Suchergebnisse

Sociocultural factors affect both the definition and the sense organs involved in hallucinations. It is suggested that, in addition to the importance of audition in communication on the human level, other sociocultural factors may affect the choice of sense organs in the expression of hallucinatory experience. As compared with non-Western societies, Western attitudes consider hallucinations more shameful and frightening (symptoms of mental illness) and this tend to be more liable to concealment and chronicity. It is proposed that the psychoanalytical approached to the interpretation of dreams or behavioural techniques could be used to overcome the concomitants of Western attitudes toward hallucinations. As hallucinations are considered to be the result of the interaction of the sense organs with the physical environment (i.e., misperception) they appear to reflect the biological rather than the social adaptation of the organism. It is thus not surpris ing that sociocultural factors in hallucinations have not been given as much attention as other schizophrenic symptoms such as delusions where social evaluation and interpersonal relationship seem to be clearly implicated (Murphy, 1967; Weinstein, 1962). The present paper aims at delineating the role of sociocultural factors in the definition and the frequency of different kinds of hallucinations. The implications of cultural variations in attitudes toward hallucinations for the development and treatment of hallucinatory experiences will also be discussed.

Hallucinations are a vivid illustration of the way culture affects our most fundamental mental experience and the way that mind is shaped both by cultural invitation and by biological constraint. The anthropological evidence suggests that there are three patterns of hallucinations: experiences in which hallucinations are rare, brief, and not distressing; hallucinations that are frequent, extended, and distressing; and hallucinations that are frequent but not distressing. The ethnographic evidence also suggests that hallucinations are shaped by learning in at least two ways. People acquire specific representations about mind from their local social world, and people (particularly in spiritual pursuits) are encouraged to train their minds (or focus their attention) in specific ways. These two kinds of learning can affect even perception, this most basic domain of mental experience. This learning-centered approach may eventually have something to teach us about the pathways and trajectories of psychotic illness.

AbstractVeridically perceiving puts us in a better epistemic position than, say, hallucinating does, at least in that veridical perception affords knowledge of our environment in a way that hallucination does not. But is there any further epistemic advantage? Some authors have recently argued that veridical perception provides a superior epistemic benefit over hallucination not just concerning knowledge, but concerning justification as well. This contrasts with a traditional view according to which experience provides justification irrespective of whether it's veridical or hallucinatory. I think both views are mistaken. Although this traditional view should be rejected in favor of one on which some hallucinations are epistemically worse than veridical perceptions (and some are not), I don't believe there is good reason to think that the mere fact of hallucination—or factivity more generally—has any consequences for justification. Susanna Schellenberg has endorsed both the traditional and the factive views (for different elements or kinds of perceptual justification), and I critique her views in detail, though I also draw out more general epistemological lessons about factivity and evidence.

AbstractNaïve realists hold that the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience is in part constituted by environmental objects that the subject is perceiving. Although naïve realism is well-motivated by considering the cognitive and epistemic roles of the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience, it is considered difficult to explain hallucinatory and imaginative experiences. This paper provides three arguments to address these explanatory problems systematically on behalf of naïve realism. First, I argue that the imagination view of hallucination (IH), which states that hallucinations are involuntary sensory imagination, can be applied to total and neutrally matching hallucinations. Second, I argue for the conjunction of IH and the representational view of imagination (RI), according to which sensory imagination (including hallucination) is representational (shortly RIH). Third, I argue that naïve realism can coherently be integrated with RIH. I finally present an integrative model of perception, imagination and hallucination from the perspective of the combination of naïve realism and RIH.