Suchergebnisse

We study implementation in settings where agents take strategic actions that influence preferences over mechanism outcomes and yet are hidden from the mechanism designer. We show that such settings can arise in entry auctions for markets, and that the Vickery-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not necessarily truthful. In this paper we first formalize so-called ex post hidden actions, we then characterize social choice functions that can be implemented in a way that is robust with respect to ex post hidden actions, and finally we propose a mechanism to do so. The model allows agents to have multi-dimensional types and to have quasi-linear utilities in money. We showcase these results by identifying social choice functions that can and cannot be implemented in entry auctions for Cournot competition models.

Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to study the problem of optimal Ramsey taxation in a finite-planning-horizon, representative-agent endogenous growth model including government expenditures as a productive input in capital formation and also with hidden actions.


Design/methodology/approach
– Technically, Malliavin calculus and forward integrals are naturally introduced into the macroeconomic theory when economic agents are faced with different information structures arising from a non-Markovian environment.


Findings
– The major result shows that the well-known Judd-Chamley Theorem holds almost surely if the depreciation rate is strictly positive, otherwise Judd-Chamley Theorem only holds for a knife-edge case or on a Lebesgue measure-zero set when the physical capital is completely sustainable.


Originality/value
– The author believes that the approach developed as well as the major result established is new and relevant.

Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an identifi cation problem. It also describes organizations that can solve this identifi cation problem and provides conditions under which such organisations exist. Applying the findings to established and new moral hazard models yields insights into optimal organization design, uncovers the reason why certain organization designs, such as advocacy or specialization, overcome restricted implementability, and formalizes a wide-spread type of multi-tasking problem.

In a little book entitled A Treatise on the Circumstances which Determine the Rate of Wages and the Condition of the Labouring Classes (1826), remembered principally for its formulation of the wages-fund doctrine, John Ramsay McCulloch set out some of the essential ingredients of certain popular contemporary approaches to the theory of labor contracts which accord priority to informational asymmetries surrounding the purchase and sale of labor. In view of the widely held opinion that this approach to the analysis of labor contracts constitutes a significant theoretical step forward, the details of McCulloch's argument, together with the manner in which that argument prefigures recent claims as to the causes and consequences of hidden actions and hidden information in labor markets, is worth recovering.

This research aimed to conduct a study for tax dispute cases in Indonesia, which refers to the behavior of the Supreme Court's verdict and indication of hidden action done by taxpayer in an effort to win tax disputes and to analyze the taxation regulations especially on the case of tax disputes. The research data are Supreme Court's verdicts 2004-2010 on the tax disputes cases.This research uses descriptive and logistic regression analysis. The result shows the Supreme Court's verdict has different way of treating tax year, the length of processingdisputes, and the difference of calculation between taxpayers and tax apparatus. The analysis indicates that hidden action is done by taxpayers in an effort winning the tax disputes. The higher difference of calculation, the higher probability for taxpayers to win the tax disputes. The longer processing time of tax disputes on the level of Supreme Court the higher probability for taxpayers winning the disputes. This indicates the public functionary's involvement in hidden action by taxpayers. The hidden action done can be in the form of corruption, collusion, and bribery. The analysis of taxation regulation indicates that Indonesian taxation regulations have not been implemented well anddeviation is still found.From this research result and the reference to the previous researches, it is identified that the Indonesian government is required to do things such as: 1) promoting the qualityof tax apparatus either intellectually or through moral behavior; 2) promoting the obedience of taxpayer by promoting the benefits of paying tax especially for taxpayers; 3) inviting citizens/societies and social institution to fight against corruption; 4) promoting the obedience to the taxation regulation for taxpayers and tax apparatus; 5) designing a better taxation institution; 6) shortening the time for the process of disputes.Keywords: hidden action, corruption, the Supreme Court's verdict, taxpayers.

Consider a situation in which a principal commits to a mechanism first and then agents choose unobservable actions before their payoff-relevant types are realized. The agents' actions may affect not only their payoffs directly but also the distribution of their types as well. This paper extends Crémer and McLean's full surplus extraction theorem to such a setting. In this environment, it is shown that a principal may not succeed in extracting full surplus from agents when there are many actions to which the agents can deviate.However, it is also shown that a principal can extract full surplus generically given any approximately efficient (completely) mixed action profile. This is achieved by using a general mechanism where agents announce both their types and their realized actions. Therefore, with hidden actions, there is a big gap between exact full surplus extraction and approximate full surplus extraction.

We test a repeated principal–agent relationship with hidden actions in the laboratory. At each period, the principal offers payments to the agent in order to induce him to provide the high effort level. The agent can accept or reject the offer; if he accepts it, he can choose the high or the low effort level. We observe that offered payments are higher than predicted by the subgame‐perfect equilibrium, and higher in the partners' than in the strangers' design. Furthermore, agents strategically reject inequitable offers in early rounds in order to induce principals to increase payments in the subsequent rounds.