Suchergebnisse

"This book explores from an English law and Institutional perspective the various types of injunctive relief that are available to a party before and during arbitral proceedings. In particular, this book examines the basis of the power of English Courts to grant such injunctions and explains when such injunctions will be granted. It considers any limitations attached to such injunctions and the relationship between section 44 of the Arbitration Act 1996 and section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. It also provides an in-depth analysis of case law and the emerging trends in this area of arbitration, as well as the powers of arbitrators under the ICC and LCIA Rules to grant such relief and other remedies that might be available to a party seeking to uphold an arbitration agreement.This book will be a vital reference tool for practitioners, arbitrators and postgraduate students. "--

The Law and Economics perspective on injunctive relief has been developed primarily from the Calabresi and Melamed (1972) distinction between property rules and liability rules, two different judicial means of enforcing legal rights. Their analysis is predicated on the assumption that, if the prevention of the unlawful activity by an injunction does not reach an efficient solution between the relevant parties, then the latter can modify the terms of the injunction by means of bilateral negotiation, drawing on Coase's basic analysis. The approach is particularly important once it is appreciated that legal entitlements are imperfectly formulated and that, in appropriate circumstances, legal wrongdoing can increase social welfare. For example, in areas where intellectual property rights are particularly difficult to formulate because of the high technology involved, too rigid an enforcement of those imperfectly targeted rights generates welfare losses. The task for economic analysis is then to determine whether injunctive relief or damages is preferable in the particular circumstances governing the parties' activities. This largely involves comparing on the one hand the welfare losses which arise from imperfect damages awards which arise predominantly where the court has high information costs in assessing the plaintiff's losses (particularly where those losses are subjective and therefore cannot be determined by reference to market evaluation) or include irrecoverable third-party losses with, on the other hand, the transaction costs of negotiating a compromise solution or the welfare losses arising from a holdout (both conditions are likely where more than two parties are involved). One branch of the literature has added a new dimension to this analysis. It is concerned to explore how the choice of remedy ex post affects behaviour ex ante, in particular the propensity to invest. In addition, literature on optimal enforcement provides insights regarding the optimal timing of sanctions, which is relevant for the choice between injunctions (the first possible stage of legal intervention) and damages (the last possible stage).

Case name: Shah v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical School et al., No. 3:13‐CV‐4834 (N.D. Tex. 08/21/14).

Case name: Taylor v. Norwalk Community College et al., No. 3:13‐CV‐1889 (D. Conn. 09/28/15).

This report provides an overview of the current debate over whether a holder of a patent essential to an industry standard, who has promised to license such patented technology on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, may nevertheless obtain an injunction from a federal court or an exclusion order from the International Trade Commission against infringing products that implement the industry standard. The report first summarizes several fundamental principles of patent law, then discusses the relationship between standard-setting organizations and FRAND licensing.

This volume in the series "Legal perspectives for global challenges" brings together various contributions on climate change remedies. The papers emanate from an international research project, set up under the auspices of the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study, dealing with how the law can meaningfully contribute to the debate on global challenges, such a sustainable development and climate change. The contributions are written by experts in the field and will be of interest to environmental lawyers and policy makers

Abstract
In this article we develop a simple economic model to analyse the effects of injunctions obtained by the holders of standard essential patents (SEPs), which shows that patent hold-ups involve two types of behaviours in the context of SEP-encumbered fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) commitments. One is general trading hold-up, which is a phenomenon described in transaction cost economics; the other is an abuse of market power prohibited by anti-trust law and/or competition policy. Therefore, it is utterly vital to identify the proper role of private governance and anti-trust intervention. A FRAND commitment does not include a waiver of the right of the holder of an SEP to seek injunctions. The holder of an SEP still can obtain injunctions. However, the granting of injunctions for holders of SEPs should be limited in special circumstances, so as to balance the interests of patentee and user. The holder of an SEP seeking an injunction against a willing licensee may not necessarily constitute an abuse of dominance; anti-trust scrutiny needs to pay much attention to anti-competitive effects. China's Patent Law lacks provisions regarding injunctive relief. China's Civil Procedure Law is vague with regard to the granting of injunctions, as are relevant judicial interpretations by the Supreme People's Court. The decision in InterDigital and the draft of the Anti-monopoly Guidelines (2017) in China demonstrate there are some issues which need to be resolved for the Anti-monopoly Law and the enforcement thereof.