Suchergebnisse

The study outlines the main challenges in measuring external imbalances via a "current account (CA) model", from which a CA "norm" may be derived and against which the actual CA is appraised. The selection of both the dependent and explanatory variables and technical issues in the estimation procedure are amongst the concerns raised. The impact on CA modelling of global trends, such as the expansion of MNEs, and of the COVID-19 pandemic is also discussed. The paper does not prescribe fully-fledged solutions, but rather provides awareness and hints on how to possibly tackle at least some of these challenges.

Several recent field experimental studies show that social pressure raises the likelihood of turning out to vote in elections. Ratcheting up social pressure to show subjects their own as well as their neighbors' prior voting history significantly increases the effectiveness of direct mail messages. A key component in stimulating this effect seems to be the presence of individual vote history. When voters are presented with less specific turnout information, such as vote history for the community at-large, the effects on turnout often dissipate. Sensitizing voters to such descriptive norms appears to do little to stimulate participation. To address this contrast, this study presents results from a voter mobilization field experiment conducted in Hawthorne, CA prior to the November 2011 municipal elections. The experiment is a fully crossed 2 * 3 factorial study in which subjects were randomly assigned to one of six conditions, in which they receive no mailing, a mailing with individual vote history only, a mailing with individual vote history and a message emphasizing high (or low) community-level turnout from a previous election, and a mailing emphasizing high (or low) community-level turnout only. County voter files were used to randomly assign voters to treatment and control and to report the effects of each mailing on voter turnout. We find that only messages that included information about subjects' own voting histories effectively mobilized them to vote. Adapted from the source document.

The military intervention of Grenada, October 25, 1983 came after years of increasing strain between the interventionists, especially the US, and Grenada. Justification for using force by the US and its Ca ribbean partners was based on 1) claims of undue increase in military power in Grenada, in comparison with other Caribbean states, 2) the non-civil libertarian and socialist character of Grenada's PRG gov ernment which brought it into close and increasing dependency on Cuba and the Soviet Union, 3) the use of force by Maurice Bishop and his NJM movement to obtain power, and 4) the brutality of his liqui dation. Also 5) the claim that the OECS organization was a bona fide regional organization operating within the scope of authority of article 52 of the UN charter. It thereby had the right to seek help from others in the fullfillment of their treaty obligations. The US in particular stressed this point plus, 6) the claim that the Governor-General invited outside assistance. Most international law scholars who ex pressed views condemned the action on legal grounds, but supporters claimed that the interventionists were within their rights based on the above arguments, plus the view that various human rights declara tions and treaties support intervention when human rights are violated, and that some treaties require it. This paper explores these claims and traces the relevant writings of scholars over several centuries, most of which refute the supporters' arguments. Interventionary policies are found to be illegal in the post WWII period, with Webster's classic argument that 'instant and overwhelming necessity' permitting 'no moment of deliberation' may provide an exception. The UN, OAS and OECS treaty provisions are ana lyzed and found to have been violated. Comparisons with other rescue missions are found inappropriate as a precedent. Finally, interventionist arguments based on human rights are refuted by examining all appropriate declarations and treaties, none of which are found to authorize enforcement action.

It is undisputed that children are vulnerable and must be protected from abuse, neglect, and trauma. While this is commonly understood as the role of parents, there is a considerable number of children who do not grow up in the care of their parents or other dedicated caregivers. The reasons for this are manifold and range from unintentional loss or separation to initiated removals due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Children in these situations are considered to be among the most vulnerable and 'left-behind' members of society (the relation to the SDG principle "to leave no one behind" has been emphasized). They become 'wards of the state' and subject to the state's decision on how to provide care for them. For centuries, one of the standard solutions provided by state and (faith-based) welfare bodies has been what is colloquially called 'orphanages' or 'children's homes'. However, the 'norms' in the field have changed. Modern best practice standards are based on the 'UN Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children' (2009) and envision an overall 'de-institutionalization' (DI) of care systems. This study explored this development in the context of the debate on international norm diffusion processes in the discipline of International Relations. An initial analysis of the global rise of the norm example and the state of it in the controversial case of South Africa set the contextual frame for an empirical-analytical and micro-level case study of Cape Town's children's home sector. This specific microcosm became the target locality for observing actual outcomes of and reactions to norm-diffusion processes at the implementation level on the ground. The selection of the specific case example at hand was based on a special opportunity for maximizing what can be learned, due to the availability of a baseline from 2009 (the author's MA thesis, year of the UN Guidelines) and a special familiarity with the sector. Based on this, the norm adjustment/non-adjustment of Cape Town's children's home sector could be assessed in two steps: a diachronic comparison of indicators (2009 and 2017) was followed by Grounded-Theory-guided interviews with leading practitioners. So, has the new norm been accepted by local actors and implemented by the practitioners in charge? After all, orphanages/children's homes have a long tradition and are evaluated differently in different contexts and world regions. How has this impacted this norm's diffusion and translation across global, national, and local levels? In sum, the findings confirmed the non-linearity and complexity of norm adoption, localization, contestation, and implementation. At all dimensions - the global, the national, and the local - various co-existing and competing norms, realities and interests shape and influence the realities of DI translation. In the light of the empirical-analytical insights gathered, the author suggests adding two concepts to the theory when it comes to observing and understanding the translation of norms into implementation at the practice level on the ground: Firstly, a state of 'translation diversity' which implies that one norm diffusion process may lead to a variety of co-existing translation outcomes. This study showed that even in a precisely defined micro-level case and locality, cases of norm compliance, resistance, and ignorance, as well as ambivalent subtypes and mixed forms, can exist next to each other. Secondly, a concept of 'translation soundness' which refers to the observation that all types of outcomes can be justified or contradictory when it comes to protecting the best interest of the concerned target group on the ground. Some local leaders resist the new norm based on an informed and moral-based judgment in the light of the realities they experience in their local contexts. Others may comply and adjust but yet not deliver in terms of the actual goal to safeguard children. These phenomena were termed 'justified resistance' and 'contradictory compliance'. Further, the study found that decisions on how and which norms were translated into practice depended to a far extent on the local context - rather than transnational and funding influences - and on the personal convictions, leadership types, and capabilities of the people in charge. Overall, the study concludes that any general assumptions and policies/guidelines need to be handled with care. The appropriateness of different solutions depends on many factors. Listening to actors on the ground, as well as leaving space for a middle ground and a 'both-and' approach, may be crucial to ensure that interventions do actually benefit or protect the target group of concern. ; Die Doktorarbeit behandelt das Thema, inwieweit die UN Richtlinien für die alternative Betreuung von Kindern (Teil der UN Kinderrechtskonvention) auf lokaler Ebene umgesetzt werden und welche Rolle die Akteure der transnationalen Zivilgesellschaft, insbesondere als Geldgeber, in diesem Bereich dabei spielen. Das Fallbeispiel dafür ist Kapstadts Kinderheimsektor, in dem die Autorin auch 2009 Daten für ihre Masterarbeit in Bezug auf dieselbe Thematik erhob und fünf Jahre lang tätig war. Verortet in der theoretischen Debatte um die Diffusion internationaler Normen, zielt die Studie darauf ab, die oft zu wenig berücksichtigte Komplexität von Norm-Diffusions-Prozessen auf der lokalen Umsetzungsebene an einem ganz spezifischen Beispiel zu untersuchen. In diesem Sinne ist die Studie eine von empirisch-analytischem Interesse motivierte qualitative Fallstudie zur Diffusion einer spezifischen internationalen Kinderschutz-Norm in dem spezifischen, lokalen Mikrokosmos Kapstadt. Die Studie analysiert zunächst die Entwicklung der Norm auf der globalen Ebene, untersucht dann ihren Stand auf der nationalen Ebene Südafrikas und konzentriert sich schließlich auf die lokale Ebene Kapstadts: Zuerst wird anhand ausgewählter Indikatoren die Entwicklung von ca. 25 Kinderheimen zwischen 2009 (Jahr der letzten Erhebung und Jahr der UN Richtlinien) und heute beobachtet und im nächsten Schritt eine 'grounded-theory-style' Analyse der Umstände konkreter Entwicklungen durch Interviews mit 15 ausgewählten Fällen durchgeführt. Die Leitfrage ist, wie die Normbewegung sich an der Basis auswirkt und unter welchen Umständen eine Anpassung, Nicht-Anpassung, oder Resistenz stattfindet. Insgesamt zeigt sich deutlich, dass die Komplexität und Multi-Dimensionalität von Normanpassung, Normlokalisierung und Normumsetzung mit der Nähe der Betrachtung kontinuierlich steigt. Während eine Linearität und 'Effektivität' von Norm-Diffusions-Prozessen auf lokaler Policy- und Diskursebene ersichtlich sein mag, kann die Realität auf der Umsetzungsebene 'on the ground' eine ganz andere sein. Die Umsetzungsebene ist von einer enormen Pluralität und Diversität von Akteuren und Verhältnissen geprägt, die eine Vielzahl von Norm-Umsetzungs-Ergebnissen nach sich ziehen, in der sich kaum Regelmäßigkeiten abzeichnen. Für dieses Phänomen entwickelt die Autorin den Begriff der 'translation diversity'. Es lassen sich zwar Typen identifizieren, aber auch innerhalb einer Typengruppe zeigen sich gravierende Diskrepanzen. Zudem wird deutlich, dass die Norm-Umsetzungs-Ergebnisse in jedem einzelnen Fall von zahlreichen Faktoren abhängen. Unter diesen ist auch die potenzielle Einflussnahme von Geldgebern stark abhängig, vor allem von den persönlichen Überzeugungen, Einstellungen und Fähigkeiten der leitenden Personen. Bestimmte starke Leadership-Typen sind in der Lage ihre finanzielle Versorgung durch diverse Fundraising-Methoden sicherzustellen und nehmen eine selbstbewusste Haltung konträr zu der internationalen Normbewegung ein. Sie stimmen dem Prinzip der Deinstitutionalisierung zwar zu, aber argumentieren, dass eine voreilige und rabiate Vorgehensweise in diesem Sinne die Kinder noch mehr in Gefahr bringt. Solange die gravierenden Herausforderungen und Dilemmata in diesem Kinderschutzfeld nicht sinnvoll und umfassend behandelt werden können, bleibt eine strikte Deinstitutionalisierung des Sektors ein wenig realistisches Ideal. Im Kontext dieser Beobachtungen arbeitet die Autorin das Konzept der 'translation soundness' heraus. Insgesamt stellt die Studie die Diskrepanz zwischen theoretischen und linearen Annahmen und der komplexen Realität an der Basis heraus und zeigt auf, dass bei der Verallgemeinerung von 'good practice' Normen Vorsicht geboten ist.

In this paper, we explore how sociocultural changes were reflected in the parliamentary record, a genre that combines elements of spoken, written and written-to-be-spoken discourses. Our main interests are in the processes of linguistic colloquialization and democratization, understood broadly as tendencies towards greater informality and equality in language use. Previous diachronic studies have established that written language has increasingly adopted features associated with spoken language, although genre and register differences are considerable. Our starting point is that as Parliament has become more demographically representative and as prescriptive norms have loosened in society on the whole, the relative frequency of informal features in parliamentary language may have increased. At the same time, profound changes took place in the practices of recording parliamentary proceedings, most importantly the introduction of the official report in 1909. Our data on British parliamentary debates come from the Hansard Corpus (Alexander and Davies, 2015). We investigate the 60-year-period 1870-1930, which includes reports of parliamentary debates and, after 1909, verbatim reports (in total ca. 40 million words). Adopting a pattern-driven approach, we focus on n-gram frequencies. The analysis first identifies major shifts in the language of the reports using unsupervised grouping methods, and then investigates in more detail the frequency trends of individual n-grams associated with spoken language, as well as their function in parliamentary debates. The findings indicate that the introduction of the official report resulted in clear changes in n-gram frequencies, which can be linked to democratization and colloquialization.

Special issue "New perspectives on democratization: Evidence from English(es)" edited by Turo Hiltunen and Lucía Loureiro-Porto ; In this paper, we explore how sociocultural changes were reflected in the parliamentary record, a genre that combines elements of spoken, written and written-to-be-spoken discourses. Our main interests are in the processes of linguistic colloquialization and democratization, understood broadly as tendencies towards greater informality and equality in language use. Previous diachronic studies have established that written language has increasingly adopted features associated with spoken language, although genre and register differences are considerable. Our starting point is that as Parliament has become more demographically representative and as prescriptive norms have loosened in society on the whole, the relative frequency of informal features in parliamentary language may have increased. At the same time, profound changes took place in the practices of recording parliamentary proceedings, most importantly the introduction of the official report in 1909. Our data on British parliamentary debates come from the Hansard Corpus (Alexander and Davies, 2015). We investigate the 60-year-period 1870-1930, which includes reports of parliamentary debates and, after 1909, verbatim reports (in total ca. 40 million words). Adopting a pattern-driven approach, we focus on n-gram frequencies. The analysis first identifies major shifts in the language of the reports using unsupervised grouping methods, and then investigates in more detail the frequency trends of individual n-grams associated with spoken language, as well as their function in parliamentary debates. The findings indicate that the introduction of the official report resulted in clear changes in n-gram frequencies, which can be linked to democratization and colloquialization. (C) 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. ; Peer reviewed

Home-Office ist schon seit Jahren ein Trend in der Arbeitswelt. Durch die rasante Weiterentwicklung der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie und der zunehmenden Digitalisierung haben sich weitere Möglichkeiten eröffnet, Arbeitsleistung nicht nur in der Arbeitsstätte des Arbeitgebers zu erbringen. Durch COVID-19 ist Home-Office schlagartig zu einem großen Thema geworden. Anstatt bisher ca 10% stieg die Anzahl der Arbeitnehmer im Home-Office auf über 40%. Und es ist zu erwarten, dass Home-Office nach der Krise eine dauerhafte Form der Erbringung von Arbeitsleistung bleiben wird. Dies bedingt auch Anpassungen der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen. Diese Arbeit soll aufzeigen, in welchen Bereichen es Notwendigkeit der Weiterentwicklung durch den Gesetzgeber gibt. Mit dem Ziel, Regelungsbedarf auf individueller Ebene zu reduzieren und Home-Office für Arbeitgeber wie Arbeitnehmer einfacher umsetzbar und rechtssicher zu gestalten. Dabei werden auch Ausblicke aufgezeigt, in welcher Form der Gesetzgeber die Rahmenbedingungen für Home-Office durch Rechtsetzung oder Änderung bestehender Normen in Zukunft gestalten könnte. ; Working from home has been a trend in our economy for years. The rapid development of information and communication technology and increasing digitization have opened up further opportunities to perform work not only in the employer's offices. Due to COVID-19, working from home has suddenly become a big topic. Instead of the previous 10%, the number of employees working from home increased to more than 40%. And it is to be expected that working from home will remain a permanent model of work after the crisis. This requires adjustments to the employment legislation. This diploma thesis is intended to identify areas in which employment law needs to be further developed by the legislator. With the aim of reducing the need for regulation at the individual level and making the implementation of working from home easier and more legally compliant for both employers and employees. It also shows outlooks in what form the legislature could shape the labor law for working from home in the future through new legislation or changes to existing law. ; eingereicht von Mag. Dr. Martin Endres ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers ; Universität Linz, Diplomarbeit, 2021 ; (VLID)5833118

Summarium Notio sic dicta Status lurlS, orta patrocinio doctrinae de tripartita potestatum separatione (Iegislativae, exsecutivae et iudicialis), pro SUrnrnQ legj$ imperio est; Status scilicet iuris Status qUidem est legi pi ene su• biectus. Haec notio Status necessario fontium hierarchiam ponit. Fons dicitur veluti productionisiuridicae; si autem normae iuridicae effectus fontium iuridicae pro. ductionis intelliguntur, distinguendae sunt fontium pro• ductionis hierarchia (ordo cum sit fontium productionis secundum potestatem qua complectuntur et ordo etiam sit potestatum atque munerum) ac normarum iuridlca• rum formalis hierarehia. Hierarchia fontium, principii legalitatis quod in statu iuris regit postulatio, via est apta ad iuridicam securitatem consequendam ac civium iurium tutelam adversus potestatis exercitationem arbitrariam. In ordinamento Ecclesiae fontium hierarchia non est nec normarum forma'lis hierarchia; quoquo modo orga• norum hierarchia gradu innixa quo in organizatione potitur. Sed ecclesiasticum magisterium uberius est in pe• titionibusa civili societate de iuridica curan da securitate civium ac de tutela iurium fundamentalium per• sonae humanae. Huius doctrinae conscia sunt Principia quae Codicois luris Canoniei recognitionem dirigant, in I Synodo Episcoporum anno 1967 disputata. Ouamobrem necesse est in ordinamentum canonicum fontium hierarchiam indu. cere, ad huius rei partes transitis maximi nominis viris in doctrina canonica. Ouod in 'Ecclesia nec separatio potestatum exsistat huic proposito obex non est quia in eius sinu possibilis distinctio munerum et ea de causa legiferorum orga• norum, exsecutionis et iudicialium. De hoc sensu quidem servanda semper divinae constitutionis Ecclesiae structura et ordinamenti Ecclesiae species. Haec indagatio concluditur plurimis suggestis de iure ¡contiendo super ratione ordinamenti ECclesiae applicandi principii fontium hierarchiae. Fontium hie. rarchia in canonico ordinamentoesset: 1) lex funda. mentalis; 2) Ordinarie leges normativae; 3) Normae pro administratione; 4) Negotia administrativa; 5) Consue. tudo. Ut vero fidem nullam normam inferiorem aliae superioriexcellere opus est fontium hierarchiae iuris• dictionalem vigilantiam etiam introducere. --- Abstract The concept State of Law, which carne into being in the light of the theory of the tripartite separation of powers (legislative,executive and judicial), is equi• valent to sovereignty of the law; that is, State of law is the State which is fully subjected to the law; this idea of State necessarily implies a hierarchy of sources. By -source. one understands a source of legal pro• duction and that the ,Iegall norms are a product of the sources of production; one has to distinguish the hierarchy of the sources of produetion (because there exists a hierarchy of the sources of production according to the power in which they are, and there ls al so a hierarchy of powers and functions) from the formal hierarchy of ,legal norms. The hierarchy of sources, exigence of the principie of legality which prevails in the State of law, is an adequate medium through which legal security and tutelage of the rights of the citizens could be obtained, to confront the arbitrary exercise of power. In the arrangement of the Church there neither exists hierarchy of sources nor formal hierarchy of norms; in any case it is an organie hierarehy based on its importance in the organization. But the teaching of the Church is pregnant with petitions to the civil society to seek the legal security of the citizens and the tutelage of the fundamental rights of the human being; consistent with this doctrine are the PrblcoiP.ia quae Codicis luris Canoniel recognitionem dirigant which were discussed at the firts Synod of Bishops in 1967; this made it necessary to introduce into the ca• nonical set up the hierarchy of sources, a question on which the most reknowned pronouncement has favoura• bly been made concerning canonical doctrine. The existence of the division of powers in the Church is no obstacle to this objective because it is possible to have a distinction of function and, therefore, a distinction of legislative, executive and judicial organs; in this sense, the structure of the divine constitution of the Church and the pecularities of the canonical I3rrangement have always got to be safeguarded. This research ends with numerous suggestions de iure eondendo on the way of applying the principie of the hierarchy of sources to the canonical set up. The hierarchy of sources in thecanonical set up would be: 1) Constitution; 2) Ordinary standard iaws; 3) Norms of the administration; 4) Standard business; 5) Costume. To guarantee that no inferior norm prevails over a superior one it is also necessary to introduce jurisdiccional control of the hierarchy of sources.

