Suchergebnisse

Z uporabo socialno-konstruktivističnega koncepta preteklosti, kot ga je uvedel Maurice Halbwachs (Assmann, 2008, str. 55) in spojem politične znanosti ter kulturno-spominskih študij, se moje delo osredotoča na interdiscplinarno raziskovanje nostalgije. Disertacija tako konceptualizira nostalgijo kot enega izmed izrazov spornosti, na podlagi ovrednotenja pomena čustev (Nussbaum, 2013 ; Hassner, 2015) v političnem polju in priznavanja vzpona politik spornega (Tilly, 2006 ; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001 ; Tilly, 2008) v svetu, kjer uradni spominski diskurzi konstruirajo in rekonstruirajo zgodovino. Zanimanje za zgodovino obdobja socialistične Jugoslavije se je v zadnjem desetletju povečalo. To zanimanje, še posebno vsaka pozitivna refleksija o jugoslovanski izkušnji, je bila nemudoma označena za jugonostalgijo ; to vsezajemajočo frazo za vsakršno nenegativno sklicevanje na Jugoslavijo. Ob razpadu države je tisto, kar je bilo nekdaj hegemona socialistična spominska pripoved Jugoslavije, zamenjana z novo "demokratično", postsocialistično in antijugoslovansko spominsko pripovedjo: revizionističnim mainstream javnim diskurzom. S koncem drugega desetletja 21. stoletja v (post)jugoslovanskem prostoru, znotraj generacije zadnjih pionirjev, postane spominjanje se Jugoslavije subverzivno ter jugonostalgija izvor kognitivne disonance2 postsocialističnih subjektov. Na osnovah razumevanja jugonostalgije kot večsmerne (post)jugoslovanske pripovedi v iskanju prihodnosti skozi preteklost, sem glavno raziskovalno vprašanje oblikovala takole: Kaj pomeni jugonostalgija politično aktivnim zadnjim pionirjem in v kakšnem odnosu je z njihovimi političnimi identitetami? Moj glavni predmet raziskave so pripovedi generacije zadnjih pionirjev (rojenih med letoma 1974 in 1982) v treh (post)jugoslovanskih državah: Sloveniji, Hrvaški in Srbiji. Začenši s temo mojega zanimanja – jugonostalgija politično aktivnih zadnjih pionirjev – sem se poglobila v zbiranje podatkov, skozi politično etnografijo, intervjuje in opazovanja z udeležbo. Z namenskim vzorčenjem sem tekom leta 2017 in leta 2018 intervjuvala 62 političnih akterjev, upoštevajoč naslednje parametre: razumevanje koncepta "političnega aktivizma" čimbolj široko in razumljivo, ob čemer sem ga opredelila kot udejstvovanje pri konkretnih aktivnostih znotraj organizirane skupine za obdobje 6-ih mesecev oz. dlje. Obenem sem se izogibala metodološkemu nacionalizmu (Wimmer & Schiller, 2003), ki trdi, da so nacionalne države edine enote analize in naravne oblike skupnosti. Ne glede na to, sem s podatkovno analizo v okviru pristopa Constructivist Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2014) upoštevala specifične kontekste držav, ko so rezultati pokazali na divergenco, s tem, da sem omogočila oris konvergenčnih rezultatov, po generacijski in politični črti. Spomini na otroštvo zadnjih pionirjev so bili izhodišče za analizo, na podlagi katerih razkrijemo, kaj zanje pomeni biti otrok socializma. Očitno politično bolj socializirani znotraj 2 Kognitivne disonance je prvič konceptualiziral ameriški psiholog Leon Festinger (1957), ko je opisal situacijo, v kateri se soočamo s protislovnimi stališči, prepričanji in vedenji – v naših poskusih doseganja skladnosti vpeljujemo različne strategije za zmanjšanje mentalnega neugodja, ki se pojavi s spreminjanjem nekaterih od teh stališč, prepričanj in vedenj, njihovih družin kot znotraj šol, zadnji pionirji razumejo koncept jugoslovanske družine veliko bolj širše od "mešanega" zakona, ki ne zajema zgolj etnonacionalne raznolikosti, bodisi znotraj nuklearne ali razširjene družine, temveč tudi religiozne in politične raznolikosti ter družbene mobilnosti. Za desničarske intervjuvance je lastna politična socializacija bolj očitno povezana z dediščino staršev – vključno z zavedanjem o posameznikovi etnonacionalni pripadnosti. Razen teh nekaj primerov, se intervjuvanci ne spominjajo niti lastnega zavedanja etnonacionalnosti, niti medetničnih napetosti med skupnostmi. Zadnji pionirji, poleg tega, da soglasno priklicujejo spomine srečnega otroštva, kot največjo vrednoto