Assessing Policy II: Governance-Choice Method
In: In: Van den Bulck, H. et al. (eds.). The Palgrave Handbook of Media Policy Research Methods. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2018.
4529 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: In: Van den Bulck, H. et al. (eds.). The Palgrave Handbook of Media Policy Research Methods. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2018.
SSRN
In: Frontiers in political science, Band 3
ISSN: 2673-3145
There are a variety of governance mechanisms concerning the ownership and use of patents. These include government licenses, compulsory licenses, march-in rights for inventions created with federal funding, government use rights, enforcement restrictions, subject-matter restrictions, and a host of private governance regimes. Each has been discussed in various contexts by scholars and policymakers and some, in some degree, have been employed in different cases at different times. But scholars have yet to explore how each of these choices are subject to—or removed from—democratic control. Assessing the range of democratic implications of these patent governance choices is important in understanding the social and political implications of controversial or wide-ranging technologies because their use has a significant potential to affect the polity. This paper seeks to unpack these concerns for genome editing, such as CRISPR, specifically. Patents covering genome editing make an interesting case because, to date, it appears that the polity is concerned less with certain kinds of access, and more with distribution and limits on the technology's particular uses, such as human enhancement and certain agricultural and environmental applications. Here, we explore what it means for patents to be democratic or non-democratically governed and, in so doing, identify that patents covering many of the most controversial applications—that is, ones most likely to gain public attention—are effectively controlled by either non- or anti-democratic institutions, namely, private restrictions on licensing. This may be effective—for now—but lawmakers should be wary that such restrictions could rapidly reverse themselves. Meanwhile, other choices, like compulsory licenses, more broadly touch on democratic deliberation but, as currently structured, are aimed poorly for particular applications. Insofar as the public wants, or perhaps deserves, a say in the distribution and limits of these applications, illuminating the ways in which these governance choices intersect—or fail to intersect—with democratic institutions is critical. We offer some concluding thoughts about the nature of patents and their relationship with democratic governance as distributed claims to authority, and suggest areas for scholars and policymakers to pay close attention to as the genome editing patent landscape develops.
There are a variety of governance mechanisms concerning the ownership and use of patents. These include government licenses, compulsory licenses, march-in rights for inventions created with federal funding, government use rights, enforcement restrictions, subject-matter restrictions, and a host of private governance regimes. Each has been discussed in various contexts by scholars and policymakers and some, in some degree, have been employed in different cases at different times. But scholars have yet to explore how each of these choices are subject to—or removed from—democratic control. Assessing the range of democratic implications of these patent governance choices is important in understanding the social and political implications of controversial or wide-ranging technologies because their use has a significant potential to affect the polity. This paper seeks to unpack these concerns for genome editing, such as CRISPR, specifically. Patents covering genome editing make an interesting case because, to date, it appears that the polity is concerned less with certain kinds of access, and more with distribution and limits on the technology's particular uses, such as human enhancement and certain agricultural and environmental applications. Here, we explore what it means for patents to be democratic or non-democratically governed and, in so doing, identify that patents covering many of the most controversial applications—that is, ones most likely to gain public attention—are effectively controlled by either non- or anti-democratic institutions, namely, private restrictions on licensing. This may be effective—for now—but lawmakers should be wary that such restrictions could rapidly reverse themselves. Meanwhile, other choices, like compulsory licenses, more broadly touch on democratic deliberation but, as currently structured, are aimed poorly for particular applications. Insofar as the public wants, or perhaps deserves, a say in the distribution and limits of these applications, illuminating the ways in which these ...
BASE
In: Public choice, Band 141, Heft 1, S. 189-212
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 697-718
ISSN: 1747-7107
This article evaluates the impact that states have on local governance decisions. We suggest that when states impose constraints on less politically costly tools for funding local services cities turn to cooperation with other local governments. Cooperation is politically and administratively less desirable than other solutions to the problems associated with fragmentation: diseconomies of scale and jurisdictional externalities. But when states constrain those other mechanisms, the relative merits of cooperation increase. At the margins, more cities should cooperate and cooperate more deeply in such situations. Using a sample of 3,664 cities across 49 states, we find that in three examples of these policy tool tradeoffs, our theory is generally supported. Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 141, Heft 1-2, S. 189-212
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Frontiers in Political Science, 2021, Vol. 3, no. 745898
SSRN
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 697-719
ISSN: 0048-5950
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 697-697
ISSN: 0048-5950
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 697-718
ISSN: 1747-7107
In: NBER Working Paper No. w20176
SSRN
Working paper
In: Organization science, Band 19, Heft 5, S. 688-708
ISSN: 1526-5455
This paper looks at when and how preexisting interorganizational trust influences the choice of governance and in turn the performance of exchange relationships. We theorize that preexisting interorganizational trust complements the choice of governance mode (make, ally, or buy) and also promotes substitution effects on governance mode choice while impacting exchange performance. We evaluate hypotheses using a novel three-stage switching regression model and a sample of 222 component-sourcing arrangements of two assemblers in the automobile industry. Analysis of our data broadly supports our hypotheses. High levels of preexisting interorganizational trust increased the probability that a less formal, and thus less costly, mode of governance was chosen over a more formal one. This finding suggests a substitution effect of interorganizational trust on governance mode choice that in turn shapes exchange performance. We also found a complementary effect of trust on performance: Regardless of the governance mode chosen for an exchange, trust enhanced exchange performance. Additional evidence of the complementary effect of trust on performance was that trust somewhat reduced interorganizational conflict.
In: The journal of financial research: the journal of the Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 495-512
ISSN: 1475-6803
AbstractUsing data that reflect the significant growth in incentive compensation during the last decade, we extend research in this area by specifying a more complete model that addresses both corporate governance and risk‐sharing factors that theory suggests should influence compensation policy. We find that the extent of incentive compensation is systematically related to other features of corporate governance, as well as to factors affecting managerial risk aversion. The results support the following conclusions: (a) the presence of outside directors and blockholders facilitates the use of incentive compensation, (b) incentive compensation is inversely related to use of leverage, and (c) the incentive pay component of compensation is lower for CEOs near or at retirement age and is decreasing in the percentage of firm stock already owned by the CEO.JEL classification: G34
In: Decision sciences, Band 45, Heft 4, S. 717-751
ISSN: 1540-5915
ABSTRACTPast work on exchange relationships has debated the efficacy of partnership versus arm's‐length governance on performance of a buyer–supplier relationship. However, how these governance approaches leverage key supplier specific relationship characteristics has not been examined. In this study, we examine the moderating role of governance choice (arm's‐length versus partnership governance) in leveraging key supplier specific characteristics to achieve superior performance for the buyer in a relationship. Specifically, drawing from residual rights theory, we argue that the governance choice buyers make moderates the impact of supplier flexibility, supplier human capital and relationship dependency on performance. Our findings suggest that, for a buyer, the benefits of supplier flexibility and relationship dependency are better realized in partnership governance as opposed to arm's‐length governance. Further, our findings suggest that although buyers choose a specific governance approach consistent with their outsourcing motivation, the choice of governance is critical to leveraging the impact of supplier characteristics due to the moderation effects studied. We elaborate on these effects and discuss the implications of our findings.
In: TLI Think!Paper 3/2022
SSRN