Suchergebnisse

Individuals with disabilities experience inequities in access to health care, education, employment, and social inclusion. Causes for Change International (CCI), a non-governmental Organization (NGO), using a community-based rehabilitation approach has worked for 20 years to build self-sufficiency, improve health-care services, and education for women, children, and persons with disabilities in Ecuador. CCI initially addressed health; advocacy for individuals with disabilities; and promoted educational opportunities for children with disabilities, starting in one rural community. CCI's outreach has expanded through Ecuador's coastal provinces, Andean provinces, and Galapagos Islands. CCI also focused on local health-care workforce development, developing employment skills for individuals with disabilities and social inclusion for this population. CCI collaborated with local organizations, government, and universities to provide resources, managed by local leadership. Key program elements of the CCI approach include (1) develop trust between CCI, local communities, local agencies, and government; (2) empower local groups to assume leadership and sustain programs; (3) support communities and groups invested in developing self-sufficiency; and (4) strengthen collaborations and partnerships between local and international organizations, universities, and government agencies. Key lessons learned by CCI are to be supportive of cultural differences; understand that limited financial and material resources may limit the program development; recognize that it is difficult not to foster dependent relationships with communities and appreciate the importance of working with and within the host country's governmental systems. CCI is expanding its service base to other regions of Ecuador and is focusing on development of the Ecuadorian health-care workforce and social inclusion opportunities for individuals with disability. The efforts of a small NGO have helped build community self-sufficiency in meeting the health care and ...

The objective of this paper is to draw attention to the conditions that Croatia needs to meet in the area of higher education on the route towards European Union (EU) accession. Although higher education is not one of the priority sectors Croatia should work upon in order to meet the provisions of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), it is very clear that the harmonisation of Croatian legislation with European standards in the area of higher education will be one of the mainstays of social development and then of genuine accession to the EU. The main means for the unification and reform of tertiary education in Europe is the Bologna Process. Just recently, through the nominal accession to the Bologna Process, Croatia has started to become
aware of the imperatives that the EU has set all accession countries and potential accession countries. However, Croatia also has additional problems, inherited from the tradition, which should be settled before it begins to address those related to joining the European higher education area. We shall first give a brief account of the situation in Europe and outline the requirements of the Bologna Declaration. Then we shall compare the situation in Croatia and the accession countries with respect to the parameters that are tracked in the integration process, and highlight just a few problems that derive from the tradition and that take on increasing salience in the process of harmonisation with the Bologna Declaration. Lastly, we shall put forward some recommendations.

The European national governments have delegated a series of competencies to a central agency called the European Commission. Among them, two are considered in this paper: research policy and regional development. However, delegating those competencies to a central agency does not prevent the national governments to still be active in those fields. Here, we model and discuss how the level of commitment of a central authority toward poor regions affects the design of the best decision process. We explore cases of full centralization and full decentralization, and situations where the two levels of government are allowed to take decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially. In that latter case we make a distinction between a situation where the central agency decides first like in most federations, and a situation where it decides second, then being an agent of the national governments, a setting especially relevant for the European Union. We show in particular that, when the degree of commitment of the centre is high, assignment of redistributive competencies to both levels of power is a better proxy for centralization than decentralization. Additionally, the poorer region may find its best interest in an institutional design where regions decide first. JEL: H41, H77, I20

The European national governments have delegated a series of competencies to a central agency called the European Commission. Among them, two are considered in this paper: research policy and regional development. However, delegating those competencies to a central agency does not prevent the national governments to still be active in those fields. Here, we model and discuss how the level of commitment of a central authority toward poor regions affects the design of the best decision process. We explore cases of full centralization and full decentralization, and situations where the two levels of government are allowed to take decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially. In that latter case we make a distinction between a situation where the central agency decides first like in most federations, and a situation where it decides second, then being an agent of the national governments, a setting especially relevant for the European Union. We show in particular that, when the degree of commitment of the centre is high, assignment of redistributive competencies to both levels of power is a better proxy for centralization than decentralization. Additionally, the poorer region may find its best interest in an institutional design where regions decide first. JEL: H41, H77, I20

The European national governments have delegated a series of competencies to a central agency called the European Commission. Among them, two are considered in this paper: research policy and regional development. However, delegating those competencies to a central agency does not prevent the national governments to still be active in those fields. Here, we model and discuss how the level of commitment of a central authority toward poor regions affects the design of the best decision process. We explore cases of full centralization and full decentralization, and situations where the two levels of government are allowed to take decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially. In that latter case we make a distinction between a situation where the central agency decides first like in most federations, and a situation where it decides second, then being an agent of the national governments, a setting especially relevant for the European Union. We show in particular that, when the degree of commitment of the centre is high, assignment of redistributive competencies to both levels of power is a better proxy for centralization than decentralization. Additionally, the poorer region may find its best interest in an institutional design where regions decide first. JEL: H41, H77, I20

The European national governments have delegated a series of competencies to a central agency called the European Commission. Among them, two are considered in this paper: research policy and regional development. However, delegating those competencies to a central agency does not prevent the national governments to still be active in those fields. Here, we model and discuss how the level of commitment of a central authority toward poor regions affects the design of the best decision process. We explore cases of full centralization and full decentralization, and situations where the two levels of government are allowed to take decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially. In that latter case we make a distinction between a situation where the central agency decides first like in most federations, and a situation where it decides second, then being an agent of the national governments, a setting especially relevant for the European Union. We show in particular that, when the degree of commitment of the centre is high, assignment of redistributive competencies to both levels of power is a better proxy for centralization than decentralization. Additionally, the poorer region may find its best interest in an institutional design where regions decide first. JEL: H41, H77, I20

The European national governments have delegated a series of competencies to a central agency called the European Commission. Among them, two are considered in this paper: research policy and regional development. However, delegating those competencies to a central agency does not prevent the national governments to still be active in those fields. Here, we model and discuss how the level of commitment of a central authority toward poor regions affects the design of the best decision process. We explore cases of full centralization and full decentralization, and situations where the two levels of government are allowed to take decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially. In that latter case we make a distinction between a situation where the central agency decides first like in most federations, and a situation where it decides second, then being an agent of the national governments, a setting especially relevant for the European Union. We show in particular that, when the degree of commitment of the centre is high, assignment of redistributive competencies to both levels of power is a better proxy for centralization than decentralization. Additionally, the poorer region may find its best interest in an institutional design where regions decide first.

The European national governments have delegated a series of competencies to a central agency called the European Commission. Among them, two are considered in this paper: research policy and regional development. However, delegating those competencies to a central agency does not prevent the national governments to still be active in those fields. Here, we model and discuss how the level of commitment of a central authority toward poor regions affects the design of the best decision process. We explore cases of full centralization and full decentralization, and situations where the two levels of government are allowed to take decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially. In that latter case we make a distinction between a situation where the central agency decides first like in most federations, and a situation where it decides second, then being an agent of the national governments, a setting especially relevant for the European Union. We show in particular that, when the degree of commitment of the centre is high, assignment of redistributive competencies to both levels of power is a better proxy for centralization than decentralization. Additionally, the poorer region may find its best interest in an institutional design where regions decide first.