Биография одного из наиболее влиятельных крымских ханов Менгли Гирея представлена в контексте писем хана, сохранившихся в архиве Topkapi. Официальная переписка Оттоманской империи и Крымского ханства позволяет проследить трансформацию отношений между правителями двух держав от фактической независимости во времена первого правления Менгли-Гирея до подчинения во время его второго прихода к власти. Предпринята попытка реконструкции политической картины региона, целей, обстоятельств и хода военных походов. ; In Eurasia, especially in the northern Black Sea region, late 15th early 16th cc. were a period of dynamic and strained international relations, arena for clashes of geopolitical interests of Ottoman Empire, Golden Horde, Crimean Khanate, Moscow principality (Russian state), Poland and Lithuania. Many of these events may clarify the meaning of today''s conflicts, the essence of which is rooted in those centuries. At the same time, there is a very small amount written evidence about the events of that epoch in this region. That's why studying few documents of this period preserved in the archives is actual scientific task for each next generation of researchers, and disputes about the interpretation of each such document last for decades in the scientific community. In its turn, official correspondence of the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate of this period contains a wealth of information about the history of both early Crimean Khanate and Ottoman Empire during the reign of Mehmed II Fatih and Bayazid II. The subject of my research is three letters of Crimean Khan Mengli Giray (1445 ca. 1515) to Ottoman Sultans from the Topkapi Palace Archive, which are earliest sources on the history of the Crimean Khanate. Using textual and comparative methods in the framework of historical reenactment approach, I have traced the development of relations between the rulers of the two powers. They varied in different periods from independence during the Mengli Giray's first reign to subjection to Sultan's power during his second reign. At the same time, this does not mean belittling of the Crimean Khan position: firstly, as a vassal he could count on protection against enemies on the part of Istanbul. Secondly, the geographical and geopolitical situation of the Crimean Khanate made it for Sultan's court a significant player (and additional military force) in relations with Golden Horde, Moldova, Poland, Lithuania and Russia. Thus, while agreeing with Anatoly Grigoriev's dating of the third Mengli Giray's bitiq (letter), I consider this document is not evidence of Khan's full humiliated depending from Bayezid II, but the document drawn up by a clever and far-sighted politician in compliance with the norms of the Ottoman imperial etiquette into his own purely pragmatic purposes. The absence of such dependence is also confirmed by miniature 'Bayazid II Receives Mengli Giray in Shah Pavilion during the Campaign against Moldova in 1484' from the Hünername ( The Book of Skilled Body Movements, 1585-1588), which is also stored in the Topkapi Palace Archive. This Ottoman miniature depicts Mengli Giray as full of dignity ruler, almost equal in his power to Sultan Bayazid II. I paid special attention to political picture of Northern Black Sea coast region during late 15th early 16th cc., and conclude that correspondence between Crimea Khan and Ottoman Sultans allows revealing pragmatic political goals of main regional actors, as well as circumstances and course of their military campaigns. This epistolary documents are vivid and detail manifestation of the struggle for power in the Crimean Khanate.

This open access book addresses communicative aspects of the current COVID-19 pandemic as well as the epidemic of misinformation from the perspective of argumentation theory. Argumentation theory is uniquely placed to understand and account for the challenges of public reason as expressed through argumentative discourse. The book thus focuses on the extent to which the forms, norms and functions of public argumentation have changed in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. This question is investigated along the three main research lines of the COST Action project CA 17132: European network for Argumentation and Public PoLicY analysis (APPLY): descriptive, normative, and prescriptive. The volume offers a broad range of contributions which treat argumentative phenomena that are directly related to the changes in public discourse in the wake of the outburst of COVID-19. The volume additionally places particular emphasis on expert argumentation, given (i) the importance expert discourse has had over the last two years, and (ii) the challenges that expert argumentation has faced in the public sphere as a result of scientific uncertainty and widespread misinformation. Contributions are divided into three groups, which (i) examine various features and aspects of public and institutional discourse about the COVID-19 pandemic, (ii) scrutinize the way health policies have been discussed, debated, attacked and defended in the public sphere, and (iii) consider a range of proposals meant to improve the quality of public discourse, and public deliberation in particular, in such a way that concrete proposals for argumentative literacy will be brought to light. Overall, this volume constitutes a timely inquiry into all things argumentative in pandemic discourse. This volume is of interest to a broad readership including philosophers, linguists, communication and legal scholars, and members of the wider public who seek to better understand the discourse surrounding communicative phenomena in times of crisis. COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology) is a funding organisation for research and innovation networks. For more information: www.cost.eu

Aktuelle Umweltprobleme stellen zentrale Anwendungsfelder der Politik, Wirtschaft und dem sozialen Zusammenleben dar. Ein Ineinandergreifen dieser drei Bereiche ist essenziell für das Lösen und Aufarbeiten von regionalen und globalen Umweltkrisen. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Wirkung von politischen Maßnahmen. Unter Berücksichtigung von sozialen Normen und Einstellungen wird die gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz und Verbreitung von Elektromobilität analysiert. Es werden zwei theoretische Ansätze zur Regulierung des sozialen Einflusses berücksichtigt. Zum einen wird Mertons Bezugsgruppentheorie und zum anderen die Theorie des sozialen Einflusses von Latané als theoretische Fundierung herangezogen. Diese beiden Theorien werden im Rahmen eines interdisziplinären Theorienvergleichs behandelt.Bei dieser Masterarbeit handelt es sich um eine Folgestudie eines Projektes, welches vom Wegener Center Graz durchgeführt wurde. Im Dezember 2011 wurden ca. 1500 BesitzerInnen von E-Fahrzeugen zu den Auswirkungen des Erwerbs von einem E-Fahrzeug postalisch befragt. Bei der vorliegenden Arbeit handelt es sich um die zweite Erhebungswelle einer Teilstichprobe (n1=157) des ersten Samples sowie einer Befragung des sozialen Umfeldes (n2=42) dieser E-Fahrzeug-BesitzerInnen. Diese zweite Erhebung erfolgte in Form einer Online-Befragung, um das Weiterleiten der Umfrage im Bekanntenkreis zu erleichtern.Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie zeigen erstens, dass sich die sozialen wie persönlichen Normen der E-Fahrzeug-BesitzerInnen sehr stabil verhalten. Zweitens zeigt sich, dass die umweltrelevanten Normen der E-Fahrzeug-BesitzerInnen und die der Personen aus dem Bekanntenkreis nur sehr schwach korrelieren (r=0,119). In dieser kleinen Stichprobe konnte nur eine schwache Diffusion von ökologischen Normen festgestellt werden. Drittens liefert die Analyse nach relevanten Indikatoren für die soziale Beeinflussung, auf Basis der verwendeten Theorien, nur für einzelne Merkmale eindeutige Ergebnisse. ; Current environmental problems are core responsibilities of politics, economy and the social life. The combination of these three fields is essential for solving and refurbishing regional and global environmental crises. This thesis will study the outcomes of political measures for dealing with environmental issues. While taking into account social norms and pro-environmental attitudes, the social acceptance, application and diffusion of electric mobility is analyzed. The paper compares two theoretical approaches to the regulation of social influence. First, Mertons reference group theory and second, the social impact theory from Latané is discussed. These approaches form the background for the empirical survey and the data analyses. What follows is an interdisciplinary comparison of both theories.This master's thesis is a follow-up study of a project, which was conducted by the Wegener Center Graz. In December 2011, approximately 1.500 owners of e-vehicles were interviewed by means of a mailed questionnaire, on the impact of the purchase of an e-vehicle. For this study a second wave of data collection was carried out by means of a survey on a sub-sample (n1=157) of the first wave of data collection. Moreover, another survey was developed in order to interview friends (n2=42) of these e-vehicle owners. This second wave of data collection was conducted as an online survey to facilitate the dispersion of the survey by e-vehicle owners to their acquaintances.First, the results of this survey show that the social and personal norms of e-vehicle owners are very stable across the two points in time. Second, it turns out that pro-environmental norms of e-vehicle owners and their acquaintances correlate rather weak (r = 0.119). Furthermore, only a weak diffusion of pro-environmental norms and values could be determined in this sample. Finally, the analysis of relevant indicators of social influence based on the two theories provides clear results for only a few items. ; Eva Anna Kouba ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers ; Zsfassung in dt. und engl. Sprache ; Graz, Univ., Masterarb., 2013 ; (VLID)234037

This thesis examines a previously unstudied site of interaction: the constituency office. At the constituency office, Members of Parliament (MPs) hold MP surgeries , during which they help constituents to solve their personal difficulties. This thesis provides the first analysis of interactions at the constituency office. It is the only place where ordinary citizens can meet their MP; as such, it also provides the first analysis of face-to-face, unmediated interactions between politicians and their constituents. For this study, 12.5 hours of interactional data were recorded at the office of an MP in the United Kingdom, comprising over 80 encounters between office staff, the MP, and their constituents. The MP was of the majority ( government ) party at the time of recording. The data were analyzed using conversation analysis (CA), in order to investigate how the social activities of the constituency office were accomplished through interaction. The first analytic chapter reveals the overall structure of constituency office encounters, as well as examining what constituents say when they call or visit the office, and how they express that they are in need of assistance. This chapter finds that constituents avoid making direct requests of their MP, and instead use narrative descriptions. These descriptions manage interactional challenges including the unknown nature of the institution (Stokoe, 2013b), contingency and entitlement (Drew & Curl, 2008), reasonableness and legitimacy (Edwards & Stokoe, 2007; Heritage & Robinson, 2006), and recruitment (Kendrick & Drew, 2016). The second analytic chapter examines the action of offering, and finds it to be the central mechanism for transacting service. The staff use different offer designs to index different nuances in the offering action, such as asking permission or confirming an activity. Both the first and second analytic chapters show that systematic deployment of offers help control the direction of the encounters and tacitly instruct constituents as to what services are available. Furthermore, both of these chapters show the flexibility participants employed in turn design and action ascription, which extends previous descriptions of how requests and offers are constructed (Couper-Kuhlen, 2014; Curl, 2006) and supports recent calls for a more nuanced approach to action description from conversation analysts (Kendrick & Drew, 2014; Sidnell & Enfield, 2014). The third analytic chapter investigates the ostensibly political context of the constituency office, and how the MP and constituents raise political topics in conversation. The chapter finds that the term political is challenging to define in live interactions, and relies on the concept of politicizing (Hay, 2007) statements that upgrade (or downgrade) a topic into greater (or lesser) public and governmental concern. Both the MP and constituents were found to initiate political topics, but in different ways. The MP initiated political topics in explicit references to government, in order to provide evidence that the government was aligned with constituents interests. The constituents initiated political topics in vague and indirect references to recent policy changes, and avoided implicating the MP in any criticisms. The findings suggest that constituents privilege interactional norms (such as not criticizing a co-present interlocutor) over any potential interest in making political critiques. The chapter also discusses what impact these findings may have on concepts such as power and evasion . The final analytic chapter assesses the concept of rapport , finding that it is difficult for both participants and analysts to determine long-term outcomes from local, interactional occurrences in interaction. Rapport is important for MPs who may be attempting to build a personal vote relationship with constituents, but this chapter also finds that constituents have a stake in building rapport in order to receive the best (or any) service. The chapter finds that while traditional practices for building rapport , such as doing small talk or finding common ground, are problematic to employ and assess from an interactional perspective, other local outcomes such as progressivity (Fogarty, Augoustinos & Kettler, 2013) and affiliation (Clark, Drew & Pinch, 2003) may be more useful indicators of positive interactions. This chapter concludes that we need a more nuanced, and interactionally-based, framework to train practitioners (and clients) in effective communication practices. This thesis challenges the conversation analytic literature by finding that the constituency office setting revolves around a more flexible ascription of requests than many studies have previously accepted, and that we can analyze actions as if on a spectrum, rather than in bounded categories. The thesis also contributes to the political discourse literature by finding that constituents activities at the constituency office are strongly influenced by interactional norms, rather than political attitudes. Finally, this thesis provides a basis from which to study the constituency office, as a site of service interaction. ; This thesis is published under the Creative Commons-licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.

