Suchergebnisse

The protests at the 1999 World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle marked a turning point in trade politics. The size and depth of the international coalition that came together to protest the WTO was striking. And then there were the television images and the stunning denouement: Teamsters marching with 'turtles,' tear gas and police charges in the darkness, the collapse of the negotiations. The author of one of the books reviewed here, Jagdish Bhagwati, was in Seattle as an adviser to the WTO's director. While trying to get to the meeting, he found himself 'confronting a tough Chinese Red Guards-style female demonstrator who was blocking my way illegally.' A colleague then 'drew me away from a confrontation that would surely have left me bloodied, saying, `You are the foremost free trader today; we cannot afford to lose you!" Bhagwati's story speaks to several things, including his considerable ego. Most important, though, it captures the embattled state in which mainstream trade economists loyal to free trade doctrines now believe they exist: 'there are not too many out there, fighting the fight for free trade,' Bhagwati worries, 'We need to change that.' Do Irwin and Bhagwati understand that this is what most of the critics believe? I'm afraid not. Both authors characterize the critics as 'anti-globalization.' Although this accurately describes some, it is not true for the majority. Both authors seem to think that the main reason critics are against globalization is that they are anticapitalist and antimarket. Irwin, for example, tells us that for many of these groups, 'Free markets and capitalism are seen as embodying and furthering environmental destruction, male dominance, class oppression, racial intolerance and colonial exploitation.' To characterize most environmental organizations, or most contemporary trade unions, as 'anticapitalist' is absurd, if that means that they are committed to the abolition of capitalism. If the term means that they are critical of the way that capitalism currently operates, the characterization is accurate, but then the authors' summary dismissal of that position becomes puzzling. The critics insist that there are better and worse forms of market economy, that the neoliberal model of regulation toward which we are currently moving (one that expands property rights while ignoring human rights) is worse than feasible alternatives, and therefore, that the current model of global economic regulation can and ought to be changed. Unfortunately, Irwin and Bhagwati, by tilting at anticapitalist windmills, fail to join the real argument. IN THEIR EFFORT to extract free trade from the wider matrix of economic globalization, the authors downplay the degree to which trade deals such as NAFTA and the WTO shape the character of the larger economic system. For example, some of the most novel and important provisions in NAFTA and the WTO--pertaining to investor property rights and the deregulation of financial services--undoubtedly increase international capital mobility. Dani Rodrik has argued that increased international capital mobility could significantly increase the 'price elasticity of the demand for labor.' That is, firms will shift production to other countries in response to smaller and smaller differences in labor costs, other things being equal. This could dampen wage growth not only in the North, but in the South as well. Bhagwati and Irwin both devote considerable effort to exploring how free trade affects wages, yet neither so much as mentions Rodrik's well-known argument. Why not? Free capital mobility is one thing, Bhagwati says, free trade is another. He favors considerably less of the former than we have today, and much more of the latter. But while conceptually distinct, the fact is that both principles are promoted in NAFTA and the WTO. If we want to assess the impacts of these international agreements, we must consider how they affect capital mobility, and how it in turn affects workers, the environment, and so on. Slippage in the way the concept of 'free trade' is employed permits Bhagwati and Irwin to evade this challenge.

THERE HAS BEEN ONLY A LIMITED ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR A TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (TAFTA), AND EVEN LESS OF A SCENARIO TO LAUNCH SUCH AN INITIATIVE. THE RATIONALE COMPRISES THREE MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE COMPONENTS: THE SUBSTANTIVE COMPOSITION OF AN AGREEMENT, THE IMPACT ON THE OVERALL INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM, AND THE BROAD GEOSTRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES. IN THIS ESSAY THE AUTHOR ADDRESSES EACH IN TURN AND SKETCHES OUT FIRST STEPS THAN CAN BE TAKEN IN 1996 TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A MORE FORMAL INITIATIVE IN 1997.

A TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (TAFTA) IS AN INEVITABLE PART OF THE TRANSATLANTIC FUTURE--SO MUCH SO THAT FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE IT AS EXPLICITLY AS WAS DONE FOR SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD CAN SIMPLY BE CONSTRUED AS A PLAIN REFUSAL TO STATE THE OBVIOUS. THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT THE TIME TO ARRANGE FOR A WIDENING OF THE SECURITY COMMUNITY KNOWN AS NATO AND OF THE ECONOMIC UNION KNOWN AS EU WILL COME AFTER THE 1996 ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES, AND AFTER THE EU'S INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN 1996. TAFTA DEMANDS THAT A POLITICAL CASE BE MADE BEFORE IT IS TURNED INTO AN ECONOMIC ARGUMENT.

MUCH HAS BEEN MADE OF A TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (TAFTA) AS A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO ATLANTIC POWERS. A POSITIVE ROLE FOR THE DIALOGUE IS TO EMPHASIZE SHARED NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOALS. A TRANSATLANTIC FRAMEWORK COULD REDRESS THE MOOD OF MUTUAL ECONOMIC NEGLECT THAT IS AN INEVITABLE BYPRODUCT OF OTHER AGENDAS. THIS ARTICLE NOTES THAT AT THE SAME TIME THE PARTIES COULD SET THE PRIORITIES FOR FUTURE GLOBAL NEGOTIATORS.

Lays out an agenda for the head of the World Trade Organization, Pascal Lamy, calling for him to set a deadline for negotiators, bypass EU Trade Minister Peter Mandelson & go directly to Jacques Chirac, push the US for support, push India & Brazil to open their markets, call for more frequent interim meetings to better position trade ministers for making the tough decisions, &, if necessary, ask the Bush administration to extend fast track. If this fails, Lamy is urged to end the Doha Round, despite the few accomplishments.