izpostavljajo tudi raznolikost in bogastvo izkušenj, skupin in skupnosti, s katerimi simbolizirajo varno okolje možnosti in obilja, ki ni zgolj osredotočeno na potrošništvo. Koncept normalnega življenja je obarvan z idejo invero v napredek in varnost, ki jo zagotavlja funkcionalnost države. Razpad države zadnje pionirje sooči z občutkom nenadne izgube, kar vodi v nepredvidljivo zarezo v njihovih življenjih in vseobsegajoč trop, ki se pojavlja v vseh pričevanjih. Počasi se pojavljajo pripovedi o medetničnih odnosih ; diskriminacija zoper predpisane etnonacionalne skupnosti ali vsled političnim zvezam z JLA (Jugoslovansko ljudsko armado) postane resnična, še posebno v šolah. Skupne spomine v vseh treh državah zaznamuje odhajanje: intervjuvanci v številnih primerih zapuščajo svoje domove in postajajo begunci. Vojna travma je prinesla zmedo in poskuse »ovinkarjenja« intervjuvancev, da bi razumeli identitetne premike, pogosto z družinskimi prepiri, razdeljenimi družinami in načetimi prijateljstvi. Živo se spominjajo nove normalnosti nasilja, ki zaznamuje spomine v devetdesetih letih, pri čemer razlika med konteksti znotraj treh držav pridobiva na pomenu. Spomini na desetletje v Sloveniji se nanašajo na preostale jugoslovanske vojne, na Hrvaškem se poistovetijo z vojno ; v Srbiji se celotno desetletje iz devetdesetih označuje z vojnami ter političnim in ekonomskim propadom obeh držav ; s hkratnim minimaliziranjem travmatičnih izkušenj s trditvami, kot da 'ni bilo tako slabo'. Skozi razpravo o razpadu in vojnah so zadnji pionirji bolj naklonjeni temu, da se držijo revizionističnih hegemonih diskurzov. Ko premišljujejo o ideologijah sprave in rehabilitacije, ki jih vodijo mainstream diskurzi, zadnji pionirji prepoznavajo potrebo po dialogu in debati, a obenem zahtevajo uravnoteženo razpravo, ki ne bi vodila niti k revizionizmu niti k banalni nostalgiji, kot jo razumejo sami. Za generacijo zadnjih pionirjev so bili etnonacionalizmi in vojna vsiljeni od zgoraj navzdol s strani političnih elit, omogočale pa so jih številne vrste faktorjev, vključno s svetovnimi okoliščinami, kot so padec komunizma in interesi zunanjih sil v regiji. S priznavanjem novih politik spomina, ki so bile uvedene z etnonacionalizmi, zadnji pionirji ubirajo dve poti. Prva se nanaša na, razrešitev kognitivnih disonanc in ambivalentnosti skozi pripovedi o singularnosti – njihove izkušnje kot izjemne, posebne in edinstvene. Druga pot pa sledi priznavanju politično strateške in instrumentalizirane uporabe izraza jugonostalgija. Naposled zadnji pionirji (re)konstruirajo jugoslovanski prostor, ki ga še naprej doživljajo kot njihov (edini) dom, z Jadranskim morjem kot najprepoznavnejšim simbolom. Vendar je občutek doma močno vpet v jezikovno bližino, pri čemer se Kosovo večinoma pojavlja zunaj njihovega občutka doma. Brez dvomov o kulturnih ali ekonomskih aspektih (post)jugoslovanskega prostora, si skupno dojemanje negativne sedanjosti in posledic tranzicije delijo vse tri države vzdolž političnega spektra, četudi se med sredinskimi in desničarskimi političnimi akterji nekatere razlage naslanjajo na koncepte balkanizma in antikomunizma. Medtem ko se jugonostalgija dojema hkrati kot tista, ki ustvarja in zavira ustvarjalnost v sedanjih političnih bojih, se jugoslovanstvo razume kot pomemben element pri (ponovnem) zamišljanju političnega prostora današnjega sveta – brez zadržkov pri priznavanju njegovih prostorskih in kulturnih elementov. Jugonostalgija zadnjih pionirjev predvsem služi namenu upora zoper vsiljene diskontinuitete, s tem, ko postaja kolektiven in politični fenomen ; pionirjem generacijsko spreminja lokacijo ter novim levičarskim gibanjem in političnim strankam ustvarja politični potencial. Vzpon levičarskih gibanj širom (post)jugoslovanskega prostora in njihovega okrepljenega sodelovanja je vpeto v raziskovalno refleksijo tega, kar 'je enkrat bilo', z namenom vzpostavljanja nove politične ideje tistemu, kar 'bi enkrat lahko zopet postalo'. Rehabilitacija socialističnega ideološkega pozicioniranja se pogosto znajde vzporedno s skoraj avtomatičnim zanikanjem jugonostalgičnih pogledov, hkratnem repolitiziranju