Groundwater recharge is constrained by various factors with rainfall playing a key role. The Kompienga dam basin located in southeastern Burkina Faso displays semi-arid climatic conditions with rainfall occurring five months per year. The average long-term (1959-2005) mean annual rainfall amounted to 830.2 mm with high temporal and spatial variability. During the year, evaporation always exceeds rainfall, except for a few months in the rainy season when recharge can take place in the basin. In addition, the crystalline rocks of granites and amphibolites mainly underlying the basin have a poor water storage capacity. Therefore, groundwater recharge in the basin is estimated to be as low as 43.9 mm, which represents 5.3% of the rainfall in 2005 for a potential groundwater volume of 259.5 million m³. The estimation based on the water balance method, the chloride mass balance method and the water table fluctuation method shows that the basin recharge is mostly through matrix flow with considerable spatial variability based on soil textures, crystalline rock fracturing, land-use/land-cover and topography. Thus, preferential flow processes are dominant in the basin recharge in the southwestern part around Tanyélé, where the chloride concentration in the groundwater is about that in rainwater. Annual recharge in the basin is determined by an annual rainfall threshold ranging between 314.3 mm and 336.6 mm reached during the first two to three months of the rains. This relationship provided the equation for deriving annual groundwater recharge in the basin. According to Eddy correlation measurements, actual evaporation in the basin depletes the aquifers at an average rate of 0.6 mm per day during the dry season. This situation contributes to the reduction of the groundwater resources and limits the possibilities of developing these resources to improve the population's livelihoods. The basin population in 2005 was 270 000 inhabitants living in 15 departments in 5 provinces, and water withdrawal was estimated at an average rate of 76 l/c/d (including livestock watering) in the dry season period. This represents 5 million m 3 of water, making up 2 % of the annual recharge to the aquifers. In anticipation of decreasing rainfall and increasing population in the Kompienga dam basin, scenarios of recharges against withdrawals show that the annual recharge will support the demand for water till 2030 at a supply rate of 25 l/c/d from 1260 functional boreholes operating 12 hours per day at an average unit yield of 1 m 3 per hour. The nationally formulated norm for rural water provision of 20 l/c/d was found to respond to basic needs only, and 35 l/c/d is considered the required supply rate especially from March to May when the water demand is highest. Therefore, the revision of the national norm and policy target for rural water supply is recommended. ; Grundwasserpotential zur Versorgung der Bevölkerung im Kompienga Staudammbecken in Burkina Faso Grundwasseranreicherung wird durch verschiedene Faktoren bestimmt, wobei dem Niederschlag eine Schlüsselrolle zukommt. Das Kompienga Staudammbecken im süd-östlichen Teil Burkina Fasos weist mit seinen durchschnittlich fünf Regenmonaten pro Jahr und einem mittleren Jahresniederschlag (1959-2005) von 830,2 mm bei hoher zeitlicher und räumlicher Varianz. Im Laufe des Jahres übersteigt dort die Evaporation die Niederschlagsmengen, mit Ausnahme von wenigen Monaten während der Regenzeit, in denen die Grundwasseranreicherung im Becken stattfinden kann. Zudem haben die kristallinischen Granite und Amphibolite, die sich unter dem Becken befinden, nur eine geringe Speicherfähigkeit. Die Schätzung der Grundwasseranreicherung für das Becken ergibt darum einen niedrigen Wert von 5,3 % der jährlichen Niederschlagsmenge im Jahr 2005 für ein potenzielles Grundwasservolumen von 259,5 Mio. m 3 . Die auf der Wasserbilanz-Methode, der Chlorid-Mengenbilanz-Methode und der Grundwasserspiegel-Fluktuationsmethode basierende Schätzung zeigt, dass die Anreicherung hauptsächlich über matrix flow gespeist wird, mit einer hohen räumlichen Varianz je nach Bodenbeschaffenheit, Vorkommen von Frakturen im kristallinischen Gestein, Landnutzung und -bedeckung sowie Topografie. Dementsprechend dominieren preferential flow Prozesse im süd-westlichen Teil nahe Tanyélé, wo die Chloridkonzentration des Grundwassers ungefähr der des Niederschlagswassers entspricht. Die jährliche Anreicherung im Becken wird durch den jährlichen Niederschlag (314,3 mm bis 336,6 mm), der während der ersten zwei bis drei Regenmonate erreicht wird, bestimmt. Den Eddy correlation Messungen zufolge führt die aktuelle Evaporation während der Trockenzeit zu einer Abnahme des in den Aquiferen gespeicherten Grundwassers um einem durchschnittlichen Wert von 0,6 mm pro Tag und damit zur Reduzierung der Grundwasserressourcen. Hierdurch sind die Möglichkeiten, diese Ressourcen zu entwickeln und so zu einer Verbesserung der Lebensgrundlage der Bevölkerung beizutragen, begrenzt. Im Jahr 2005 lebten die 270 000 Bewohner des Beckens in fünfzehn Distrikten bzw. fünf Provinzen, und ihre Wasserentnahme in der Trockenzeit entsprach ca. 76 l/c/d (einschließlich Wasser für das Vieh). Das entspricht 5 Mio. m 3 Wasser und 2 % der jährlichen Grundwasseranreicherungsmenge. Vergleichende Szenarien auf der Grundlage der zu erwartenden geringeren Niederschläge und steigendenden Bevölkerungszahlen im Kompienga Staudammbecken zeigen, dass die jährliche Grundwasseranreicherung ausreichen wird, um den Wasserbedarf bis 2030 bei einer Versorgung mit Wasser von 25 l/c/d durch 1260 funktionale Bohrlöcher im 12-stündigen Betrieb bei einer Pumprate von 1 m³ pro Stunde zu decken. Die auf nationaler Ebene formulierte Norm von 20 l/c/d für ländliche Gebiete kann lediglich die Grundversorgung sicherstellen, da tatsächlich 35 l/c/d benötigt werden, insbesondere in der Zeit von März bis Mai, wenn der Wasserbedarf am höchsten ist. Daraus ergibt sich die Empfehlung, die nationale Norm und politische Zielvorgabe für die ländliche Versorgung zu überprüfen und gegebenenfalls zu korrigieren.

Issue 19.6 of the Review for Religious, 1960. ; SACRED CONGREGATION OF RITES Litany of the Precious Blood [On February 24, 1960, the Sacred Congregation of Rites issued .the Latin text of a new litany to be included in future editions of the Roman Ritual immediately after the Litany of the Sacred Heart. The,:original text may be found in /lcta Apostolicae Sedis, 52 (1960), 412-13. On March 3, 1960 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 52 [1960], 420), the Sacred Apostolic Penitentiary granted an indulgence of seven years each time the litany is recited with contrite heart; moreover once a month a plenary indulgence can bi~ gained under the usual conditions provided the litany has been said daily for an entire month.] Lord, have mercy on us. Christ, have mercy on us. Lord, have mercy on us. Christ hear us. Christ graciously hear us. God the Father of heaven, have mercy on us. God the Son, Redeemer of the world, have mercy on us. God the Holy Spirit, have mercy on us. Holy Trinity, one God, have mercy on us. Blood of Christ, only Son of the eternal Father, save us. Blood of Christ, incarnate Word of God, save us. Blood of Christ of the new and eternal testament, save us. Blood of Christ, flowing to the earth during the agony, save us. Blood of Christ, poured out during the scourging, save us. Blood o[ Christ, streaming forth during the crowning of thorns, save us. Blood of Christ, shed on the cross, save us. Blood of Christ, price of our salvation, save us. Blood of Christ, without which there is no forgiveness, save us. Blood of Christ, purifying drink of souls in the Eucharist, save us. Blood of Christ, river of mercy, save us. Blood of Christ, conqueror of the devils, save us. Blood of Christ, courage of the martyrs, save us. Blood of Christ, strength of confessors, save us. Blood of Christ, seed of virgins, save us. Litany ot the Precious Blood VOLUME 19, 1960 ~2! Blood of Christ, strength of those in danger, save us. Blood of Christ, solace of the suffering, save us. Blood of Christ, consolation in time of grief, save us. Blood of Christ, hope of penitents, save us. Blood of Christ, comfort of the dying, save us. Blood of Christ, peace and sweetness of hearts, save us. Blood of Christ, pledge of eternal life, save us. Blood of Christ, liberating souls from Purgatory, save us. Blood of Christ, worthy of all glory and honor, save us. Lamb of God, who takes away the sins of the world, spare us, O Lord. Lamb of God, who takes away the sins of the world, graciously hear us, O Lord. Lamb of God, who takes away the sins of the world, have mercy on us. V. You have redeemed us, O Lord, in Your Blood. R. And You have made us a kingdom for our God. Let us pray Almighty, everlasting God, who made Your only begotten Son the Redeemer of the world and who willed to be pro-pitiated by His Blood: grant, we beseech You, that we may venerate this price of our salvation and be defended on earth by Its power from the evils of the present life, so that we may thereby enjoy the perpetual reward of heaven. Through the same Christ our Lord. Amen. ÷ ÷ ÷ Sacred Congregation o~ Rites REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 322 JOSEPH F. GALLEN, S. J. The Constitutions Questions, difficulties, and cases on the constitutions ot religious institutes are of frequent occurrence. It seems more practical to retain the question and answer form for this matter than to synthesize it in the abstract form of an article. I. The Obligation to Strive for Perfection 1. What is the obligation o] a religious to strive ]or perfection? All authors admit the existence of such an obligation, but they differ in explaining its source. The first and at least solidly probable opinion is that the obligation of striving for perfection is not distinct from the obligation of observing the two distinctive means of perfection of the religious state, that is, the vows and the laws of the par-ticular institute, which are contained principally in the Rule and constitutions. This obligation is consequently completely identified with the obligation of observing the vows and the laws of the particular institute. Therefore, sin cannot be committed against a special and distinct ob-ligation of striving for perfection. The first argument for this opinion is that the Code of Canon Law nowhere as-serts a distinct obligation of striving for perfection. The code at least appears to confirm this opinion and may even be explicitly affirming it, since canon 593 states that all religious are obliged to observe their vows constantly and completely, to order their lives according to their rules and constitutions, and thus tend to the per[ection oI their state. The canon evidently at least appears to identify the obligation of observing the vows, rules, and constitutions with the striving for perfection. The same principle is con-tained in canon 488, 1°: "A religious institute signifies a society., in which the members, according to the laws proper to the society, take public vows., and so strive after evangelical perfection." This opinion maintains also that one who is obliged to the means of perfection is suffi-ciently obliged to strive for perfection, and an additional obligation is not to be asserted without necessity. It is likewise a general principle that one fulfills the duties of Joseph F. Gallen, $.J. is Professor of (:anon Law at Woodstock College, Woodstock, Maryland. VOLUME 19, 1960 323 ÷ ÷ Joseph F. Gallen, REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 324 his state of life by satisfying the obligations proper to that state. The final argument is drawn from a comparison with~ the obligation of attaining eternal salvation. All mankind' is obliged to attain eternal salvation, but this is not an oh' ligation distinct from that of obeying the laws to which/ one is subject. The man who habitually commits or in-~ tends to commit serious sins of theft does not also sini against a special obligation of attaining eternal salvation.~ Geerts, Revue D'~lsc~tique et De Mystique, 2 (1921),i 213--47; Auxentius a Rotterdam, Commentarium Pro Re-¢ ligiosis, 31 (1952), 250-75; 33 (1954), 77-85; 192-211;I 302-11; Creusen, Religious Men and Women in Church l Law, n. 253; Bastien, Directoire Canonique, n. 521; bart, Trait~ de Droit.Canonique, n. 876, 3°; and others. The second probable opinion affirms a special obliga-~ tion from the virtue of religion to strive for perfection, that is, an obligation distinct from that of observing the l vows and the laws of the particular institute. The first l argument for this opinion is that the religious by profes-sion becomes a member of a public state whose purpose~ is to strive for perfection. The religious is therefore t obliged to strive for the purpose of his state of life. It can~ be immediately replied that the religious does this by the obligation of observing the vows and the laws of the par-ticular institute, whose observance necessarily leads to per-fection. No other obligation is necessary nor proved. The second argument is founded on a tacit promise of the re-ligious in his profession to strive for the purpose of his state. But again the religious fulfills such a promise by the obligation of observing the vows and the laws of the par-ticular institute. The last argument is that one who ex-plicitly promises to observe a definite means [the vows] to an end, implicitly also promises to strive for the end. This may be granted, but it does not prove a special obligation to strive for the end. It even appears to affirm the con-trary doctrine, that is, the end or purpose is sufficiently attained by the obligation of observing the means to that end. We may therefore conclude that the obligation of ob-serving the vows and the laws of the particular institute is clear in itself and in the code; that such observance necessarily leads to perfection; and that a special obliga-tion of striving for perfection is not necessary, is not proved, and consequently does not have to be admitted. The opinion of a digtinct obligation is held by Vermeersch, De Religiosis, II, (68)-(69); I, nn. 224-27; Epitome luris Canonici, I, n. 748; Theologia Moralis, III, n. 114; Wernz- Vidal, De Religiosis, n. 338; Pujol, De Religiosis Orientali-bus, nn. 342-45; Muzzarelli, De Congregationibus Iuris Dioecesani, n. 327; and others, H. Meaning and Content of Rule an_d Constitutions 2. We call the constitutions our holy Rule. Are consti-tutions and the Rule the same thing? The Rule gives only general, primary, fundamental, and concise spiritual and ascetical norms; the constitutions are more detailed, more legal and disciplinary. The Rule is relatively small and incomplete; the constitutions are larger and contain all the particular norms necessary for the religious life. The various Rules originated before the fifteenth century; new constitutions continually arise. The Rule is usually the work of the founder himself; the con-stitutions have very frequently originated in chapters. The Rule is considered as perpetual, untouchable, immutable, and may be changed only by the Roman Pontiff; this sta-bility is greater than that of the constitutions, even when the latter were approved by the Holy See. The Rule is in fact common to many distinct religious institutes; the con-stitutions are proper to each institute. To exemplify this fact, even though incompletely, in lay institutes the Rule of St. Augustine is found in nuns of the Sacred Order of Preachers, of Our Lady of Charity of Refuge, of the Blessed Sacrament of Our Lady, of the Visitation, and of the Order of St. Ursula, as also in Dominican congregations of sisters and in the Good Shepherd of Angers Sisters. The Rule of St. Benedict is used by Benedictine nuns and sisters; and the Rule of St. Francis, which is rather a triple Rule, is found in institutes of Franciscan nuns, sisters, and broth-ers. The Rule of St. Basil is confined almost exclusively to oriental religious. The Rules of St. Basil, St. Augustine, St. Benedict, and St. Francis are called the four great Rules. Other Rules also exist, for example, that of the Carmelite Order, which is observed also by Carmelite nuns and sisters. Because the Rule was general, incomplete, and so ex-clusively spiritual, in institutes that arose before the six-teenth century it had to be completed by other norms that clarified and determined the general principles of the Rule, adapted the Rule to the specific purpose of an insti-tute, and completed it by defining the purpose, means, government, offices, and the rights and obligations of the members. These complementary norms were usually called constitutions. Therefore, in institutes that have a Rule, the Rule is the fundamental law, the constitutions are the complementary law. Institutes that arose from the beginning of the sixteenth century ordinarily did not adopt one of the ancient Rules but assembled all their basic laws in one collection, which was generally called constitutions. Therefore, in these institutes and in the more modern sense, constitutions include both the funda-mental and complementary law of the institute. However, ÷ ÷ ÷ TI~ Constitutions VOLUME 19, 1960 325 4" ]oseph F. Gallen, $.~. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 326 at present in institutes of brothers, nuns, and sisters that have a Rule, the constitutions ordinarily are of exactly the same nature in subject matter as in institutes that fol-low no Rule. The sense explained above is that of Rule in the singu-lar. In the plural, rules are not part of the basic law of an institute, as are the Rule and constitutions, but secondary, particular, and detailed norms of conduct, for example, common rules, rules of modesty, of the provincial, of the local superior, of priests, of confessors, of scholastics, of lay brothers, and so forth. Such rules are in use in many of the institutes founded from the beginning of the sixteenth century. They are not found too frequently in lay insti-tutes, whose particular law generally consists of a Rule, if the institute follows one, constitutions, directory, custom book, ordinances of the general chapter, and regulations of higher superiors. In the Code of Canon Law, the terms rules, rules and constitutions, and constitutions in relation to religious sig-nify the entire particular law of an institute, whether this has its origin in a Rule or constitutions, and no matter what may be the parts or the names by which various parts of this particular law are designated in a given institute. The Normae of 1921 forbade religious congregations to call their constitutions a Rule in the text of the constitu-tions. They are to be termed constitutions (n. 22 h.). This norm of canonical usage does not forbid such expressions as "our holy Rule" in other usage nor in conversation Even moral and canonical authors are still accustomed to explain the obligation and Other matters appertaining to constitutions under the general heading of the obligation of the Rule. Maroto, Regulae et Particulares Constitu-tiones Singularum Religionum, nn. 1-97; Larraona, Com-mentarium Pro Religiosis, 4 (1923), 134-39; Ravasi, De Regulis et Constitutionibus Religiosorum, 8-14. 3. I have noticed that religious universally speak of their constitutions, or of their holy Rule, as iJ all the arti-cles of the constitutions had the same force. Is this true? Constitutions are in fact composed of several different species of laws. 1. Laws of God. These, for example, the prohibition of stealing or of lying, whether natural or revealed, oblige immediately under sin, mortal or venial, according to the particular law. There are very few such laws in constitu-tions. 2. Laws that determine the matter of the vows. These are also few in number, since they are ordinarily confined to the articles that give the definition of each vow. Such laws evidently oblige in the same way as the vow, because they define the matter of the particular vow. A particular article may also contain a precept in virtue of the vow of obedience, but such articles are not found in the constitu-tions of lay institutes. 3. Laws of the Church, especially those appertaining to religious. A very great number of these are found in all constitutions. They oblige immediately under sin, mortal or venial, according to the law. However, practically none of these laws immediately affect the daily lives of religious. 4. Particular laws of the institute. These are divided into exhortations or counsels, legal, merely disciplinary, and spiritual articles. (a) Exhortations or counsels. It is not repugnant that some articles of the constitutions be mere ex-hortations or counsels, such as those on the practice of virtue to an exalted degree, for example, charity, hu-mility, obedience, mortification, and so forth. Of this nature are articles that demand a perfect love of God and complete detachment from selblove in all actions, the acceptance and desire only of what our Lord ac-cepted and desired, complete conformity of judgment in all obedience, and the more perfect abnegation and mortification of oneself in every act. If understood in the particular institute as counsels, they produce no obligation; if understood as preceptive, they are vio-lated only by a habitual neglect to cultivate such vir-tues. (b) Legal articles. Some of these are on government and the organization of the institute, for example, the following matters established by the law of the con-stitutions: the members Of the general and provincial chapters; the substitutes for such members; the system of electing delegates; the possession of active and pas-sive voice; the number required for a valid s~ssion of a chapter and council; the number of votes re-quired for a valid election; the right of making pro-posals to the general chapter; the qualities required for offices, for example, for superiors, councilors, sec-retaries, and treasurers; the term of office and imme-diate reelection or reappointment of supe?iors and officials; the incompatibility of offices; matters that require the consent or advice of councils; matters that demand a secret vote of a council; the number of councilors; appointments to be made in a full coun-cil; substitutes for councilors; the prescribed resi-dence Of officials, for example, of general and provin-cial councilors; the manner of replacing a general official; the frequency of canonical visitations by higher superiors; determination of higher superior competent for admission to the postulancy, novice-ship, and professions, reception of professions, for the erection and transfer of a novitiate, and for the erec- 4- The Constitutions VOLUME 19. 