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Intro -- HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR IN THE US AND JAPAN: COHORT ANALYSIS -- HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR IN THE US AND JAPAN: COHORT ANALYSIS -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION -- Chapter 2 AGE-PERIOD-COHORT DECOMPOSITION -- 2.1. STANDARD COHORT TABLE -- 2.2. COHORT MODEL AND IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM -- 2.3. GENERAL COHORT TABLE -- Chapter 3 METHODS -- 3.1. CONSTRAINED MULTIPLE REGRESSION METHODS -- 3.2. PROXY VARIABLE APPROACH -- 3.3. BAYESIAN COHORT MODEL -- 3.4. AGE-PERIOD-COHORT MIXED MODEL -- 3.5. PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OR PARTIAL LEAST SQUARES METHOD -- 3.6. AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION -- Chapter 4 SIMULATION STUDIES -- 4.1. SIMULATION DESIGN -- 4.2. COMPARISON OF MODEL FITNESS -- 4.3. COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCES OF THE PC AND PLS METHODS -- 4.4. COMPARISON OF MODEL-SELECTION PERFORMANCES -- Chapter 5 EMPIRICAL STUDIES -- 5.1. LIFE SATISFACTION -- 5.1.1. Introduction -- 5.1.2. Data -- 5.1.3. Analysis of Empirical Results -- 5.1.4. Two-Country Comparisons -- 5.2. BIRTH RATES -- 5.2.1. Introduction -- 5.2.2. Data -- 5.2.3. Empirical Results -- 5.2.4. Two-Country Comparisons -- 5.3. EATING-OUT BEHAVIOR -- 5.3.1. Introduction -- 5.3.2. Data -- 5.3.3. Empirical Results -- 5.3.4. Two-Country Comparisons -- 5.4. AUTOMOBILE EXPENDITURE -- 5.4.1. Introduction -- 5.4.2. Data -- 5.4.3. Empirical Results -- 5.4.4. Two-Country Comparisons -- 5.5. FEMALE LABOR PARTICIPATION -- 5.5.1. Introduction -- 5.5.2. Data -- 5.5.3. Empirical Results -- 5.5.4. Two-Country Comparisons -- 5.6. HOUSEHOLD SAVING RATES -- 5.6.1. Introduction -- 5.6.2. Data -- 5.6.3. Estimation Results -- 5.6.4. Two-Country Comparisons -- Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX -- 1. Covariance Matrix of Disturbance Term -- 2. Derivation of Parameter Estimates -- 3. Derivation of ABIC -- REFERENCES -- INDEX -- Blank Page

Chapter 1 Introduction: Purpose and Organization of This Book -- Part I Housing Markets and the Macro Economy -- Chapter 2 House-Price Dynamics and Effects on the Macro Economy -- Chapter 3 Housing Market Imperfections and Distortions Resulting from Criteria Based on House Floor Space -- Chapter 4 Housing and Housing Finance Markets -- Part II Housing Tenure and Changes in Economic Welfare -- Chapter 5 Effects of Systems and Regulations on Residential Mobility -- Chapter 6 Housing Tenure Choice After the Revision of the Rental Act -- Chapter 7 The Term Premium of Cancellable Lease Rates -- Part III Earthquake Risk and the Residential Market -- Chapter 8 Earthquake Risk and a Quality of Life Index -- Chapter 9 Valuation of Earthquake Risk in Housing Markets -- Chapter 10 Consumer Valuation of Earthquake Risk before and after Massive Earthquakes -- Chapter 11 Earthquake Insurance Subscription Rates and Regional Cross-Subsidies -- Part IV Households' Behavioral Responses after the Great East Japan Earthquake -- Chapter 12 Perceived Preparedness and Attitude of Japanese Households toward Risk Mitigation Activities following the Great East Japan Earthquake: Earthquake Insurance Purchase and Seismic Retrofitting -- Chapter 13 Households' Risk Mitigation Activities and Risk Perception Bias: Earthquake Insurance Purchase and Seismic Retrofitting -- Part V Policy Implications of This Book -- Chapter 14 Conclusion: Policy Implications and Future Research -- Index

AbstractThis paper presents a model of strategic interaction between households and recidivists who commit property crimes. It is estimated that the households pay an income tax rate between 0.12 and 0.21 percent for protection from a loss of 1.8 to 2.25 percent of their annual incomes. Thirteen to 22 percent of total funding for public enforcement is devoted to detecting property crime. The minimum acceptable payoff to a property crime opportunity for the city of Buffalo, New York, is estimated to be between $325 and $400. The expected disutility from punishment for a crime is eight to nine times the minimum acceptable payoff. The model is useful in determining the elasticity of the income tax rate with respect to several important policy parameters.