nostalgije, ter obenem tudi z emancipacijo odnosa do ideološke dediščine Zahoda ter s sprejemanjem jugoslovanske. Kljub vsemu nostalgija oblikuje generacijske skupnosti, ki se preoblikujejo v politične generacije ; s preoblikovanjem spomina za jugoslovanski namen v spomin z (post)jugoslovanskim namenom (Rigney, 2016) ter povratkom ideje o napredku in upanju v politično polje (post)Jugoslavije. Ker desničarske in sredinske politične izbire ostajajo vpete v koncepte nacionalnih držav in etnonacionalnistične vizije sveta, se novo levičarsko pozicioniranje obrača v smeri jugoslovanskih internacionalističnih refleksij. Z razumevanjem generacije kot ključne spremenljivke sem ugotovila, da generacija zadnjih pionirjev deli občutek za skupno razumevanje generacije in s tem prikazuje obstoječo skupno zavest v vseh treh državah ter kaže svoj večji vpliv na spominske pripovedi kot na politično pozicioniranje. Pripovedi o izgubljeni generaciji in skupen občutek nemoči, v preteklosti in sedanjosti, se pojavljajo v vseh mojih intervjujih. Intervjuvanci se jasno razmejujejo od generacije svojih staršev, za katere verjamejo, da so jim bila dana najboljša leta jugoslovanske preteklosti, ter od svojih otrok, za katere verjamejo, da ne delijo istih jugoslovanskih vrednot. V prostorskem smislu verjamejo, da njihova generacija vsekakor obstaja onkraj meja novonastalih nacionalnih držav, kar predstavlja še vedno obstoječi (post)jugoslovanski prostor. V danih prelomih med osebnimi spomini in mainstream spominskimi politikami se politično premika v (neslutene) prostore vsakdanjega življenja, kulturne nezavezanosti, intimnih prijateljstev in odnosov. S prikazom moči politične socializacije znotraj družin vsled izkušnjam vojne in vsakodnevnih izkušenj onkraj meja nacionalnih držav in etnonacionalnih skupnosti, pričujoča disertacija pomaga nadalje razumeti pomen vplivov na naše spominske pripovedi in našo politično pozicioniranje znotraj sprtih regij in zgodovin. Disertacija brez dokončne definicije jugonostalgije pokaže, kako instrumentalnost omenjenega termina in njegova uporaba v diskurzivnih strategijah zakriva jugoslovansko preteklost in kakršnokoli jugoslovansko prihodnost, posebno z ozirom na levičarske ideologije. Jugonostalgične spominske pripovedi zadnjih pionirjev zahtevajo identitetno kontinuiteto ter preoblikovanje heterogene skupnosti v zopet zamišljene, pri čemer sočasno iščejo lastno resnico o razpadu Jugoslavije. Politično produktivne kategorije se kažejo skozi različne aktivnosti – prenos osnovnih vrednot na posameznikove otroke predstavlja element aktivnega političnega življenja ; prav tako z vzpostavitvijo mrež sodelovanja med političnimi strankami v Sloveniji, na Hrvaškem in v Srbiji, ki temeljijo na ideološki orientiranosti tozadevnih strank in gibanj in ne na osnovi etnonacionalnih skupnosti. Ti novi solidarnostni kanali predstavljajo pomembno politično intervencijo v (post)jugoslovanskem svetu. Še en pomemben element aktivizma se pojavlja v nasprotovanju hegemonim diskurzom skozi obeleževanja dogodkov ali z javnimi diskurzi političnih akterjev. Pričujoča disertacija pokaže, kako neuspešen je vsak poskus kategorizacije nostalgije ; ne zato, ker se izogne našim zmožnostim, da bi razumeli multitude pomenskih slojev in pomene, ki jih vsebuje, temveč zato, ker se trudimo zanikati njen politični značaj. Ravno skozi politično subjektiviteto nostalgika oz. nostalgičarke, ki s svojimi vsebinami obarva nostalgijo, lahko prepoznamo naravo le-te. Namesto, da zavržemo nostalgijo kot apolitično, jo je potrebno repolitizirati ter s tem razširiti naše lastno razumevanje političnega polja v 21. stoletju. (Post)jugoslovanske spominske pripovedi zadnjih pionirjev nam dajejo vpogled v nove in še neraziskane politične imaginarije (post)jugoslovanskega prostora, ki bi jih lahko povzeli kot »Brez države, brez nacije – en prostor, ena identiteta«. ; Embracing the social-constructivist concept of the past, as introduced by Maurice Halbwachs (Assmann, 2008, p. 55), my research takes an interdisciplinary approach to nostalgia, bringing together political science and cultural memory studies. Valuing