1960 ÷ ÷ Joseph F. Gallen, REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 328 tion and suppression of houses; and reports and ac-counts of administration of various superiors and officials. Some articles of this class prescribed by the law of the constitutions are concerned with formation and religious profession, for example: entrance impedi-ments; entrance testimonials; a postulancy longer than six months; a noviceship longer than a year; temporary profession longer than three years; man-ner of beginning the .noviceship; formula and rite of profession; place of religious profession, except the first; limitations on 'acquisition and ownership of personal property; limitations on disposition of use and usufruct of p~rsonal property; and the giving of a copy of the constitutions to each novice. (c) Merely disciplinary articles. In general, such articles refer to the order and regularity of common life, the religious exercises, the work, and domestic and community duties of the religious, for example: reporting of presumed permissions; reception of visi-tors; going out of the house; going out alone; permis-sion for and inspection of correspondence; reception of visitors; visiting of externs; silence; reading at ta-ble; suffrages for the dead; interviews prescribed with superiors and masters; the spiritual duties, for exam-ple, daily Mass; recitation and choral recitation of the Little Office or the Short Breviary; prescribed visits to the Blegsed Sacrament; meditation and its prepara-tion; rosary; examen; spiritual reading; weekly con-fession; public devotional renewal of vows; retreats; monthly recollection; and the chapter of faults. (d) Spiritual articles. The constitutions, contain many spiritual articles, which enjoin the practice of various virtues, especially of those more distinctive of the religious life. IlL Obligation of the Constitutions 4, What is the obligation o~ constitutions which state merely that they do not o] themselves bind directly, or immediately, under pain o] sin and o] ~hose that add the phrase, "but under the penalty imposed ]or their viola-tion?" Authors usually treat this matter under the heading of the obligation of the rule; but they understand rule here to include not only the Rule properly so called, for ex-ample, the Rule of St. Augustine, St. Benedict, and St. Francis, but also the constitutions; and they quite Com-monly include also the legitimate customs, ordinances of the general and provincial chapters, if the latter possesses such authority, and the regulations of higher superiors. We are following the same complete sense in answering this question. The question of the obligation of the particular law of an institute is confined to. the articles described in n. 4(b), (c), and (d) of the preceding question, since the obligation of the other articles contained in the constitutions was stated in this s~ame question. Constitutions have the moral obligation that the legislator imposed. This can be imme-diately under sin. In some of the older orders, there are prescriptions of the Rule or constitutions that oblige im-mediately under mortal or venial sin. A prescription o~ the constitutions of any clerical exempt institute to which a canonical penalty is attached necessarily obliges immedi-ately under mortal sin, because such a punishment pre-supposes an objective and. subjective mortal sin (cc. 2218, §2; 2242, §1). In several older orders, congregations, and lay institutes in general, the obligation of the constitu-tions is phrased as in the present question and more com-monly in the first manner.~ All authors admit that the constitutions effect a real obligation. No Rule or constitutions consist entirely of counsels and exhortations. The essential effect of law is to produce an obligation.The common opinion has been and is that such constitutions are merely penal laws. The enactment of a law requires the power of jurisdiction. This authority is possessed by the general chapters of clerical exempt religious (c. 501 §1); and the constitutions o~ other institutes become laws by theapprobation or confirmation of the Holy See or local ordinaries, in the case o~ diocesan congregations. Some authors, ancient a_nd modern, have denied that the Rule and constitutions are laws; but this does not imply that they deny also an obligation to ob-serve the Rule and constitutions. That which is commanded or forbidden by the articles of such constitutions is not enjoined immediately under sin, for example, the violation of silence is not in itself a sin. There is no dispute on this point, because these con-stitutions expressly exclude such an obligation. The legis-lator of these laws or statutes is not indifferent to the ob-servance of his laws. He wills the observance of the law. An obligation immediately under sin is not necessary to secure the observance o~ the constitutions ~rom religious, and a legislator should not impose, an obligation greater than is necessary for observance and for the common good. Religious are cer~tainly subjects more prone to observance than to violation of law. Another way o~ stating the same argument is that sins are not to be multiplied without necessity. An 9bligation immediately under sin would also cause unnecessary anxieties of conscience. Since religious profession is a free and,spontaneous c?nsecration of one-self to Christ, it is becoming also that the living of this ÷ ÷ The Constitutions VOLUME 19, 1960 + 4. 4. Joseph F. Gollen, $.~. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 330 consecration should not be lacking in these same notes of freedom, spontaneity, and generosity. A religious who vio-lates his constitutions under the rationalization that they do not oblige under sin overturns the very reasons for which his constitutions exclude such an obligation, as is evident from the reasons listed above. He has a disposi-tion exactly contrary to that presumed by his constitutions. I[ religious were commonly of this disposition, the only reasonable norm of a legislator would be to make the con-stitutions oblige immediately under sin. All authors admit that the violation of such constitu-tions is in itself a positive imperfection. This is defined as the omission of a good that is not commanded under sin but in the concrete circumstances is known certainly to be a greater good for the person concerned, either from the clear interior inspiration of the Holy Spirit, the certain judgment of reason, or the declaration of legitimate au-thority given through oral directives or such a medium as the constitutions of religious. A dispute exists among theologians as to whether a positive imperfection is a sin in itself, but the more common opinion denies that it is a sin. The effect of such an imperfection is the lessening of worthiness for more intense and more efficacious graces from God. The dispute as to whether a positive imperfection is a sin in itself is of little practical import, since all authors declare, particularly of a violation of constitutions, that such an act is rarely lacking in at least some venial malice, either from the effects or the motive of such a rejection of a greater good. Sinfulness from the effects is verified when the violation causes scandal, a relaxation of religious dis-cipline, or other harm. The sinful motive can be anger, impatience, pride, vanity, sloth, sensuality, and so forth. A religious penitent may therefore accuse himself of vio-lations of the constitutions in confession both for better guidance and because these violations rarely lack at least some venial sinfulness. All theologians and canonists also agree that a subject is obliged under sin to accept and perform a punishment, or penance, imposed by a superior for a violation of the constitutions. Some hold that this obligation arises wholly or at least partially from the constitutions themselves; others maintain that the obligation has its source purely in the precept of the superior imposing the punishment. There is little practical difference, if any, in these two - theories. In the latter doctrine, the punishment will not oblige immediately under sin. unless it is expressly so im-posed by a precept of a superior. However, in practice this is true also in the first opinion. It would be contrary to the spirit of such constitutions if all punishments, even when very slight, were considered as imposed immediately under sin. Therefore, also in the first opinion, the punishment will not oblige immediately under sin unless it is so im-posed, explicitly or implicitly, by the precept of a superior. "Therefore, let all members Of the states of striving for evangelical perfection remember, and frequently recall before God, that it is not enough for the fulfillment of the obligations of their profession to avoid grave sins or, with the help of God, even venial sins; nor is it enough to carry out only materially the commands of their superiors, or to observe the vows or bonds binding in conscience, or even to observe their own constitutions according to which, as the Church herself commands in the s, acred canons, 'each and every religious, superiors as well as subjects, ought . to order his life and thus strive after the perfection of his state.' They should accomplish all these things with a whole-hearted intention and a burning love, not only out of necessity, 'but also for conscience's sake.' In order to be capable of ascending the summits of sanctity, and of being living founts of Christian charity for all, they must be im-pelled by the most ardent love for God and their neighbor and adorned with every virtue." Plus XII, Apostolic Con-stitution, Sedes Sapientiae, n. 24. 5. Don't the constitutions o] lay congregations ap-proved b~ the Hol~ See state that subjects are obliged Irora the virtue o] obedience to observe the constitutions and prescriptions o~ superiors, that is, over and above those contained in a precept in virtue o] the vow? Doesn't "to oblige" mean an obligation immediately under sin? It is the practice of the Holy See to include such an arti-cle in the constitutions. The article quoted in the question is taken verbatim from the Normae of 1901, n. 134; Statuta a Sororibus Externis Monasteriorum Monialium Cuiusque Ordinis Servanda, n. 60; and the Normae pro Constitu-tionibus Congregationum luris Dioecesani a S. Congrega-tione de Propaganda Fide Dependentium, n. 69. However, it is not the intention of the Holy See in this article to affirm any obligation over and above what these other prescriptions of superiors and the constitutions have in themselves. All of these documents, successively in nn. 320, 126, and 193, also state explicitly that the constitutions do not oblige immediately under sin. 6. Do the constitutions oblige in virtue of the vow of obedience~ ÷ It is possible to find older orders of religious in which ÷ prescriptions of the Rule or constitutions binding immedi-ately under sin oblige in virtue of the vow. This is evi-dently possible, because obedience is vowed according to the constitutions and such is the sense of the vow of obedi-ence in these orders. It is equally evident that institutes The Constitutions VOLUME 19, 1960 331 in which the constitutions do not in general bind immedi-ately under sin may place some precepts in virtue of the vow in their constitutions. This is actually done, and such specific precepts obviously oblige in virtue of the vow of obedience. Outside of such precepts, constitutions that do not bind immediately under sin do not and cannot oblige in virtue of the vow of obedience. They do not, because the sense of the vow in such institutes is that the constitutions can be made the matter of a precept of the vow by a competent superior but are not in themselves a precept in virtue of the vow. They cannot of themselves oblige in virtue of the vow, because the vow obliges immediately under sin and the prescriptions of these constitutions do not so oblige. 7. Precisely what sin is committed by a sinful violation of constitutions that do not oblige immediately under sin? The sinfulness in such a violation is from the subjective motive or the circumstances or both. Therefore, the precise sin is that of the motive or the circumstances. For example; if such constitutions are violated from pride, the sin is pride; if the circumstances of the violation are such as to cause scandal, the sin is against charity. It is evident that both malices can be found in the one act. If the constitu-tions obliged immediately under sin, the primary malice would be from the object. For example, the violation of such a law of fast would be against the virtue of temper-ance. This sinfulness is not verified in the constitutidns in question, because they do not oblige immediately under sin. 4" $oseph F. Gallen, $.1. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 8. What do our constitutions mean when they state that a sin is committed by violating the constitutions from contempt? It is evident thata sin is committed whenever the con-stitutions are violated from a sinful motive. Formal con-tempt is the despising of a superior, a law, or a counsel as such. It is therefore the contemning or despising of au-thority. This is a mortal sin, because to despise authority is to despise God, from Whom all authority proceeds. Formal contempt is rarely found in the faithful and less fre-quently in religious. The contempt stated in the constitu-ttons is formal contempt. Despite its rare occurrence, con-stitutions almost universally specify contempt as a sinful motive. It seems to me that it would be more realistic and practical to state that a religious sins whenever he violates the constitutions through a sinful motive. This is particu-larly true of constitutions which word the pertinent article as if contempt were the only sinful motive. Cf. Normae of 1901, n. 320; Statuta a Sororibus Externis Monasteriorum Monialium Cuiusque Ordinis Servanda, n. 126; Normae pro Constitutionibus Congregationum Iuris Dioecesani a S. C. de Propaganda Fide Dependentium, n. 193. Material contempt is the despisal of the person or a su-perior or of the matter of a law or counsel, "for example, if a religious despises a legislator or superior as ignorant, imprudent, rigid, malicious, uncultured,, obstinate, or a law as unsuitable, antiquated, ridiculous and because of such a motive violates the constitutions. This is ordinarily a venial sin. The sin will be mortal if such a motive leads to a serious violation of the vows, the serious harm of the institute, grave scandal, or to the proximate occasion of grave sin. 9. According to your explanation ot the obligation of constitutions, a superior may by his precept impose im-mediately under sin a punishment or penance for a vio-lation. The only precepts immediately under sin of which our constitutions speak are those in virtue of the vow of obedience. Is is true that the constitutions of lay institutes ordi-narily mention explicitly only precepts in virtue of the vow of obedience, which are usually also called formal precepts, A superior may impose a penance for such a vio-lation by a precept in virtue of the vow, since a penance for a violation, as something necessary or very useful for the observance of the constitutions, is indirectly Or implicitly contained in the constitutions. However, the constant practice of the Holy See in approving the constitutions of lay institutes forbids a superior to give a command in vir-tue of the vow except in grave matter. Other institutes should take this practice as a directive norm. Therefore, in practice a precept imposing a penance for a violation in virtue of the vow may be given only when the matter is grave. Even when such matter is verified, it is not the practice of religious institutes to impose the penance al-ways in virtue of the vow. All religious superiors, clerical or lay, possess authority in virtue of their office (cc. 501, §1; 502). This authority includes the power to impose an obligation immediately under sin, mortal or venial; and superiors are not obliged to impose such an obligation in virtue of the vow of obedi-ence, The understanding of the constitutions is that a su-perior may impose a penance immediately under sin for a violation. The constitutions do not demand that such a penance be imposed in virtue of the vow. It is therefore evident that precepts immediately under sin can and do exist in the religious life that are not imposed in virtue of the vow of obedience. A superior is obliged to make it clear, explicitly or implicitly, that he is imposing a strict precept, that is, one imposing an obligation immediately ÷ ÷ ÷ The Constitutions VOLUME 19o 1960 333 ÷ ÷ ÷ ]oseph F. Gallen, $.1. REVIEW FOR' RELIGIOUS 334 under sin. In light mgtter, he may impose an obligation only under venial sin; in grave matter, he may impose the obligation under mortal or venial sin. Religious superiors are not to be unmindful of the ad-monitions of the'Council of Trent expressed in canon 2214, §2: "Let bishops and other ordinaries bear in mind that they are shepherds and not oppressors and that they ought so to preside over those subject to them as not to lord it over them, but to love them as children and breth-ren and to strive by exhortation and admonition to deter them from what is unlawful, that they may not be obliged, should they transgress, to coerce them by due punishments. In regard to those, however, who should happen to sin through frailty, that command of the Apostle is to be ob-served, that they reprove, entreat, rebuke them in all kind-ness and patience, since benevolence toward those to be corrected often effects more than severity, exhortation more than threat, and charity more than force. But if on account of the gravity of the offense there is need of the rod, then is rigor to be tempered with gentleness, judg-ment with mercy, and severity with clemency, that disci-pline, so salutary and necessary for the people, may be preserved without harshness and they who are chastised may be corrected, or, if they are unwilling to repent, that others may by the wholesome example of their punish-ment be deterred from vices." Schroeder, Council ol Trent, 81. 10. To what observance does the obligation of the con-stitutions extend? The obligation of the constitutions, as is true also of the vow of obedience, does not certainly extend beyond the external performance of what is commanded by the con-stitutions. However, we are to beware here also of the danger of saving the law and losing our souls. A religious who restricts himself to the field of strict obligation has, in a certain sense, put himself outside the religious state, which is essentially a life of supererogation, counsel, and generosity. A merely external and legalistic observance is contrary to the purpose of the religious life. The religious therefore should strive constantly to purify and elevate the interior motives of his observance. In the same way, he is to endeavor to attain an ever more perfect external ful-fillment of the law, He cannot be content with the legal-istic external observance of the mere demands of the law. The religious life should be the state of the spiritually magnanimous, not of spiritual misers. The vows are the primary, the constitutions the secondary, of the distinctive means of striving for sanctity in the religious life. As in the vows, so in the constitutions, the essential source of sanctification is in the interior acts of the mind and the will. Mere externalism is foreign to the. religious life, so also is a supposed interior life without external observ-ance. Anyone who has the proper interior spirit cannot be deficient in external observance. "Submission to the observances of the rule must not degenerate into a stifling formalism. The religious cannot be content in an external observance devoid of care for the interior spirit. If the in-terior dispositions are lacking, the rigid practice o[ ob-servances and usages does not conduce to union with God." Reverend I. Van Houtryve, O~S.B., Acta et Docu-menta Congressus Generalis de Statibus PerIectionis, II, 458; "There is also a danger, especially in superiors and superioresses, of legalism, which is a source of no small harm to the formation of subjects. By legalism we mean the acquired propensity merely or principally to the ma-terial and literal observance of positive laws and the pro-portionate omission of true morality, which consists in sincere love of God and the neighbor." Reverend R. Car-pentier, S.J., ibid., II, 548. "There is danger Of a certain formalism in proposing the religious life to subjects when external regularity is so intensively and vehemently urged that explicit formation to supernatural virtues is almost omitted." Reverend R. Carpentier, S.J., ibid.; "It seems particularly that in the study of moral theology and canon law a sufficient distinction is not made between the view-point of simple morality, sin and no sin, and that of Christian perfection. The norm of life of the religious is not merely the sinless, but the more perfect." Reverend Benjamin of the Most Holy Trinity, O.C.D., ibid,, II, 195; "The interior life is essentially the union or habitual oc-cupation of the soul with God, so that it thinks, speaks, and acts constantly in 'the spirit of God, that is, it is guided and impelled in its every movement by the spirit and love of God." Reverend A. Gennaro, S.D.B., ibid., II, 62; "All realize that automatism and formalism are fatal to any re-ligious life and that legalism, or the mere satisfying of the wording of the law, can quiet the conscience but is the source of sterility and pharisaism, the negation of evangeli-cal sanctity." Reverend L. Veuthey, O.F.M. Cony., ibid., II, 229. His Holiness, Plus XII, reaffirmed the warning of these authors: "It is clear, in the first place, that a sincere devo-tion to the religious life excludes all legalism, that is, the temptation to be bound by the letter of the law, without fully accepting its spirit. Such an attitude would be un-worthy of those who bear the tide of spouse of Christ and who wish to serve Him with a disinterested love." .4llocu-tion to Cloistered Contemplatives, REviEw l~oR RELIGIOUS, 18 (1959), 71. 