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Preface -- Contents -- About the Author -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 A Brief Overview -- 1.2 A Univariable Rational Expectations Model -- 1.2.1 Base Model -- 1.2.1.1 The Case with a Unique Steady State -- 1.2.1.2 The Case with Multiple Steady States -- 1.2.1.3 The Case with a Continuum of Steady States -- 1.2.2 Fundamental Disturbances -- 1.3 General Equilibrium Models of the Monetary Economy -- 1.3.1 Base Model -- 1.3.2 The Case with a Unique Steady State -- 1.3.3 The Case with Multiple Steady States -- 1.3.3.1 Hyper Inflation -- 1.3.3.2 Taylor Rule -- 1.3.4 A Model with a Continuum of Steady States -- 1.4 References and Related Studies -- 2 Indeterminacy in Real Business Cycle Models -- 2.1 One-Sector Growth Models with Fixed Labor Supply -- 2.1.1 A Model with Production Externalities -- 2.1.2 A Model with Productive Consumption -- 2.2 The Benhabib-Farmer-Guo Approach -- 2.2.1 Base Model -- 2.2.2 Dynamic System -- 2.2.3 Indeterminacy Conditions -- 2.2.4 Calibration -- 2.3 The Source of Indeterminacy -- 2.3.1 Strategic Complementarity -- 2.3.2 Intuitive Implication of Indeterminacy Conditions -- 2.4 Related Issues -- 2.4.1 Indeterminacy Under Mild Increasing Returns -- 2.4.1.1 Endogenous Capital Utilization -- 2.4.1.2 Two-Sector Economy -- 2.4.2 Preference Structure -- 2.4.2.1 Non-separable Utility -- 2.4.2.2 The Role of the Income Effect -- 2.4.3 Consumption Externalities -- 2.4.3.1 Basic Idea -- 2.4.3.2 A Two-Sector Model -- 2.4.4 News Versus Sunspots -- 2.4.5 Local Versus Global Indeterminacy -- 2.5 References and Related Studies -- 3 Indeterminacy in Endogenous Growth Models -- 3.1 A One-Sector Model with Social Increasing Returns -- 3.1.1 Separable Utility -- 3.1.2 Non-separable Utility -- 3.2 A Two-Sector Model with Intersectoral Externalities -- 3.2.1 Model -- 3.2.2 Dynamic System -- 3.2.3 Indeterminacy Conditions

We study the dynamic properties of an endogenous growth model with pollution in which the government can control the pollution through distorting taxes on the pollutant firms and through public abatement activities. First, we characterize the conditions for indeterminacy of equilibria when the government is benevolent and chooses its tax policy by taking into account the decentralized competitive equilibrium. Under this second best setup we show that two balanced growth paths can be found (one with a low level of pollution and the other with a high level) both of which can be locally indeterminate. Therefore, under indeterminacy, the optimal public policies do not guarantee that the economy will converge towards the steady state characterized by a low level of pollution and neither guarantee that the economy will display, along the transition, low levels of pollution. Second, we show that the central planner solution might also display indeterminacy; in particular, two Pigouvian taxes can be found. Estudiamos las propiedades dinámicas de un modelo de crecimiento endógeno con contaminación en el que el gobierno puede controlar la contaminación mediante impuestos distorsionantes sobre las empresas que contaminan y mediante actividades públicas encaminadas a reducir la contaminación. Primero, caracterizamos las condiciones para que se produzca indeterminación de equilibrios cuando el gobierno es benevolente y elige su política fiscal teniendo en cuenta el equilibrio descentralizado. Demostramos que, en este contexto de second-best, puede encontrarse indeterminación global (puede haber dos sendas de crecimiento equilibrado) y local. Por tanto, bajo indeterminación, la politica económica óptima no garantiza que la economía convergerá hacia el estado estacionario caracterizado por un nivel de contaminación bajo y tampoco garantiza que, durante la transición, la economía mostrará bajos niveles de emisiones. Segundo, demostramos que la solución del planificador también puede estar indeterminada, en particular, pueden ...