the importance of emotions (Nussbaum, 2013 ; Hassner, 2015) in the political field and acknowledging the ascent of contentious politics (Tilly, 2006 ; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001 ; Tilly, 2008), in a world where official memory discourses are constructing and reconstructing history, this thesis conceptualizes nostalgia as another contentious expression. The last decade has seen an increase in interest in the history of the socialist period in Yugoslavia. This interest in Yugoslavia and in particular, any positive reflection on the Yugoslav experience, was immediately marked as Yugonostalgia: a catch all phrase for any non negative reference to Yugoslavia. With the dissolution of the country, what was once the hegemonic socialist Yugoslav memory narrative was replaced with a new "democratic" post-socialist anti-Yugoslav memory narrative: the revisionist mainstream public discourse. In the (post)Yugoslav space, within the generation of the last pioneers, reminiscing about Yugoslavia became viewed as subversive, and Yugonostalgia as a refuge for post-socialist subjects' cognitive dissonances.1 Understanding Yugonostalgia as a multidirectional (post)Yugoslav narrative searching for the future through the past the main research question is as follows: What does Yugonostalgia mean for politically active last pioneers and how does it dialogue with their political identities? My primary object of research are the narratives of the generation of the last pioneers (born between 1974 and 1982), in three (post)Yugoslav countries: Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. Starting with a topic of interest – Yugonostalgia of politically active last pioneers – I dived into the data collection, through political ethnography, interviews and participant observation. Through purposive snowball sampling, over the course of 2017 and 2018, I interviewed 62 political actors within the following parameters: understanding "political activism" as wide and comprehensive as possible, whilst drawing a line at taking part in concrete activities within an organized group for 6 months or longer. Methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller, 2003), which asserts that nation-states are the only units of analysis and a natural form of community, was avoided. Nevertheless, data analysis within the Constructivist Grounded Theory approach (Charmaz, 2014) took into account the specific country context whenever results showed divergences, while allowing us to outline the convergences, along generational and the political lines. Departing from the analysis of the childhood memories of the last pioneers, we unravel what it means for them to be children of socialism. Apparently more politically socialized within their families than within schools, the last pioneers depict a concept of a Yugoslav family, understood in a much larger sense than the "mixed" marriage: encompassing not only the ethno-national diversity, within both nuclear and larger families, but also religious and political diversity, and social mobility. For the right-wing interviewees, their political 1 Cognitive dissonances were first conceptualized by Leon Festinger (1957), an American psychologist, describing a situation when we face contradicting attitudes, beliefs and behaviors – in our attempts to achieve consistency we implement various strategies to lower the mental discomfort that appears through altering some of those attitudes, beliefs and behaviors, socialization is always evidently linked with their paternal heritage, including the awareness of one's ethno-nationality. Other than afew examples, the interviewees have recollection of neither their own awareness of ethno-nationality nor any interethnic tensions between the communities. Their childhood memories, besides being unanimously depicted as happy childhoods, paint the diversity and the richness of various experiences, groups and communities as the biggest value ; symbolizing a secure environment, providing possibilities and abundance, not solely focused on consumption. The concept of 'a normal life' is colored by the