4- The Constitutions VOLUME 19, 1960 Joseph F. Gallen, $.~. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 336 11. Aren't there any cases in which a violation of the constitutions is not a sin? A religious does not sin when he has a reasonable mo-tive and no culpable effects~arise from not observing the constitutions. Authors .commonly give as an example of reasonable motive the break!ng of silence in order to con-sole a fellow religious in sadness. One author adds that such acts, though good and not sinful, will frequently less perfect than the observance of the constitutions. religious also does not sin when he is excused or dispensed from the observance of an article of the constitutions. The individual transgressions of articles of frequent applica-tion will often not be sinful because of the lack of ad-vertence, but the habitual will of persisting in or of correcting such violations will be sinful. Cf. Genicot-Sals-mans, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis, II, n. 796; Rega-tillo- Zalba, Tractatus de Statibus Particularibus, n. 212. 12. Does a religious obtain the merit of the virtue of obedience and of the vow of obedience by observing ,the constitutions? A religious who observes his constitutions because they are commanded obtains the merit of the special virtue obedience. If he observes them because of another good motive, he obtains the merit of the virtue under which this motive falls. Therefore, a religious obtains the merit of the vow of obedience, that is, of the virtue of religion, when the motive of his observance of the constitutions the vow. The presumption is that the motive of the sub-jection of a religious to any type of will of his superiors is his vow of obedience. Therefore, in all subjection, un-less he positively excludes this motive, he acquires the-merit of the vow of obedience. The Holy See has approved constitutions that contain an article of the following type: "The sister can always have the new bond or virtue of re-ligion as the motive or end of any act of obedience. In fact such a will must be presumed to be implicitly contained the act of religious profession. Accordingly, the special e~cacy of the vow of obedience, or merit of the virtue o~ religion, extends not only to actions obligatory on the sis-ter by a formal precept in virtue of the vow but also to the ordinary commands and to every action in conformity with the constitutions that the religious perform with motive o[ obedience." Constitutions of the Pious Society of the Daughters of St. Paul, n. 131, 4; Cf. Choupin, Nature et Obligations de l'~tat Religieux, 481. 13. What is my obligation as a superior to correct vio. lations of the constitutions? All superiors have a grave obligation in conscience to maintain observance of the constitutions. A superior may consequently sin mortally by the neglect of correction, for example, of frequent violations, even though not serious in themselves, that will cause a serious relaxation of re-ligious discipline, or of violations that gravely compromise the good name of the institute. The obligation admits lightness of matter, for example, the failure to take appro-priate action against isolated violations that create no danger of a serious relaxation of the religious life. The obligation of correction is often stated in the constitutions, for example, that superiors are bound to admonish and correct subjects who violate the constitutions, especially when the violations are frequent or serious. It is evident that the superior should be prudent. He will often appear not to see violations. Counsel, advice, direction, persuasion, correction, and reprimand are to be employed more frequently than the imposition of a pen-ance; and patience will sometimes accomplish more than an immediate correction, These counsels of prudence have always been given. Superiors have rarely failed to observe them, and one may be permitted the suspicion .that they have been observed too well. Harshness is not desirable in a superior; neither is softness, sloth, nor cowardice. The prime requisite of a superior is not that he is a man who will never bother anyone. Such a man is a bother only to the observant and t9 the sanctity of the religious life. Nice people are not always competent people. Niceness is in some cases a product of weakness. All realize that a su-perior must be prudent; but the norms of prudence vary according to the circumstances, for example, patience is considered an attribute of prudence, but what religious does not know of abuses whose existence is due to failure to correct the original violations? "Although your rules, by the wise decision of your founder, do not bind their subjects under sin, nevertheless superiors are bound to foster their observance; and they are not free from guilt if they permit a general neglect of regular discipline." Plus XII, Allocution to the Thirtieth General Congregation of the Society o[ Jesus, September 10, 1957. IV. Excuse, Permission, Dispensation 14. My superioress told me that ! was excused from hearing Mass because of sickness. I told this to a priest, and he replied that it was impossible for a superior who is not a cleric to have the power of dispensing from a law of the Church. Which of the two is right? Both. An excuse is not a dispensation (cf. Question 17). An excuse from the observance of a law means that the obligation simply ceases to exist for a subject of the law. No one may place an action that is intrinsically evil, for example, blasphemy, idolatry, denial of the faith, hatred ÷ ÷ ÷ Th~ Com~imtions VOLUME 1% 1960 337 ÷ ÷ ÷ 1o~'ph F. G~, SJ. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS of God, and so for~hiThe obligation of other laws.gen-, erally ceases when an accidental but special difficulty, dis-i proportionate to the observance of the law, is connectedl with its observance, for example, it is impossible for a l person in a weak and dying condition to attend SundayI Mass; a teacher is excused from the law of fast if its ob-] servance causes quite a lessening of his efficiency.In an l excuse, the obligation of the law simply ceases to exist of[ itself; there is no need of a relaxing of the obligation, (dispensation) or of a declaration by an ecclesiastical au-~ thority or a superior. Since a judgment has to be made[ between the difficulty and the matter and importance of] the law, it would often b~ prudent to ~onsult a book or a competent person. This is the sense of c~nstitutions which state that a superioress may declare a subject excused from the observance of the constitutions and even of an ec-clesiastical law, for example, from Sunday Mass and ec-clesiastical fast. Cf. R~vmw fOR R~LIG~OUS, I (1942), 42-46. 15. What is the difference between a permission with regard to our constitutions and a dispensation from them? Some laws do not forbid an act absolutely but only when it is done without the permission of a competent superior. For example, canon 806 forbids bination without the per-mission of the local ordinary; canon 1108, §3, prohibits the solemn nuptial blessing during Advent and Lent without the same permission; the reading of forbidden books is forbidden by canon 1398, §1, without proper permission; and clerics and professed religious are forbidden, by canon 139, §3, to undertake the administration of property be-longing to lay persons without the permission of their own ordinary. The constitutions usually forbid the reception of visitors, visiting of externs, consultation of a doctor, going out of the house, sending out letters, and absence from common exercises without the permission of the superior. The permission makes the act licit, and the law is ob-served. Permission does not remove the obligation and free from the observance of the law, as is done in a dis-pensation. A permission.is granted for lesser reasons than a dispensation. It may also be presumed, unless formal and express permission is demanded by a particular law. A dispensation may not be presumed, because the obligation of a law ceases by a dispensation only through the actual exercise of the dispensing power. A dispensation from an ecclesiastical law can be granted only by one possessing the power of jurisdiction; a permission may be given by one who possesses only dominative power. A presumed dispensationis admitted in matters of lesser legal moment than those ordinarily contained in laws, as is true of many spiritual duties that the constitutions command absolutely, for example, visits to the Blessed Sacrament, meditation and its preparation, rosary, exa-men, and spiritual reading. The proportionate reason for a presumed dispensation in such cases will usually con-stitute an excuse from the'oblig~ik'ion (cf. Question '14). A dispensation may also be presumed from an obliga-tion imposed by dominative power, for example, by the ordinances of the general chapters of lay institutes and the ordinances and regulations of religious superiors. The re-lation in such cases is not that of a subject to a law but of his will to that of the superior. In a presumed dispensa-tion, subjection to the habitual will of the superior is pre-served, since a dispensation may not be presumed unless it is at least solidly probable that the superior would grant it, if asked. It is presupposed that there exists an impossi-bility or difficulty, according to the importance of the matter, of approaching the superior for his express dis-pensation. Cr. Rodrigo, Tractatus de Legibus, n. 448; Ledwolorz, Antonianum, 13 (1938), 35; R~VlEW FOR R~- r~c,ous, 1 (1942), 196--205. 16. 11 a dispensation can be given only in virtue o~ the power of jurisdiction, how can a lay religious superior of brothers, nuns, or sisters ever dispense? Jurisdiction is the authority to rule a perfect society; dominative power that of ruling an imperfect society. In virtue of canon 118, only clerics are capable of possessing the power of orders and of ecclestiastical jurisdiction. Therefore, no brother, nun, or sister superior possesses ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 'The obligation of an ecclesiastical law arises from the power of jurisdiction. Consequently, the power of juris-diction is necessary in one granting a dispensation, because this is the liberation from an obligation of ecclesiastical law. The power of jurisdiction is not necessary to dispense from the obligation imposed by dominative power, for example, from the ordinances of chapters in lay institutes and from the ordinances and regulations of religious su-periors. Since the obligation in such cases arises £rom dominative power, it can be made to cease by the same power. Both the common doctrine in the Church and the con-stitutions themselves give lay superiors the power of dis-pensing the Rule and constitutions. There is no doubt therefore that they can dispense and that this act has the same effect as if it were granted by one possessing jurisdic-tion. It may be gr~nted for reasons of no greater import and it equally frees from the obligation of the Rule or con-stitutions. The problem is the explanation of the nature of this act o£ lay superiors. There is no difficulty in clerical ÷ 4. ÷ Tlw Constitutiom VOLUME 1% 1960 ÷ ÷ ÷ Joseph F. Gallen, $.1. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 340 institutes. In clerical exempt institutes, the superiors pos-sess jurisdiction according to the code and the particular constitutions (c. 501, §1); in clerical non-exempt institutes, the superiors can be given jurisdiction. For those who hold that the Rule and constitutions are not ecclesiastical laws but laws of the particular institute (Creusen, Revue des Communaut~s Religieuses, 2[1926], 173) or not laws at all (Ravisi, De Regulis et Constitu-tionibus Religiosorum, 109), the solution is easy. Domina-tive power suffices for a dispensation in either opinion, because jurisdiction is necessary only for a dispensation from an ecclesiastical law. The far more common opinion is that the Rule and con-stitutions are ecclesiastical laws. In clerical exempt insti-tutes, the chapters possess jurisdiction according to the norms of the code and of the constitutions (c. 501, §1). These chapters may therefore enact laws. In other insti-tutes, the Rule and constitutions become laws by the ap-probation or confirmation of the Holy See in the case of pontifical institutes, by that of the local ordinary in the case of diocesan institutes. In the former case, the Rule and constitutions are in fact treated as pontifical laws; in the latter, as diocesan laws (cf. Ravisi, ibid., 44-51). The nature of a dispensation of a lay superior is a real diffi-culty for this more common opinion. Various unsatisfactory theories have been proposed to solve this difficulty, for example, that the dispensation of a lay superior is a mere declaration that the subject is ex-cused; that his act is a relaxation or exemption, not a dispensation; that the laws from which he dispenses are implicitly conditional and therefore his act is a permis-sion, not a dispensation; or he is giving a private interpre-tation that the law does not extend to a particular case; or such a superior merely declares that a just reason exists but the dispensation is given by the Holy See in a pontifical institute, by the local ordinary in a diocesan institute (Van Hove, De Privilegiis, De Dispensationibus, n. 426; Mi-chiels, Normae Generales Iuris Canonici, II, 725-26; Fe-rreres- Mondria, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, II, n. 168). All of these theories are contrary to the clear wording of constitutions approved by the Holy See. These constantly grant lay superiors the power of dispensing and use the term "dispense," not to relax or exempt. Furthermore, what would be the distinction between a relaxation or exemption from an obligation in a particular case and a dispensation? These same constitutions also distinguish clearly, at least implicitly, between an excuse, an interpre-tation, and a dispensation; between absolute and condi-tional laws; and between a dispensation granted by a superior and one given by external authority. Therefore, it is certain that lay superiors have the power of dispensing from the Rule and constitutions, but we have no satisfactory explanation of the nature of this act in the supposition that the Rule and constitutions are ec-clesiastical laws. The source of the difficulty is that a dis-pensation from an ecclesiastical law demands the power of jurisdiction and these superiors possess only dominative power. 17. What is a dispensation? A dispensation is the liberation from the obligation of a law in a special case. It can be granted only by a compe-tent authority and only for a proportionate reason. The act of the competent authority flees from the obligation. The case is special because the law remains; a dispensa-tion is not the abrogation of a law. Since a dispensation is the authoritative liberation from the obligation of a law, it may be given only by the legislator, his successor or su-perior, or one to whom any of the preceding has granted such authority (c. 80). The reason or reasons should be pro-portionate to the gravity of the law in question. They evi-dently need not be as serious as those required for an ex-cuse, but they should at least be such as to make the observance of the law more than ordinarily difficult or onerous or such that they render the observance of the law obstructive of a greater good. A dispensation may he licitly asked or given in a doubt about the sufficiency of a reason (c. 84, §2) and, with at least safe probability, also in a doubt about the existence of a sufficient reason (cf. Mi-chiels, Norrnae Generales Iuris Canonici, II, 754). 18. When we request a dispensation from the Holy See, the Apostolic Delegate, or a local ordinary, are. we merely to request the dispensation or must we also give reasons? It is evident from the definition and explanation of a dispensation, given in the preceding answer, that a dis-pensation is granted not because it is requested but be-cause of the reasons for which it is requested. Any petition for any dispensation should also contain truthfully, ac-curately, clearly, and as briefly as possible all the reasons that actually exist for asking and granting the dispensa-tion. Canon 583 forbids a religious of simple vows of a con-gregation to give away his property during his lifetime. Only the Holy See can dispense from this law of the code. A petition for a dispensation is not to state merely that the religious wishes to give away his property. Explicitly this is merely another way of stating that the religious does not wish to observe the law. He may petition the dis-pensation and it may be granted only for sufficient tea- 4- 4- 4- The Constitutions Joseph ~. Gell¢~, REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS sons. Therefore, all relevant facts and his precise petition, should be stated, that is, the number of years he has beenl professed, the value of all the property he possesses, i whether he wishes' to give away all or part of it, and thel value of such a par.t. The reasons must then be given, for~ example, he wishes to give this determined sum or all his i property to his father and mother because they are in need, or to his institute" to help pay its large debts, or to assist in the erection of a new chapel, and so forth. If th~ , institute requests a dispensation from the canonical age of thirty-five years prescribed for the novice master (c. 559, §1), the relevant fact of the age of the religious for whom the dispensation is intended should be given. The reasons are then to be stated, for example, that he is the only competent or the most competent religious for this office. The failure to give the relevant facts, to state the petition accurately, and to include the reasons causes un-necessary work and delay in the chancery or on the part of one who is forwarding the petition. 19. Is a dispensation given without a sulT~cient reason merely illicit or is it also invalid? At least one sufficient reason, that is, at least probably sufficient or a probably existing sufficient reason (cf. Ques-tion 17), must for licelty be verified at the time the dis-pensation is granted, e~en when it is given by the legis-lator, his successor, or superior (c. 84). Otherwise, the one dispensing would unreasonably free a subject from an obligation whose observance would tend to the common good. A law or statute is enacted for the common good. A dispensation from an ecclesiastical law given by an inferior (not by the legislator, his successor, or superior) without such a sufficient reason is both illicit and invalid, because an inferior is not granted the power of dispensing except when this sufficient reason exists (c. 84, §I). Re-ligious superiors are inferiors in this matter, not legis-lators. ¯ The principles given above apply to ecclesiastical laws. According to the far more common opinion, the Rule and constitutions are ecclesiastical laws (cf. Question 16); and the same principle of invalidity would therefore apply to their dispensation. However, it is a solidly probable opin-ion that the Rule and constitutions are not ecclesiastical laws. A dispensation from them without a sufficient reason will always be illicit, from the argument given above; but it does not seem certain that we must apply the principle of invalidity, established for ecclesiastical laws, to enact-ments that are not certainly ecclesiastical laws. Therefore, it is safely probable that a dispensation from the Rule or constitutions without a sufficient reason is valid. Ravisi, II De Regulis et Constitutionibus Religiosorum, 116; Creu-sen, Revue des Communautds Religieuses, 2 (1926), 177. 20. What power of dispensing from the Rule and con-stitutions is possessed by lay religious superiors of broth-ers, nuns, and sisters? It is evident that no religious superior may dispense his subjects from the substance of the vows, for example, free him of the obligation of the vow of poverty or obedience. This would at least temporarily and morally put the sub-ject outside the religious state, for which the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience are essential (cc. 487-488, 1 °). Nor may a superior dispense from a vow proper to the institute, unless such a faculty is expressly granted in the constitutions. Some of these vows are of such import as to exclude a dispensation; others are not. The general principle is that superiors possess only the power of dispensing that is expressly granted them by the constitutions. The common doctrine of authors and the practice of the Holy See in approving constitutions ex-clude the power of dispensing in articles that concern the government and organization of the institute and the sub-stance of the vows. These are in fact the matters listed in Question 3 under legal articles, that is, on government, organization, formation, and religious profession. How-ever, the constitutions may grant authorit~y to dispense from some of these, as is generally done for merely pro-hibiting impediments to the noviceship prescribed by the particular law of the institute. Some of these are also not of such moment as to be excluded from the power of dis-pensing possessed by superiors, for example, the reports of various superiors and officials, entrance testimonials of particular law, the manner of beginning the noviceship prescribed by particular law, and the giving of a copy of the constitutions to each novice. Proper and efficient government demands some power of dispensing in superiors. Therefore, the common doc-trine of authors and the practice of the Holy See in ap-proving constitutions grant to all superiors the right of dis-pensing in merely disciplinary articles, temporarily, and at least in favor of individuals. This power is accordingly possessed by all religious superiors, even when it is not expressly stated in the constitutions. The constitutions may limit such a power. The merely disciplinary articles were stated in Question 3. The dispensation is to be granted for a limited time, but it may be renewed on its expiration. This power extends at least to all individuals of the institute who are subjects of the superior, that is, all attached to or present in his province or house. The con-stitutions or, more likely, the usage of a lay institute may ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ ]oseph F. Gallen, S.]. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 344 limit a superior's power of dispensing with regard to one, of his subjects who is temporarily outside his own province / or house and concerning one, otherwise not a subject, who l is temporarily residing in the p~ovince or house of the su-~ perior. Cf. Normae of 1901, nn. 266, 316; Statuta a Soro- I ribus Externis Monasteriorum Monialium Cuiusque Or-dinis Servanda, n. 127; Normae pro Constitutionibus Congregationum luris Dioecesani a S. Congregatione de Propaganda Fide Dependentiurn, nn. 162, 182. 21. When the common doctrine in the Church and the practice of the Holy See in approving constitutions state that religious superiors may dispense from the merely disciplinary articles of the Rule and constitutions, does this faculty extend also to the merely disciplinary ordi-nances oy the general chapter? Yes. The ordinances of a chapter are understood as in-cluded in the Rule and constitutions in this matter Question 4). 22. Our constitutions state that the superior may dis-pense "'in particular cases." Is this power restricted to dispensing individual subjects or may entire houses, provinces, and the institute itself be dispensed in virtue of a taculty so worded? It is conceivable that these constitutions explicitly ex-clude any dispensation except that of individuals by stat-ing that the superior may dispense individual religious subject to him in particular cases. If so, only individuals may be dispensed, except in the case given in Question 23. The meaning of "in particular (or special) cases" is then merely that the dispensation may be given to individuals for as long as the sufficient reason of. the dispensation ex-ists. The constitutions do not explicitly restrict the dispens-ing power to individuals when they state that the su-perior may dispense the religious subject to them in par-ticular or special cases or simply that the superiors may dispense in particular or special cases. In virtue of such formulas, a superior may dispense both individuals and, with safe probability, also houses, provinces, or the in-stitute for a sufficiently general reason and for as long as this reason exists. The particular or special character of a dispensation is verified not only when it is given to an in-dividual but also when granted for a special, accidental, and transitory or temporary necessity to a house, province, or the institute. Rodrigo, Tractatus de Legibus, nn. 467; 503; Cicognani-Staffa, Commentarium ad Librum Primum Codicis Iuris Canonici, II, 570; 599; Coronata, lnstitu-tiones Iuris Canonici, I, 432; Abbo-Hannan, The Sacred Canons, I, 332-33. The reason is sufficiently general, even though not veri-fied in everyone, when it would he difficult or inopportune to restrict the dispensation to those in whom the reason is actually verified. Rodrigo, ibid., n. 487. 23. May a superior never dispense an entire commu-nity when the constitutions state expressly that his power of dispensing is restricted to individuals? A superior whose power of dispensing is limited to indi-viduals may by the one act dispense all individuals of a community if he knows that the reason for the dispensa-tion is verified in all o[ these individuals. He is then dis-pensing the individuals as such, not the community as such. Vermeersch-Creusen, Epitome Iuris Canonici, I, n. 204; II, n. 554. Van Hove, De Privilegiis, De Dispensa-tionibus, n. 328. 24. Don't lay religious superiors of brothers, nuns, and sisters ever have the power of dispensing entire houses, provinces, and the entire institute? The more common practice of constitutions approved by the Holy See grants the superior general the faculty of dispensing individual religious, provinces, regions, and houses; that o[ the provincials and other intermediate su-periors, for example, o~ regions, extends to individuals and houses; but the faculty of local superiors is restricted to individuals. This more common practice may be followed when it is not certainly contrary to the constitutions, since it manifests what is commonly understood to be a su-perior's power o[ dispensing. Some constitutions of lay institutes demand that the su-perior general have the advice or consent o~ his council for a dispensation to a province or house. Some institutes permit the superior general to dispense the entire institute with the advice or consent of his council or for a definite occasion. A Jew institutes impose the same restrictions on a ,provincial for the dispensation of a house or of the prov-ince. Some constitutions grant a local superior the ~aculty of dispensing his entire community in an urgent case, or for a single occasion and a grave reason, or with the advice or consent of his council. 25. May a religious superior, whether general, provin- + cial, regional, or local, delegate to another, for example, + to his assistant, the yaculty of dispensing ~rom the Rule + and constitutions. A superior general, provincial, or local,, as also a master of novices, possesses the power of dispensing from the Rule and constitutions in virtue of the law of the consti-tutions. It is therefore ordinary power; and ordinary The Constitutions VOLUME 1% 1960 ~45 ÷ ÷ ÷ ~oseph F. Gallen, S.]. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 346 power may be delegated in whole or in part to another~ except in those matters in which law expressly exclude.~ delegation (c. 199, §I). It is not the practice of constitu:' tions, especially of lay institutes, to make any such exclu sion with regard to the faculty of dispensing. Therefore,i a superior general or provincial, the local superior of al canonically erected house, and the master of novices may certainly delegate the faculty of dispensing in whole or in~ part to another. The same principle is true of a regional superior or any similar intermediate superior when his authority ofl governing is ordinary, that is, granted by the constitutionsl themselves. However, the authority of a regional superior~ may be merely delegated by either the superior generall or provincial. In this case, the regional superior will pos-i sess a general delegated faculty of dispensing his subjects. General delegation may be subdelegated only for indi-vidual cases, that is, for one or many determined cases (c. 199, §3). Therefore, such a regional superior will be able to subdelegate his faculty of dispensing only for one or several determined cases. This is true also of the one at the head of a canonically filial house, because his author-ity is delegated either by a higher superior or by the local superior of the canonically erected house to which the filial house is attached. An acting superior or vicar succeeds to the full dispens-ing power of the superior; and the legitimate substitute, such as the assistant, of a superior who is absent or im-peded from fulfilling his duties has the dispensing power that is necessary for ordinary government. He is to use this faculty according to the expressed or presumed will of the superior; and its use may also be regulated by the law, or in lay institutes, more frequently by custom or usage. 26. The constitutions of our pontifical congregation ol brothers grant no faculty of dispensing to the novice master, but the novice masters have always exercised such a power with regard to the novices. How can this be ex-plained? The constitutions of lay institutes apparently never mention the power of the master of novices to dispense. Since the master may be said to be, in a wide sense, the superior of the novices and of the novitiate part of the house (c. 56i, §1), he has the same power of dispensing his subjects as a local superior possesses for his commu-nity, exclusive of the matters that appertain to the general discipline of the house. In virtue of the same canon, these matters are under the authority of the local superior. However, the local superior maydelegate the faculty to dispense also in these matters to the master of novices. Cf. Lar~aona, Commentarium Pro Religiosis, 24 (1943), 32. 27. May a religious superior dispense himself? Even if such a power is not expressly stated in the con-stitutions, any religious superior may dispense himself in matters in which he is competent to dispense others. The principle of canon 201, §~, is that voluntary jurisdiction, and from analogy of law the same is to be said of domina-tive power, may be exercised in one's own favor. The canon also states that this power may be excluded by law. The constitutions may therefore deprive a superior of the faculty of dispensing himself in some matters. Such an exclusion is not found in the constitutions of lay insti-tutes. It would not be prudent to deprive the superior en-tirely of the power of dispensing himself, 28. Our constitutions state that a local superior "'must consult her council before granting a dispensation to any-one subject to her." What do you think of this law? It is evidently too rigid and consequently an imprudent law. Dispensations should not be .granted for insufficient reasons. This of its nature tends to weaken religious disci-pline. On the other hand, there are many occasions when a dispensation is not only justified but a greater good will :be attained or a greater evil avoided by its concession. According to the literal.sense of the law quoted in the question, a local superior must consult her council before granting the slightest dispensation from a religious disci-pline, for example, to allow a subject to go to bed earlier or to rise later than the community. The same consulta-tion would be necessary for a dispensation from any pre-scription of the constitutions, for example, from choral recitation of the Little Office, rosary, examen, or spiritual reading. The law is an evidently imprudent restriction of the authority of a local superior and should be changed. Such an imprudent rigidity with regard to religious ob-servances has been noted and castigated by authors on renovation and adaptation. "Religious discipline is also frequen_t.ly enforced with an unreasonable rigidity. Re-ligious know that it is possible to be excused or dispensed from the laws of the Church, for example, from Sunday Mass or from fasting; but observances are often proposed as if they never admitted an excuse or dispensation." RE-VIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, 14 (1955), 301. 29. May a local ordinary dispense from all articles of the constitutions that are proper to a diocesan congrega-tion? ~ Yes. The local ordinary is the legislator or ~he successor of the legislator of the laws proper to a diocesan congre-÷ ÷ ÷ The Constitutions VOLUME 19, 1960 ~ose~h F. Gallen, $.L REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 348 gation. He therefore possesses the intrinsic right of dis-pensing from all such l~iws, whether they are merely pre-ceptive or invalidating (cc. 80; 492, §2). The Holy See may exclude some articles of the constitutions, because of their greater importance, from this dispensing power of the ordinary but thus far has not certainly done so. In a reply of February 12, 1935, the Code Commission stated that the local ordinary could dispense from the second year of noviceship in diocesan congregations when this was not required for the validity of profession. This reply does not certainly deny that the local ordinary may give the same dispensation when the second year is required for validity. The reply can be interpreted as merely an answer to the question proposed, that is, .when the second year is required only forliceity, without saying anything about a question that was not proposed, that is, when the second year is demanded for validity. The affirmative an-swer to this latter question is had in the clear wording of canon 80, stated above. Cf. Regatillo, Interpretatio et Iurisprudentia Codicis Iuris Canonici, 210; Larraona, Commentarium Pro Religiosis, 23 (1942), 15, and note 969. The laws proper to a pontifical congregation are treated in fact as pontifical laws (cf. Question 16). Therefore, for a dispensation from these same laws, except for those that fall under the dispensing power of religious superiors (cf. Question 20), a pontifical congregation must recur to the Holy See, unless the faculty of dispensing from the par-ticular article has been granted to the Apostolic Delegate or the local ordinary by the Code of Canon Law, his ha-bitual delegated faculties, or a particular indult (cf. Question 31). 30. May a local ordinary dispense from all the laws of the constitutions of diocesan lay congregations? No. It is evident that no authority within a lay insti-tute, whether pontifical or diocesan, may dispense from the laws or decrees of the Holy See. This faculty would de-mand a power of jurisdiction, and canon 118 states that only clerics are capable of acquiring ecclesiastical juris-diction. As was stated in Question 3, many of the articles of constitutions are laws of the universal Church, that is, laws or decrees enacted by the Holy See. The intrinsic right to dispense from a law appertains to the legislator, his successor, or superior; and these three alone may give the faculty of dispensing to another (c. 80). Therefore, all lay institutes, even if diocesan, must recur to the Holy See for dispensations and permissions with regard to such laws and decrees, unless the faculty to grant the particular dispensation or permission has been ~iven to the Anos- tolic Delegate or the local ordinary by the Code of Canon Law, his habitual delegated faculties, or a particular in-dult. The following are the cases of more frequent occur-rence for which a diocesan congregation also will have to recur to the Holy See: 1. Spending of the dowry (c. 549). 2. Impediments to the noviceship (c. 542). 3. For canonical novices to have a vacation outside the novitiate house (c. 555, §1, 3°). 4. To make the first temporary profession outside the novitiate house (c, 574, §1). 5. Whole or partial renunciation of personal patri-mony (c. 583, 1°). 6. Change of will (c. 583, 2°). 7. For a religious to reside outside any house of his institute for more than six months, except for study (c. 606, §2). 8. Alienation of property and contracting of debts (c. 534), except for the amount for which the Apos-tolic Delegate is competent. 9. Reappointment of a local superior for an immedi-ate third term in the same house (c. 505). 10. Age required for the master of novices (c. 559, §1). 31. What delegated faculties of the Apostolic Delegate and o~ the local ordinary concerning religious are of practical moment? The following habitual delegated faculties of the Apos-tolic Delegate and of the local ordinary concerning re-ligious are of practical utility: 1. Of the Apostolic Delegate a) To dispense from the dowry in orders and all con-gregations (c. 547, §4). b) To abbreviate or prolong the postulancy pre-scribed by canon law (c. 539, §1). c) To allow nuns in case of sickness or for other just and grave reasons to live outside the religious house for a time to be fixed at his prudent discre-tion (c. 601, §1). d) To permit the contracting of debts and the alien-ation of property provided the sum involved does not exceed $300,000 ( . 534). 2. Of the local ordinary a) To dispense for entrance into religion from il-legitimate birth and advanced age that is not over forty. b) To dispense from the dowry in orders and all con-gregations (c. 547, §4). c) To approve an ordinary confessor of religious women for a fourth and fifth three-year term, The Constitutions vol.IJ~i~ 3.% tg~,~, 849 + ÷ ÷ ]oseph F. Gallen, S.$. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 350 d) e) with the c6nsent of the majority of the religious (cc: 524, §2; 526). To permit nuns to leave papal cloister for surgi-cal treatment.(c. 601, §1). In mission territories, to permit religious women to do the first washing of palls, corporals; and purificators and to allow religious men and women to practice medicine and surgery (cc. 1306, §2; 139, §2; 592). 32. May a local ordinary dispense exempt religious from the common laws of the Church? In virtue of canon 615, all religious orders are exempt from the jurisdiction of the local ordinaries, provided in the case of religious women that they are subject in fact to an order of men. Congregations, or religious institutes o~ simple vows, are not exempt unless they have obtained this privilege by a special indult from the Holy See (c. 618, §1). Exempt orders are subject to the jurisdiction of the local ordinary only in the matters in which the code declares them to be subject; congregations exempt by privilege have an exemption according'to the terms of the indult. Because exemption removes religious from ~he jurisdiction of the local ordinary, the question naturally arises whether or not the latter may use his jurisdictional power of dispensing in favor of exempt religious. Canon 620 states: "By an indult legitimately granted by the local ordinary dispensing {rom the obligation of the common law, that obligation ceases likewise for all religious living in the diocese, without prejudice to the vows and particular constitutions of their own institute." This canon is clearly explained by Abbo-Hannan, The Sacred Canons, I, 640: "The privilege conceded here is that by which even exempt religious may avail themselves of dispensations granted by the.local ordinary, e. g., from the laws of fast and abstinence, though they are not per-mitted to do this, i. e, invoke the dispensation from the law of fast and abstinence, in a case in which they are bound to the observance involved by an additional obli-gation arising from a special vow or from their constitu-tions. But in the latter case, a violation of the obligation would offend, not against the law of the Church, the obli-gation of which has been removed by the local ordinary's dispensation, but only against the vow or constitutions." This canon confirms the common opinion that exempt religious may recur to the local ordinary, pastor, and other priests, whether the faculties possessed by any of these is from law or delegation, for dispensations from the com-mon laws of the Church. The reasons for this doctrine are that exemption is a privilege and therefore is not to be interpreted to the disadvantage of exempt religious; be- cause otherwise exempt religious would be in a less favor-able position 'in such matters than other religious and the faithful; and, finally, exemption does not demand that exempt religious be excluded.from the favorable jurisdic-tion of the local ordinary. Cf. Regatillo-Zalba, Theologiae Moralis Summa, I, n. 576; Michiels, Normae Generales furls Canonici, II, 735-36; Van Hove, De Privilegiis, De Dispensationibus, n. 434; Rodrigo, Tractatus de Legibus, n. 481; Schaefer, De Religiosis, n. 1288. 33. May a confessor or pastor dispense religiouS' frdm the observance of merely disciplinary articles of the Rule or constitutions? No. Neither the confessoi: nor the pastor possesses any faculty in virtue of his office to dispense from any article of the Rule or constitutions, nor are local ordinaries or religious superiors accustomed to delegate any such fac-ulty to confessors or pastors. For example, a pastor pos-sesses the ordinary faculty and confessors frequently the delegated faculty of dispensing from the fast and absti-nence prescribed by the Church (c. 1245, §1); but neither has the faculty of dispensing from fast or abstinence im-posed by the Rule or constitutions of a religious institute. Both, when a sufficient reason exists, may declare a re-ligious excused from the observance of an article of the Rule or constitutions (cf. Question I4). 