT Regime -- 4. Negotiating Trade Agreements: The Uruguay Round -- 5. The International Trade System of the 1990s -- Bibliography -- Index

In this article, we first describe the characteristics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that are the basis of the framework of the multilateral trading system. We then provide an overview of concepts of fairness in trade agreements. Thereafter, we offer a critique of the efficiency criterion in assessing multilateral trade agreements, taking issue with T.N. Srinivasan's (2006) analysis and then elaborate on our conception of fairness as reflected in agreements covering market access. We also address considerations of distributive justice, in contrast with Srinivasan's contention that distributive justice has no role to play in the design and negotiation of multilateral trade agreements. Finally, we question bilateral trade agreements from the standpoint of fairness, drawing on the example of the U.S. bilateral FTA negotiated in 2005 with Central America and the Dominican Republic.