idea and the faith in progress and security, provided by the functionality of the state. The dissolution of the country confronts the last pioneers with a sense of a sudden loss, leading into the unforeseen overnight rupture of their lives, an overarching trope appearing in all narratives. The narratives on the interethnic relations slowly appear. Discrimination against assigned ethno-national communities or parents' professional association with JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) becomes a reality, most notably in schools. Shared memories in all three countries are marked by everybody leaving and, in a number of cases, with the interviewees leaving their homes and becoming refugees. The war trauma brought confusion and meandering attempts by the interviewees to understand these identitarian shifts, often within family quarrels, familial divisions and disrupted friendships. A new normality of violence is recalled vividly, marking the memory on the 1990s. The difference in contexts within the three countries gains traction. As memories of the decade in Slovenia refer to the rest of the Yugoslav wars, for Croatia they are identified with the war and, in Serbia, the whole decade of the 1990s is a marker for wars and the political and economic destruction of the country. Still, all the interviewees were minimizing the traumatic experiences through assertions that, 'it was not that bad'. Discussing the dissolution and the wars, the last pioneers become more prone to adhering to the revisionist hegemonic discourses. Reflecting upon the reconciliation and rehabilitation mainstream discourses, the last pioneers recognize the need for dialogue and debate but also demand a balanced discussion, which avoids both revisionism and banal nostalgia, as they understand it. For the generation of the last pioneers, ethno-nationalisms and the war were imposed top-down by the then political elites and made possible by a large number of various factors, including the global circumstances of the fall of communism and foreign powers' interests in the region. Acknowledging the new memory politics that were introduced with ethno-nationalisms, the last pioneers take upon two paths: first, resolution of cognitive dissonances and ambivalences through the narratives of singularity, with understanding their experience as exceptional, particular and unique ; second, recognizing the political strategic and instrumental use of the term Yugonostalgia. Finally, the last pioneers (re)construct the Yugoslav space, which they continue to feel as their (only) home with the Adriatic Sea being its most prominent symbol. Yet, the feeling of home is largely embedded in the linguistic proximity, leaving Kosovo mostly outside. Without questioning the cultural and economic aspects of the (post)Yugoslav space, a shared perception of the negative present and the consequences of transition transpires in the three countries and across the political spectrum, even if among the center and right-wing political actors some of the explanations relay on the concepts of Balkanism and anticommunism. While Yugonostalgia is perceived as equally producing and obstructing creativity in the present political struggles, Yugoslavism is understood as an important element of the re-imagining of the political space in today's world - acknowledging without hesitation its spatial and cultural elements. Yugonostalgia of the last pioneers primarily serves the purpose of resisting the imposed discontinuity, becoming a collective and a political phenomenon. Generationally changing the location, it finds itself engendering the political potential notably for the new left-wing movements and political parties. The rise of the left-wing movements throughout the (post)Yugoslav space, and their enhanced cooperation, is embedded in investigative reflection into how 'it was once' in order to establish the new political ideas for how it 'can be once again'. Rehabilitation of the socialist ideological positioning often finds itself in parallel with the almost automatic denial of Yugonostalgic views, simultaneously repoliticizing