34. Before last Lent, 1 talked over the matter of fasting with my local brother superior. He told me he thought I should ask the confessor for a dispensation. Before going to confession, this matter came up accidentally in a con. versation with another priest. We talked over the whole matter of fasting and my own case thoroughly, and he said that he could dispense me. He gave me the dispensa-tion during this conversation. I did not know that a dis° pensation could be given to an individual outside of con-fession, The only faculty of a confessor that is confined by its nature to the sacrament of penance, or what the Church also calls the internal sacramental forum, is that of ab-solving from sin. This faculty therefore may be exercised only in the internal sacramental forum. Confessors possess or may possess other jurisdictional faculties, for example, of dispensing from fast and absti-nence and from the observance of Sundays and holy days of obligation (c. 1245, §1); of commuting the pious works established for gaining indulgences (c. 935); of dispensing and commuting private non-reserved vows and promis-sory oaths (cc. 1313, 1°; 1314; 1320); of dispensing from irregularities (c. 990); of dispensing from matrimonial im-rpediments (cc. 1043--44-45); and of absolving, dispensing, + ÷ The Constitutions VOLUME 19, 1960 351 and suspending canonical punishments. Such faculties may be exercised by a confessor outside of confession, in what the Church calls the internal non-sacramental forum, unless the law or authority that granted the faculty restricted it to the sacrament of penance, that is, to the internal sacramental forum. A confessor may dispense anyone in the internal non-sacramental forum if he could here and now hear the confession of this person. The con-cession to confessors of the faculty to dispense from fast and abstinence is frequently not restricted to the sacra-mental forum. This was true in the'case proposed, and the confessor thus granted the dispensation in the internal non-sacramental forum. Cf. Van Hove, De Privilegiis, De Dispensationibus, n. 419; Michiels, Normae Generales Juris Canonici, II, 728; Rodrigo, Tractatus de Legibus, n. 57; Regatillo-Zalba, Theologiae Moralis Summa, I, n. 574, 7°. 4- 4- 4- Joseph F. Gallen, S.l. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 35. May I, a confessor, use the jurisdictional faculties I possess in favor of myself, for example, by dispensing myself ~rom fast or abstinence? Judicial jurisdiction may not be used in one's own favor. The only judicial jurisdiction possessed by a con-lessor is that of absolving from sin (c. 870), which there-fore he may not use in his own favor (c. 201, §2). The other jurisdictional faculties that a confessor possesses or may possess fall under the heading of voluntary or non-judi-cial jurisdiction. These faculties may be used by a confes-sor in his own favor unless such a use is excluded by the nature of the matter, which is true of the remission of a canonical punishment or a dispensation from an irregu-larity; or the concession of the faculty restricts its exercise to the sacramental forum, which demands the distinction of persons of confessor and penitent (cf. cc. 1044; 2253, 1°; 2254; 2290); or, finally, the concession of the faculty expressly excluded its use in one's own favor (c. 201, §3). Local ordinaries, in delegating the faculty to dispense from fast and abstinence, quite frequently restrict it to the sacramental forum. They are not wont to exclude the exercise in one's own favor when they have not restricted the faculty to the sacramental forum. Therefore, in the former case, the faculty may not be exercised in one's own favor; in the latter, it may. Cf. Rodrigo, Tractatus de Legibus, n. 482; Michiels, Normae Geneiales ]uris Ca-nonici, II, 736-37; Coronata, Institutiones Iuris Canonici, I, 330-31. V. Change and Authentic Interpretation 36. A general revision of the constitutions of our con-gregation is being planned and discussed. A priest told me that a change in the constitutions had to be approved by the unanimous vote of all the members of the congre-gation. Is this correct? No. The reason for the statement is evidently canon 101, §1, 2°, which reads: "That which affects all singly must be approved by all." No one may' maintain that any change in the constitutions falls under this canon and demands the unanimous approval of all the members of the institute. It has been the evident law, practice, and teaching for centuries that changes in the constitutions appertain to the general Chapters of religious institutes, which are evidently not tl~e entire institute. The general chapters have either full auth6rity to make these changes, or partial, that is, with the confirmation of the Holy See, or at least the authority to request such changes from the Holy See or the local ordinaries. The practice of the Holy See does not consider a general revision of the constitu-tions as something that in itself requires the approval of all the members of an institute. This is clear from the fact that the Holy See has repeatedly approved such revisions with only the ordinary majority vote of the general chap-ter. Nor does a change in the constitutions demand a unani-mous vote of the general chapter. In by far the greater number of lay institutes, the approval of such a change requires only an absolute majority vote of the chapter. In about one-fourth of these institutes, such a change de-mands a two-thirds vote. The latter norm is found with greater frequency, but by no means always, in constitu-tions of more recent approval. If the constitutions contain no special norm for the approval of a change of the con-stitutions, an absolute majority vote of the general chap-ter is sufficient, because this is the general norm in con-stitutions for deciding matters in the chapter of affairs and a change of the constitutions as such does not fall under the norm of canon 101, §1, 2°. The Sacred Congregation of Religious at times ap-proves at least temporarily and experimentally a change in the constitutions recommended only by the superior general with the consent of his council, for example, the extension of the time of temporary profession from three to five years (cf. REvIEw VOR P~LXG~OUS, 18 [1959], 156-57). If approved only temporarily and experimentally, the matter must be discussed at the next general chapter. If the necessary majority vote is attained, it is again sub-mitted to the Sacred Congregation for definitive approval. The matters that demand the unanimous approval of all the mer~b.ers of the institute are commonly defined as those that d.irectly, primarily, and principally affect in-dividuals ~s such, that is, the privation of a personal right + The Constitutions VOLUME 19, 1960 at. 4, ~oseph F. Gallen, S.~. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 354 or the imposition of a new personal obligation, of such a nature in either case that its exaction without the con-sent of the individuals would be an injustice. It is not easy to give the abstract definition of such matters, and all admit that it is even more difficult to determine in the concrete just what these matters are. Authors commonly list the following as failing under the necessity of the unanimous vote: a reformation of an institute, the impo-sition of a new observance, a change in the form or nature of an institute, union with another institute, a substantial change in an institute, and the change of the special pur-pose of an institute. The difficulty of determining what these matters are can be ~een from the opinion of Michiels (Principia Generalia de Personis in Ecclesia, 489), who argues that all the matters just listed except the last two (and his opinion applies equally to these) appertain in themselves directly and primarily to the institute and only indirectly and secondarily to the individuals as such, so that a decision for any of them requires only the pre-scribed majority vote, not a unanimous vote. It is evi-dent that the imposition, of any new observance whatever does not in itself demand a unanimous vote. The necessity of a unanimous vote is the exceptional norm in law. Therefore,.in any case in which its necessity is not proved with certainty, the prescribed majority vote of the general chapter suffices (cf. c. 19; Cappello, Summa luris Canonici, I, n. 197, 4°; Michiels, ibid.; Jone, Com-mentarium in Coclicem Iuris Canonici, I, 114). However, all authors recommend that any really probable case of this kind be referred to the Holy See, which in the pleni-tude of its power can for the common good impose indi-vidual obligations and deprive subjects of individual rights. The Holy See is accustomed in such cases to pro-vide suitable measures for the liberty of individuals, ~for example, in the resumption of solemn vows by a monas-tery of nuns, any nun in simple perpetual vows who does not wish to make the solemn profession may remain in simple vows but she is obliged by all the prescriptions of papal cloister; and in such matters as the union of insti-tutes or the change of. an order of nuns into a congrega-tion of sisters, the Holy See has added the clause that any religious who refuses to consent to the change may re-quest an indult of secularization or a ti:ansfer to another institute according to the norms of canon law. The practical course of action in any matter that even probably requires a unanimous vote of all the members is to present the question to the Holy See, with the vote for and against the measure End a statement also of the reasons for and against it. It should also be stated whether the opposition constitute a clamorous and hardened mi-nority. The Holy See will settle the question; but, even thbugh the measure is highly desirable, it may in pru-dence and for peace recommend a delay. The unanimous vote can clearly create a difficulty. Some measures that at least pr?bably require this 'vote are not only desirable but ~t times even necessary for the very existence of the institute. All who have experience with religious know that a unanimous vote is possible and that it sometimes occurs; they also know that it is very rare, especially in important matters. 37. Our pontifical congregation of sisters has Warded a general revision of our constitutions to the Hoiy See. Is this revision now in effect, that is, before the approval of the Holy See? In virtue of their approval by the Holy See, the consti-tutions of pontifical lay institutes are treated as if they were pontifical laws; those of diocesan congregations, ap-proved by the local ordinary, are treated in the same way as diocesan laws. Therefore, not the institute but the Holy See is the legislator for pontifical institutes and the local,ordinaries for the particular laws of the constitutions of diocesan congregations. Such institutes merely request that their constitutions or a change in them be approved by the Holy See or the ,local ordinaries. No authority within a lay institute, may change its constitutions, and local ordinaries may not change the constitutions, of pon-tifical institutes (c. 618, §2, 1°). The Holy See alone has the authority to change the constitutions of a pontifical institute, The same change in a diocesan congregation may not be made without the ,unanimous consent of all the ordinaries in whose dioceses 'the congregation has houses (c. 495, §2). The dissent of even one of these or-dinaries prevent.s the change from becoming effectiv$~ The congregation may recur to the Holy See in such a case. The ordinaries may' not change any of the things ap-proved by the Holy See in the erection of the diocesan c6ngregation, that is, the special purpose, title, particular works, and form and color of the habit. A change of any of these requires the approval of the Holy See. These mat. oters did not have tO be proposed to the Holy See for the erection of a diocesan congregation before July 16, 1906. Therefore, in congregations erected before this date, the local ordinaries may change such matters also (cf. Ravisi, De Regulis et Constitutionibus Religiosorum, 126, note 3). The answer to the question proposed should now be evident. Any change in the constitutions of lay institutes is effective only from the date on which its approval is granted by the Holy See or the local ordinaries. Before this date, the institute may not put the proposed change into effect. ÷ ÷ ÷ The Consiitution's VOLUME 19, 1960 ÷ ÷ ÷ Joseph F. Gallen, REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 356 38. The constitutions of our pontifical congregation of sisters state: "The Holy See alone may change and au-thentically interpret the constitutions . In case of real doubt about some particular point of the constitutions, the general chapter, as also the mother general with the advice of her council, may give a practical interpretation of the doubt; and the sisters are obliged to follow this in-terpretation." What is.the meaning of these two articles? An interpretation is an explanation of the true sense contained in a law. A law needs no interpretation when it is so clear that it excludes even subjective obscurities and doubts. An interpretation is frequently necessary, be-cause it is difficult for a human legislator to express his will with perfect clarity in a brief general statement. Ex-perience also proves that the obscurity of a law often in-creases proportionately with its length. The application of a brief general norm to various particular cases is also a frequent source of obscurities and doubts. An authentic interpretation is an authoritative or obligatory explana-tion of the sense of a law. It may therefore be given only by the legislator, his successor or superior, or in virtue of power delegated by any of these (c. ,17, §1). Since the constitutions of pontifical lay institutes are treated in fact as pontifical and those of diocesan congre-gations as diocesan laws, it follows that the authentic in-terpretation Of the former is reserved to the Holy See and of the latter to the local ordinary, if the diocesan congre-gation is confined to one diocese, and otherwise to the unanimous consent of all the ordinaries in whose dioceses the congregation has houses (cc. 492, §2; 495, §2). It is clear that the Holy See also, as the superior of the local ordinaries, may authentically interpret the constitutions of diocesan congregations. The constitutions of lay insti-tutes usually affirm explicitly that an authentic interpre-tation is reserved to the legislator (cf. Normae of 1901, nn. 251; 265; Normae pro Constitutionibus Congregationum Iuris Dioecesani a S. Congregatione de Propaganda Fide Dependentium, n. 162). A private, non-authentic, or doctrinal interpretation is one given according to the principles of correct interpre-tation by those who lack the authority to enact an authen-tic interpretation. It is based on the legitimate principles of interpretation of canon law, of constitutions in general, and of the particular constitutions. A doctrinal interpreta-tion is a purely private opinion and possesses only the weight and value of the arguments on which it is founded. This is the nature of the opinion given by authors on canon law and constitutions. These can and often do differ in their interpretations. This diversity of opinion often disturbs lay religious superiors. They should follow the norm given by Creusen: "Superiors, however, may follow in their government the doctrinal interpretation given by those authors whose opinions carry weight. In this case the inferior who may have a different opinion must sub-mit himself to the superior, for it is the superior who has the right to choose among several opinions the one which seems to him to offer the best guarantees of truth" (Re-ligious Men and Women in Church Law, n. 273). The exclusion of an authentic interpretation does not prohibit superiors from giving a doctrinal interpretation of the constitutions. In a doubt about the sense of any matter of particular law of a lay :institute, the general chapter or the superior general, as in the second article quoted in the quegtion, may also determine what observance is to be followed. This is in fact an ordinance of the chapter or a regulation of the superior (cf. Van Hove, De Legibus, n. 243; Mi-chiels, Normae Generales Juris Canonici, I, 504, note 1; Rodrigo, Tractatus de Legibus, n. 380). In constitutions it is sometimes called a practical solution of the doubt. It is evident that each superior may authentically in-terpret his own regulations. A higher superior may do the same with regard to the regulations of a lower superior. A general chapter is the authentic interpreter of its own or-dinances and of those of previous chapters. A doctrinal interpretation by others is not excluded, and the superior general may give a practical solution of a doubt concern-ing the sense of these ordinances, as described above for the constitutions. The constitutions could give the su-perior general the faculty of authentically interpreting the ordinances of the general chapter. Such a concession is not contained in the constitutions of lay institutes, but this does not disprove its desirability. It is evident that only the Holy See may authentically interpret the laws of the code and its own decrees and instructions, whether these are contained in the constitutions or not. Cf. Ma-roto, Commentarium Pro Religiosis, 1 (1920), 41-45; Ravisi, De Regulis et Constitutionibus Religiosorum, 96- I00. 39. Our constitutions say nothing whatever about a change in the constitutions. Some have stated explicitly and I think many others hold that our constitutions are immutable. Certainly no change has been made in them for many years. Do our constitutions consequently ex-clude any change? It is contrary to the nature of human law to exclude any change or abrogation. The common good, according to the varying circumstances of persons, places, and times can counsel or demand an abrogation, change, or the substi-tution of another law. Even the universal laws of the ÷ ÷ ÷ The Constitutions VOLUME 19, 1960 .Joseph F. Gallen, S.]. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 358 Roman Pontiffs may be and have been changed, and we can certainly predicate no greater stability or perpetuity of religious constitutions. It is furthermore evident that the constant practice of the Holy See considers constitu-tions changeable and grants the authority to request a change to the general chapters of lay imtitutes. Finally, as stated in Question $6: "If the constitutions contain no special norm for the approval of a change of the constitu-tions, an absolute majority vote of the general chapter is sufficient, because this is the general norm in constitutions for deciding matters in the chapter of affairs and a change of the constitutions as such does not fall under the norm of canon 101, §1, 2°. . Superiors are not to think that they can preserve the identity of their institute intact if they never dare to change particular regulations. If they te-naciously adhere to these as if they were immutable laws, they will most certainly destroy the essential unity of their institute. A tree would certainly die if it did not change its blossoms or leaves . The fact that more ancient inSti-tutes are already senile is at least one of the reasons why we see new institutes constantly arising." Reverend R. Lombardi, S.J., Acta et Documenta Congressus Generalis de Statibus Per[ectionis, I, 117. "A religious order or con-gregation that always rejects any change in its regulations for the sole reason that things were always done this way and accordingly refuses to face the new exigencies is con-demned to self-fossilization and sooner or later to disap-pear. The precise reason is that its particular manner of life will no longer be compatible with actual conditions. Other institutes more adapted to the actual circumstances of society will take its place. The most optimistic outlook for institutes that do not strive to adapt their methods of teaching and their life is that they will necessarily appear deficient in comparison to the age in which they live. This will inevitably produce in their members a state and a sense of disturbing and harmful inferiority, which will also curtail the efficacy of their apostolic efforts." Leoni, Aggiornamento o Processo di Adeguamento, 47-48. The balanced judgment that should guide an institute in this matter has been given by Pius XII: "It is only right that convents and orders bf cloistered nuns esteem, protect, and remain faithful to the distinctive spirit of their order. It would be unjust not to take account of this. But they should defend it without narrow-mindedness or rigidity, to say nothing of a certain obstinacy which opposes every legitimate development and resists every kind of change even though the common good requires it." Allocution to Cloistered Contemplatives, REWEW ~'OR RELIGIOUS, 18 (1959), 136. 40. According to our constitutions, "a change in the constitutions may not be proposed to the Holy See until three successive general chapters have sanctioned the change." Is this restriction prudent? Evidently no. The necessity of the approval of three suc-cessive chapters would ordinarily demand an interval of eighteen years before a useful or even necessary change in the constitutions could be proposed to the Holy See; Such an interval is clearly an obstacle tO the common good of the institute and to efficient government. The changes in the constitutions that are frequently being made now, for example, to a postulancy of nine or ten months or a year and to temporary profession for five years, evidently can-not wait eighteen years for their inception. A useful or nec-essary change in the constitutions that is proposed now could even be antiquated in eighteen years. This restric-tive law is directly contrary to the principles of the Holy See on renovation and adaptation. The next general chap-ter should vote forits abrogation and send the petition im-mediately to the Holy See. "If superiors according to their rank refuse to see the changed circumstances of the time, there is danger that they may turn that which was living [their institute] into a carefully protected corpse, even though they believe that they have completely preserved their institute. They have killed it by a form of spiritual parricide. The greatest effort of superiors should be to act, as far as possible, in "the same way as the founder himself, if he were alive, would act. It is true that he taught his sons a rule composed by him under the direction of the spirit of God for their government; but in defining many things, even those of greater importance, in the interpreta-tion of the rule according to the circumstances, and in the selection of mihistries, he would undoubtedly avail him-self of a holy liberty. He would be guided by the .burning zeal that consumed him on earth, that made him a man of his own age, and led him to devote himself to the more pressing needs and to select the more suitable ministries within the limits of his vocation." Reverend R. Lombardi, S.J., Acta et Documenta Congressus Generalis de Statibus Perfectionis, I, 119. "In the same spirit of profound intelli-gence of the rule, some communities no longer judge every proposal to change the constitutions as necessarily a sacri-lege." Reverend A. PM, O.P., ibid., II, 146. 