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"February 1991." ; "GAO/AFMD-91-17." ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"April 1991"--Cover. ; Shipping list no.: 91-361-P. ; "As required by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990"--Cover. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are huge, fast-growing, highly leveraged, lightly regulated, and susceptible to failure. Prudence calls for having a legal mechanism adequate for handling their failure. Yet no adequate insolvency mechanism currently exists for them. Unlike ordinary business firms, these government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) cannot liquidate or reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code. If Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac became sufficiently troubled, its regulator could appoint a conservator to take control of the firm and attempt to restore its financial health. But by then the firm's problems could well have become too severe for the conservator to resolve. The conservatorship statute provides no means for effectuating a reorganization and does not expressly authorize a liquidation. Uncertainty about the priority of and process for handling creditors' claims could worsen the firm's problems and increase the risk of disrupting financial markets and eliciting a costly congressional rescue. By enacting a workable insolvency mechanism, Congress could avoid using public money or credit to rescue a troubled GSE's creditors. Congress should specify priorities among creditors' claims, authorize appointment of a receiver, and empower the receiver to reorganize the GSE or establish an interim firm to carry on the GSE's business. Alternatively, Congress could allow GSEs to liquidate or reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code.

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Serious concerns exist regarding the risk management practices and the federal oversight of the housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSE)--Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBank System), which had combined obligations of $4.6 trillion as of year-end 2003. In 2003, Freddie Mac disclosed significant accounting irregularities. In 2004, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) cited Fannie Mae for accounting irregularities and earnings manipulation. Fannie Mae has to restate its financial statements for 2001-2004 and OFHEO has required the GSE to develop a capital restoration plan. Also in 2004, the FHLBanks of Chicago and Seattle entered into written agreements with their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), to implement changes to enhance their risk management. To assist Congress in its housing GSE oversight, this testimony provides information on GSEs' missions and risks, the current regulatory structure, and proposed regulatory reforms."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the regulation of the housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSE)."

The Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac last September spells the end of an experiment in the public-private hybrid known as the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE). This paper documents the subsidies provided to the enterprises and the public and private benefits generated. The public benefits included somewhat reduced interest rates for borrowers receiving conforming mortgages. The public subsidies allowed the firms to use the implicit guarantee of their debts to borrow at attractive rates to invest in mortgage portfolios and also to provide a fee-based service in issuing mortgage-backed securities. We suggest reforming the functions provided by the GSEs. In particular we advocate spinning off the portfolio investment activities into a fully private firm. We also advocate conducting the services necessary to issue mortgage-backed securities within a government-owned corporation responsible directly to federal authorities. These reforms would curb excess risk taking in the secondary mortgage market and would provide the liquidity necessary to support the primary mortgage market.