nostalgia, whilst also emancipating from the Western ideological heritage through embracing the Yugoslav one. Nostalgia forges generational communities who are transforming into political generations, transforming the memory of the Yugoslav cause into a memory with a (post)Yugoslav cause (Rigney, 2016), bringing back the idea of progress and hope into the political field of (post)Yugoslavia. As the right-wing and center political choices remain embedded in the concepts of nation-states and ethno-national vision of the world, the new left-wing positionalities turn to internationalist Yugoslav reflections. Understanding generation as a key variable, I have established that the generation of the last pioneers shares a sense of a generation, displaying an existing shared consciousness in all three countries and showing stronger influence on memory narratives than political positionality. The narratives of a lost generation, and the shared sentiment of helplessness in the past and in the present appear in all of my interviews. They clearly delineate themselves from the generation of their parents, for whom they believe that they were given the best years of the Yugoslav past, and their children, whom they believe, do not share the same Yugoslav values. In spatial terms, they believe their generation indeed exists beyond the borders of the newly created nation-states, representing the still existing (post)Yugoslav space. Given the fractures between personal memories and mainstream memory politics, the political shifts into (unsuspected) places of everyday life, cultural attachments, intimate friendships and relationships. Showing the strength of political socialization within families over the experience of war and, further on, the strength of the everyday experience across the borders of new nation-states and ethno-national communities through stable emotional networks and connections, within and outside the families – friend or professional networks and traveling. This thesis helps further understand the important influences on our memory narratives and our political positionality within contentious regions and histories ; without providing a final definition of Yugonostalgia, this thesis shows the instrumentality of the term and its use as a discursive strategy for obscuring the Yugoslav past and any Yugoslav future, especially regarding left-wing ideologies. The Yugonostalgic memory narratives of the last pioneers demand an identitarian continuity and make the heterogeneous communities again imaginable, while searching for their own truth about the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Politically productive categories manifest through numerous activities: transmission of basic values to one's children as much asthrough establishment of cooperation networks between political parties in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, based on the ideological orientation of the parties and movements in question, rather than on the basis of ethno-national communities. These new solidarity channels represent an important political intervention in the (post)Yugoslav world. Another important element of activism appears as opposition to the hegemonic discourses through commemoration events or the public discourses of the political actors. The thesis shows how any attempt to categorize nostalgia fails ; and not because it evades our capacity to understand the multitude of layers and meanings it comprehends, but because we try to deny its political character. It is precisely through the political subjectivity of the nostalgic, who colors his/her nostalgia by its contents, that we can identify the nature of nostalgia. Instead of discarding nostalgia as apolitical, we need to reinstate it as the political and thus expand our own understanding of the political field in the 21st century. The (post)Yugoslav memory narratives of the last pioneers give us an insight into new and unexplored political imaginaries of the (post)Yugoslav space that could be summarized as "No state, no nation – one space, one identity" and the future possibilities of the left-wing imaginaries.