41. According to an article of our :diocesan constitu. tiom, the constitutions may be neither authentically in-terpreted nor changed without the unanimous consent of the ordinaries ol the dioceses in which the congrega-tion has houses. Are these two the only matters in a dioc-esan congregation that demand the unanimous consent of all the ordinaries? 4" 4" + The Constitutions VOLUME "t91 '1960 359 ÷ ÷ ÷ $oseph F. Gal~en, REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 360 Canon 495, §2, explicitly requires the unanimous con-sent of all the ordinaries for any change in the constitu-tions. Since the local ordinaries are the legislators for di-ocesan congregations and the ordinary of the motherhouse enjoys no pri~aaacy of jurisdiction, the authentic interpre-tation of the constitutions also certainly demands this same unanimous consent (c. 17, §1). The Code of Canon Law says nothing concerning the erection, union, modification of boundaries, or suppres-sion of provinces in diocesan congregations (c. 494, §1). In the introduction to the quinquennial report, the Holy See stated that the division of a diocesan congregation into provinces could scarcely be permitted and that such an institute, if special reasons existed for a division into prov-inces, should petition pontifical approval. Before the time of this report, a very small number of diocesan congrega-tions had been divided into provinces; and the report does not absolutely exclude the same division o~ other diocesan congregations. Canonical authors begin their treatment of this question by stating that the constitutions, if ex-traordinarily they contain anything on the matter, are to be observed. This is evidently true, but the mere observ-ance of the constitutions will most rarely be sufficient. Even when they mention the matter, the constitutions will practically never affirm anything but the religious superior (general chapter, superior general with the consent of his council, or both) competent for the preliminary judgment on the erection and related acts concerning provinces. The observance of the constitutions will be sufficient only when they state that such acts appertain to all the local ordi-naries affected or to the local ordinary of the motherhouse. In the latter case, the other ordinaries have delegated or consented to the delegation of their jurisdiction to the ordinary of the motherhouse. No authority within the in-stitute will ever be sufficient for the acts in question. A division into provinces is the erection of new moral per-sons; and the code does not give religious institutes the authority to erect religious moral persons. This is clear from the canons on the erection o~ religious houses (cc. 495, §1,497). It is the common and at least probable opin-ion of authors that the acts concerning provinces listed at the beginning of this paragraph demand for validity the consent of the one local ordinary, if such acts affect houses within only one diocese, or the unanimous consent of all the ordinaries concerned when the houses affected by these acts are in many dioceses. The best proof of this opinion is that the silence of the code on provinces in diocesan con-gregations should be supplied (c. 20), because of the argu-ment on moral persons given above, and the similar law to be applied is canon 495, §9. This may also be the argu- mentation of several authors who give no explicit reason for their doctrine. At least two authors apparently argue that any matter which affects houses.in several dioceses re-quires, in virtue of canon 495, §2, the unanimous consent of all the ordinaries o[ such dioceses. One or two authors demand the unanimous consent because the erection of provinces implies a change in the constitutions. This is true, but the two matters are distinct. Some authors demand also the consent of the ordinary of the motherhouse for all the acts listed above concerning provinces. They argue that his consent is afortiori neces-sary because canon 495, §1, requires it for the erection of the first house in another diocese. This doctrine also is probable. The erection of provinces does not necessarily imply the extension of the congregation into other dio-ceses, but something of the same reason is verified, that is, the judgment as to whether the congregation is capable of such a division and whether or not the division is expe-dient (cf. Larraona, Comrnentarium Pro Religiosis, 5 [1924], 262--63; Muzzarelli, De Congregationibus Iuris Di-oecesani, p. 92, note 15; nn. 101; 130). The. changes in the constitutions consequent upon the division into provinces will evidently demand the consent of all the ordinaries in whose dioceses the congregation has houses, in virtue of canon 495, §2. The other similar matters in a diocesan congregation that has houses in many dioceses are: the acceptance of the resignation and the deposition of the superior general; transfer of the permanent residence of the superior gen-eral; dispensation of a law that affects the entire congrega-tion, province, or houses in several dioceses, for example, of a law of the congregation that forbids postulation in the general or provincial chapter or of an impediment of the constitutions for the appointment of a provincial superior or provincial official; canonical visitation of the general and provincial houses, superiors, and officials as such and o[ the general and provincial government and administra-tion; consent for any investment or change of investment of general or provincial funds in congregations of women; the right of inquiring into the entire financial state of a generalate or provincialate of congregations of men or women; permission for the convocation of a general chap-ter for reasons other than general elections; and the con-firmation of the deposition o[ a general councilor. Some authors maintain that these and similar matters which affect an entire diocesan congregation, province, or houses in many dioceses appertain cumulatively to the jurisdiction of the ordinaries of all the dioceses concerned and demand their unanimous consent. Any one ordinary is competent in these matters only when he is exceptionally ÷ ÷ The Constitutions VOLUME 191 1960 36! 4, ÷ ÷ Joseph F. Gallen, $.]. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 362 granted such authority by the code. The following are the arguments for this opinion. Canon 492, §2, according to these authors, states that a multidiocesan congregation remains subject, not to any one ordinary, but to all the ordinaries and thus to their cumulative jurisdiction. Canon 495, §2, requires the unanimous consent of all the ordinaries for a change in the constitutions. The reason for this prescription is that such a change affects general government. Therefore, the same norm is to be applied to all similar matters. The lack of a general principle in the code on these matters should be supplied (c. 20), and the similar law to be applied is canon 495, §2. The juris-diction of any one ordinary is necessarily confined to his own diocese and does not extend to the congregation, provinces, or houses in other dioceses. Any one ordinary acting on matters that affect houses or religious in another diocese would be infringing on the jurisdiction of the or-dinary of this diocese. The unilateral action of an ordi-nary in such a matter would endanger the unity of govern-ment of the congregation. The code and the practice of the Holy See are opposed to a primacy of jurisdiction in any one ordinary, especially in the ordinary of the mother-house. These arguments are evidently sufficient to con-stitute at least a probable' doctrine. The opinion of these authors should be followed in practice, since it is at least preferable in itself and has been accepted by the Sacred Congregation of Religious, as is clear from the introduc-tion to the quinquennial report for diocesan congrega-tions (cf. Muzzarelli, ibid., nn. 96-102). It can be maintained that this doctrine is not as evident from the sense of our present law as it appears to some of its followers. The code nowhere asserts the general prin-ciple of cumulative jurisdiction. Cumulative jurisdiction is stated only once and then on the specific matter of a change of the constitutions (c. 495, §2). The local ordinary of the place of the chapter presides in his own name, not by delegation from the other ordinaries, at the election of the mother general (c. 506, §4). This ordinary has the same right of confirming or rescinding her election (c. 506, §4) and of accepting or refusing a postulation for this office when the impediment is. of the particular law of the con-gregation (c, 181, §1). The local ordinary of the higher superior has the vigilance over the dowries, which are part of the general or provincial administration (cc. 549-550). In alienations and the contracting of debts and obligations below the sum that demands the permission of the Holy See, the literal and more obvious sense of canon 534, §1, is that such acts by a congregation or province, as opposed to a house, of diocesan sisters require the permission of the ordinary of the generalate or provincialate. The text of canon 512, §1, 2°, does not certainly exclude the right of the local ordinary to make a canonical visitation of a mul-tidiocesan generalate or provincialate as such, nor canon 533, §1, 1 °, the necessity of his consent for an investment or change of investment of general or provincial funds in a congregation of women, nor canon 535, §3, 1°, the right of inquiring into the administration of general and pro-vincial property. Only the local ordinary of the mother-house approves constitutions to be presented to the Holy See for pontifical approbation (Normae of 1921, n. 8, d.), although testimonial letters are required from the other ordinaries. The typical constitutions published for dioc-esan missionary congregations by the Sacred Congrega-tion of the Propagation of the Faith in 1940 contain no prescriptions based on cumulative jurisdiction. Finally, it can also be maintained that matters such as the convoca-tion of a general chapter and the deposition of a general councilor appertain of their nature to internal govern-ment. They therefore demand the permission or confirma-tion of a local ordinary and fall under cumulative juris-diction only when the intervention of the local ordinary is prescribed.by the particular constitutions. The same is true of the establishment and transfer of a novitiate, which is not too frequently explicitly mentioned by authors as appertaining to cumulative jurisdiction (cf. Larraona, ibid., 10 [1929], 376, note 25). The difficulties in the exercise of cumulative jurisdic-tion are evident immediately, for example, it is most la-borious, cumbersome, and inefficient to be compelled to secure the unanimous consent of nine, ten, or fifteen or more ordinaries for any change in the Constitutions. The obvious remedy is to petition pontifical approval, which is practically always long overdue in these multidiocesan congregations (cf. Larraona, ibid,, 5 [1924], 145, note 95; Muzzarelli, ibid., 94, and notes 27-28). Until this approba-tion is secured, the efficient remedy is the delegation jurisdiction, preferably in the constitutions, to the local ordinary of the motherhouse for matters that fall under cumulative jurisdiction. Extraordinarily serious m~itters may be excepted from this delegation. An ordinary who receives into his diocese a congregation whose constitu-tions give the competence in such matters to the ordinary of the motherhouse implicitly consents to this delegation. In a case of urgent necessity, delegation may be presumed as far as is really imperative to take care of the necessity. Tacit or implicit delegation is also not excluded to the ex-tent that the actions of the other ordinaries certainly mani-fest a delegation (cf. Larraona, ibid., 14 [1933], 418-19, note 784; Muzzarelli, ibid., n. 102). 4. 4. 4. The onstitutiom VOLUME 1% 1960 36~ VI. Knowledge, Practice, and Public Reading of De-crees of the Holy See. Public Reading and ihe Giving ol a Copy of the Constitutions to Each Novice ÷ ÷ ÷ ]oseph F. Gallen, REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 364 42. Am I, a local superior, obliged to put into execu-tion immediately any new document of the Holy See that affects religious? All superiors in the proper sense of this term, whether general, provincial, or local, are commanded by canon 509, §l, to promote among their subjects the knowledge and practice of the decrees of the Holy See that concern religious. A question of the quinquennial report to the Holy See reads: "How do superiors see to it that the de-crees of the Holy See which concern religious be known and observed by their own subjects?" Decrees of the Holy See include the canons of the code and the interpretations, instructions, and decrees promulgated by the Holy See after the code. The decrees that concern religious are not merely the documents specifically or exclusively on the religious life but all documents of the Holy See that apply either solely or also to religious. The matter of these docu-ments may therefore be on things common to all the faith-ful, for example, the sacraments, liturgy, and indulgences, or on the apostolate of the religious as priests, educators, catechists, nurses, social workers, and missionaries. Canonical Legislation Concerning Religious, published by the Vatican Press, is an authorized but unofficial trans-lation of the canons on religious, with the exception of those that affect only clerical religious. It is an evident fact of experience that lay religious especially are not con-versant with the mere prescriptions of canon law. One consequence is that they fail to distinguish between the articles of their constitutions that are canons and those that are laws proper to the particular institute. The read-ing in the refectory once a year of Canonical Legisla-tion Concerning Religious would help considerably to eliminate this common and harmful ignorance. The Canon Law Digest, Bouscaren-O'Connor, four volumes and annual supplements, published by Bruce, Milwaukee, is a collection of the documents promulgated by the Holy See after the Code of Canon Law. It therefore contains the subsequent interpretations, instructions, and decrees of the Holy See that affect religious. Current documents are to be learned from a periodical such as the REvIEw fOR RELIGIOUS, in which they are also explained. A regular section of the REwEw is devoted to a survey of Roman documents. A local lay superior should inform his com-munity of such a document as soon as he is in possession of the accurate official text in the vernacular. The ordi- nary way is by posting the text or having it read to the community, usually in the refectory, Practically all authors state the evident principle that a local superior is obliged to put a document of the Holy See into effect, without waitifig to be informed of it by either higher superiors or a diocesan chancery. However, in practice a local lay superior will rarely be in possession o[ an accurate translation and much less of the certain sense of a document before he is informed of it by higher superiors. A document should not be put into execution before its text and sense are known with accuracy and cer-tainty. Higher superiors must strive to secure an accurate translation and a certain explanation as soon as possible. The higher superior should then inform all the religious subject to him of the document by a circular letter. From custom or previous consultation, it will be known whether the superior general or provincial is to issue this letter. It should be an understood duty of a general or provincial secretary that he is to inform the respective superior and council of any new document of the Holy See and of any new diocesan or civil enactments that affect the institute or its members. Authors also point out that a document which requires the coordinated activity of several supe-riors cannot be put into execution until such activity is possible. All superiors must enforce any legislation of the Holy See. Higher superiors should investigate its ob-servance at the time of the canonical visitation, and an account of the same observance should be included in the reports of local to higher superiors, 43. Our constitutions contain no prescription on the public reading of the constitutions. Are we obliged by canon law to have them read publicly? Local superiors are obliged by canon 509, §2, 1 °, to have the constitutions of their institute read publicly in the community at least once a year on the days a~nd in the place determined by the constitutions, custom, usage, or the directives of higher superiors. The usual place is the refectory. There are many constitutions that say nothing about this matter. These institutes must observe at least the frequency of reading imposed by the code. The more usual frequency in constitutions is twice or at least twice a year, but in many the norm is once or at least once a year. The first part of the constitutions of lay institutes, exclusive of such chapters as the care of the sick and de-parture and dismissal, contain the duties common to all. In a few institutes, this part is read more frequently, two or four times a year or every month. A few institutes pos-sess an ascetical or spiritual summary of their constitutions and read this instead of the full constitutions. This prac-tice may be followed, because such a summary pertains + The Constitutions VOLUME 19, 1960~ ÷ ÷ Joseph F. Gallen, $.~. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 366 more immediately to the religious perfection of all and thus fulfills the purpose of the law. It would be preferable to have the full constitutions read at least once a year. All religious should be familiar also with the canonical or legal articles of their constitutions. An article is often found that commands or exhorts the religious to read the constitutions frequently in private, to meditate on them, and to make their observance a subject of the particular examen. Greater attention is obviously to he given to the spiritual articles and to the chapters containing the com-mon obligations. These are evidently laudable and profit-able practices for all religious, even when not commanded nor counselled by the particular constitutions. 44. The constitutions of our pontifural congregation oy sisters have been conlormed to the Code of Canon Law. Three documents antedating the code are in the back of the constitutions. Some older sisters have com-plained that these documents are no longer read publicly once a year. This practice was discontinued some years ago. Are we still obliged to have these documents read publicly once a year? No, and these documents should not be in your consti-tutions. Canon 509, §2, 1°, commands local superiors to have read publicly in their communities, with the fre-quency and on the days determined by the Holy See, any of its documents, that the Holy See will order to be read publicly. The canon is in the future tense, that is, decrees that the Holy See has ordered to be read after the promul-gation of the Code of Canon Law. Thus far there has been no order to read any document publicly in lay institutes. Only one such document, the instruction of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, December 1, !931, on the cleri-cal and religious training of members who are called to the priesthood and on the test to be made before the re-ception of orders, has been ordered to be read publicly at the beginning of each year but only to religious clerics. Documents antedating the code are no longer to be in-cluded in the constitutions nor read publicly. Several lay institutes are apparently unaware of this fact and continue to do both. The decrees antecedent to the code that the questioner has in mind are on manifestation of conscience, confessors, and frequent and daily Communion, that .is, Quemadmodum, of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, December 17, 1890; Cum de sacramentali. bus, of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, February 3, 1913; and Sacra Tridentina Synodus, of the Sacred Con-gregation of the Council, December 20, 1905, which was in-cluded in some constitutions. The same principle is to be followed with regard to all other documents antedating the code. 45. We are a diocesan lay congregation. There is noth-ing in our constitutions about giving a colby of the con-stitutions to each novice. I heard that we were obliged to do so. Is this correct? The universal practice of the Sacred Congregations of Religious and of the Propagation of the Faith in approv-ing constitutions commands that a complete copy of the constitutions be given to each novice from the beginning of the noviceship. This prescription is not a canon and is strictly obligatory only when included in the particular constitutions. Even when not found in the constitutions, it is at least the preferable practice, since it clearly mani-fests the mind of the Holy See and in itself is most useful, if not necessary, for the study of the constitutions. The ex-pressed purpose of the practice is that the novice may be able to read and meditate on the constitutions and more readily follow the instructions of the master. Each novice and professed may be given only an ascetical summary, but a copy of the complete constitutions should be in the library or in some other readily accessible place for con-sultation. It is the better practice to give a complete copy of the constitutions to all professed and novices. 4. 4. The Constitutions VOLUME 19, 1960 LEO P. ROCK, S.J. Is Christian Spirituality Self-Centered?' Leo P. Rock, S.J. is cur-rently