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Cover -- Half-title -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Table of contents -- List of figures and map -- List of tables -- List of boxes -- Notes on contributors -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction: key notions and trade-offs involved in MRVing emissions -- 1.1 Purpose and audience for this book -- 1.2 Climate economics at work -- 1.3 Scale, scope, uncertainty and related trade-offs: key definitions and stakes of MRV in climate economics -- 1.4 Outline, editorial choices and comparison tools between chapters -- Appendix -- Bibliography -- Part I MRV of territorial/jurisdictional emissions -- 2 Trendsetter for territorial schemes: national GHG inventories under the UNFCCC -- 2.1 Context -- 2.2 Objectives, national inventory system and challenges -- Specifications of UNFCCC national GHG inventories -- The different gases -- Commitment scope -- The temporal scope -- Required qualities of national inventory systems -- National information system -- Challenges and incentives -- 2.3 Monitoring -- Sources of GHG emissions to be monitored -- Methodology -- Bottom-up vs. top-down approaches -- Use of emission factors vs. measurements -- Tier approaches of methodologies and key category sources -- National statistics and inventory methodology -- Activity data and emission factors -- Data and process management -- Archiving the different processes of the monitoring -- How to manage confidential data -- Monitoring accuracy and uncertainties -- Uncertainty assessment and inventory improvements -- Incentives to reduce uncertainty -- Illustration of improvements driven by specific studies with technical and research centers -- 2.4 Reporting -- Reporting requirements -- National variations -- 2.5 Verification -- Verification procedures at national level -- Timing, institutional organization.

Introduction / De-en Jiang, Shannon M. Mahurin, and Sheng Dai -- CO₂ capture and separation of metal-organic frameworks / Xueying Ge and Shengqian Ma -- Porous carbon materials : designed synthesis and CO₂ capture / Xiang-Qian Zhang and An-Hui Lu -- Porous aromatic frameworks for carbon dioxide capture / Teng Ben and Shilun Qiu -- Virtual screening of materials for carbon capture / Aman Jain, Ravichandar Babarao, and Aaron W. Thornton -- Ultrathin membranes for gas separation / Ziqi Tian, Song Wang, Sheng Dai, and De-en Jiang -- Polymeric membranes / Jason E. Bara and W. Jeffrey Horne -- Carbon membranes for CO₂ separation / Kuan Huang and Sheng Dai -- Composite materials for carbon captures / Sunee Wongchitphimon, Siew Siang Lee, Chong Yang Chuah, Rong Wang, and Tae-Hyun Bae -- Poly(amidoamine) dendrimers for carbon capture / Ikuo Taniguchi -- Ionic liquids for chemisorption of CO₂ / Mingguang Pan and Congmin Wang -- Ionic liquid-based membranes / Chi-Linh Do-Thanh, Jennifer Schott, Sheng Dai, and Shannon M. Mahurin.

AbstractStringent policies that significantly increase the cost of greenhouse gas emissions, such as CO2, are increasingly necessary for mitigating climate change. Yet while richer individuals in society generate the most CO2 emissions and thus will face the largest absolute cost burden, they also tend to be more supportive of stringent environmental policies. In this paper, we examine how information about the distribution of carbon emissions by income affects support for carbon taxation. While carbon taxation is widely advocated as the most efficient policy for mitigating climate change, it faces significant political hurdles due to its distributional costs. Using original survey data, with an embedded experiment, we find that providing information about the actual distribution of household CO2 emissions by income significantly changes individuals' support for carbon taxation. These effects are particularly pronounced at the bottom of the household income distribution, leading to increased support for costly climate policies. However, individuals who believe that carbon taxes will reduce their income continue to hold their level of support for carbon taxation. Our findings have significant implications for understanding the public's response to the distributional consequences of the green transitions and ultimately their political feasibility.

"In this compelling book, leading economist James Boyce shows that the key to curtailing our use of fossil fuels is to put a price on carbon emissions. But how do we secure broad public support for a policy that increases fuel costs for consumers? This book's proposed solution is essential reading for all concerned citizens and policy-makers"--

SummaryUsing cross-sector and cross-country data, this paper evidences that rent seeking influenced the allocation of CO2emission permits in the two first phases of the European emissions trading scheme. Industry lobbies effectively used the 'job loss' and 'competitiveness' arguments, as unemployment proxy variables significantly impacted the allocation in both phases, and carbon intensity influenced it in the second phase. The countries that adopted a partial auction scheme also gave relatively more permits and in particular to the politically more powerful sectors. This suggests a compensation mechanism and supports the assumption of a political tradeoff between the quantity of permits issued and the decision between free grant and auction. It also confirms that the initial allocation is not neutral in the presence of special interest lobbying.