The present article analyzes the value patterns of the current legal system in Lithuania. The legal system here is described as a broader definition than that of the system of law. The legal system is understood as a social formation of the legal environment which represents the unity of the legal consciousness, system of law and legal practice of any social group. Law is one of the most important ways in which modern civic societies function. On the one hand, society's legal system is an instrument of social politics through which decisions are exercised and their consequences are evaluated. On the other hand, social processes have a direct impact on the changes within the legal system itself. The current legal system in Lithuania does not live up to the ideals of the emerging civic society. This has been conditioned by the behavioral models which have started appearing during the transition from totalitarianism to democracy and which have not conformed to the society's expectations of social justice. An aggressive implementation of these models has brought Lithuanian society to a moral crisis. The analysis of this process has shown that to protect their interests, government elites have been consistently making use of legal nihilism and the breaches in the system of law. The power of the non-transparent agreements between political and business groups has become a significant phenomenon in shaping a negative legal environment. factors of the social disorganization in Lithuania.

The present article analyzes the value patterns of the current legal system in Lithuania. The legal system here is described as a broader definition than that of the system of law. The legal system is understood as a social formation of the legal environment which represents the unity of the legal consciousness, system of law and legal practice of any social group. Law is one of the most important ways in which modern civic societies function. On the one hand, society's legal system is an instrument of social politics through which decisions are exercised and their consequences are evaluated. On the other hand, social processes have a direct impact on the changes within the legal system itself. The current legal system in Lithuania does not live up to the ideals of the emerging civic society. This has been conditioned by the behavioral models which have started appearing during the transition from totalitarianism to democracy and which have not conformed to the society's expectations of social justice. An aggressive implementation of these models has brought Lithuanian society to a moral crisis. The analysis of this process has shown that to protect their interests, government elites have been consistently making use of legal nihilism and the breaches in the system of law. The power of the non-transparent agreements between political and business groups has become a significant phenomenon in shaping a negative legal environment. factors of the social disorganization in Lithuania.

In the theoretical literature on tolerance a distinction is proposed between coexistence and respect tolerance. In three studies with four national samples of Dutch majority members, we demonstrate that these two forms of tolerance can be distinguished empirically in relation to different immigrant target groups. The findings of all studies further show that the more principled respect tolerance was negatively associated with prejudice towards immigrants, and positively associated with the acceptance of concrete minority practices, above and beyond prejudice. However, the positive association between respect tolerance and acceptance of practices was weaker for people who were more strongly concerned about the continuity of their national cultural identity. Overall, the more pragmatic coexistence tolerance was found to have no independent association with prejudicial feelings and with the acceptance of minority practices. The findings indicate that stimulating respect tolerance might be particularly helpful for improving intergroup relations in culturally diverse societies.

The starting year of what the WHO declared the "Decade of Healthy Ageing" is also the year that because of the spread of Covid19 is highlighting part of the vulnerabilities of the elderly. Therefore, at a time when the protection of the elderly is drawn to attention, it is inevitable to turn our gaze to those digital innovations that exist in support of the elderly. The thesis, in fact, aims to give an overview of the phenomenon of aging and above all to show examples of digital innovations that allow to transform what appears more and more as a challenge for governments in healthy and active aging opportunities. Fully aware of the breadth and complexity of the topic, the thesis aims to explore some of the challenges that the application of ICT entails, including the adaptability of digital tools to the cognitive schemes of the elderly.

The starting year of what the WHO declared the "Decade of Healthy Ageing" is also the year that because of the spread of Covid19 is highlighting part of the vulnerabilities of the elderly. Therefore, at a time when the protection of the elderly is drawn to attention, it is inevitable to turn our gaze to those digital innovations that exist in support of the elderly. The thesis, in fact, aims to give an overview of the phenomenon of aging and above all to show examples of digital innovations that allow to transform what appears more and more as a challenge for governments in healthy and active aging opportunities. Fully aware of the breadth and complexity of the topic, the thesis aims to explore some of the challenges that the application of ICT entails, including the adaptability of digital tools to the cognitive schemes of the elderly.

Along with a number of other countries, particularly those in southern Europe, Italy has only been a receiving country for international immigration for about 25 years. Italy itself has a long tradition of emigration and it is estimated that there are currently about 60 million Italian emigrants all over the world. In Italian Law, the concept of "immigrant" first appeared as recently as 1986. Previously there was only the general juridical type of the "foreigner", whose residence within the national boundaries was governed by public security law. In the Italian public discourse, up to the end of the 1980s, "immigrants" were internal migrants from less developed southern regions ("Mezzogiorno") who moved towards the more dynamic areas of Northern Italy, a huge phenomenon throughout the twentieth century, and particularly intense in the "golden period" of the industrial development (from the 1950s and the first half of the 1970s): initially migration was mainly towards the so called "industrial triangle" (Milan-Turin-Genoa), afterwards it was also towards the central and north-eastern regions, characterized by the growth of small companies and industrial districts. Based on a historical analysis, we know that today's aversions and oppositions towards foreign immigrants were directed to migrants from the south of Italy in the past. However, in those times immigration was not a central issue in the political debate, essentially because the internal migrants were citizens and voters and they might be employed as civil servants. The phenomenon of international migration has therefore developed in a national context characterized by certain aspects that should be taken into account throughout the analysis.

This paper analyzes Peter Berger's theory of secularization, its main arguments and recent developments in general described as the theory of desecularization. The first part of the text examines Berger's theory of religion as the sacred canopy and secularization as the process in which religious symbols and institutions loose their dominance in the contemporary society. The second part focuses on the recent developments in Berger's theory of secularization which is usually described as the theory of desecularization, its main arguments and factors. The third part presents arguments of main critique (Steve Bruce) and supporters (Grace Davie, Danièle Hervieu-Leger) of recent developments within Berger's theory of secularization. The paper ends with the generalizing insights into Berger's secularization and desecularization theories and their application for contemporary societies. The author concludes that desecularization theory should be tested within the societies of the new member states of the European Union; she also emphasizes that Berger's classical distinction between objective and subjective secularization remains useful tool for the analysis of religion in contemporary society.

This paper analyzes Peter Berger's theory of secularization, its main arguments and recent developments in general described as the theory of desecularization. The first part of the text examines Berger's theory of religion as the sacred canopy and secularization as the process in which religious symbols and institutions loose their dominance in the contemporary society. The second part focuses on the recent developments in Berger's theory of secularization which is usually described as the theory of desecularization, its main arguments and factors. The third part presents arguments of main critique (Steve Bruce) and supporters (Grace Davie, Danièle Hervieu-Leger) of recent developments within Berger's theory of secularization. The paper ends with the generalizing insights into Berger's secularization and desecularization theories and their application for contemporary societies. The author concludes that desecularization theory should be tested within the societies of the new member states of the European Union; she also emphasizes that Berger's classical distinction between objective and subjective secularization remains useful tool for the analysis of religion in contemporary society.

This paper analyzes Peter Berger's theory of secularization, its main arguments and recent developments in general described as the theory of desecularization. The first part of the text examines Berger's theory of religion as the sacred canopy and secularization as the process in which religious symbols and institutions loose their dominance in the contemporary society. The second part focuses on the recent developments in Berger's theory of secularization which is usually described as the theory of desecularization, its main arguments and factors. The third part presents arguments of main critique (Steve Bruce) and supporters (Grace Davie, Danièle Hervieu-Leger) of recent developments within Berger's theory of secularization. The paper ends with the generalizing insights into Berger's secularization and desecularization theories and their application for contemporary societies. The author concludes that desecularization theory should be tested within the societies of the new member states of the European Union; she also emphasizes that Berger's classical distinction between objective and subjective secularization remains useful tool for the analysis of religion in contemporary society.