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Researchers have long known that large firms pay higher wages than small firms for workers with similar measured characteristics; however, an agreed-upon explanation for this firm size wage effect (FSWE) has not been reached. Recent changes in the economy provide new leverage for testing competing theories for the effect, while questions about the existence and nature of the "New Economy" provide new motivation for exploring this topic. This study uses the 1988-2003 Current Population Survey and finds that the FSWE has declined by about one third over the study period. Examining the competing explanations for the FSWE, this study finds that while the sorting of workers by traits, unions, and industry factors all contribute to some portion of the effect in cross-section, they fail to explain why it has declined over time. Market power explanations also fail to find support. Shifts in organizational structures, particularly a decline of internal labor markets, appear to best fit the results. These findings provide supporting evidence for the "New Economy" and the idea that recent decades have brought about significant changes within organizations and in employment opportunities.

ABSTRACTWe relate pricing policy of firms to their size, where firm size is interpreted as the size of the clientele served by the concerned firm. We argue that a firm with a large clientele faces a more severe reputational backlash if it 'reneges', i.e., deviates from its earlier price offer. This allows the firm to effectively commit to its offers, leading to a unique equilibrium without delay. Interestingly, this equilibrium corresponds to the equilibrium of the related model that does not allow for reneging possibilities. For smaller firms, however, the reputational effects are much less intense, and consequently the equilibria may involve deviation possibilities. In this case, the equilibria are non‐unique and may involve delays as well.

AbstractSutton (1998) has recently proposed a theoretical lower bound to firm size inequality when a market is made of several independent submarkets. His results are valid asymptotically, as the number of submarkets becomes arbitrarily large. We show that, in small samples, his results can be interpreted as a positive relationship between an index of firm size inequality and the number of submarkets. We also test this relationship in the Italian motor insurance market.

AbstractThis study documents an association between firm size and abnormal returns from the announcement of large dividend increases. Dividend announcements are examined only where there are no contemporaneous earnings announcements. The methodology controls for both the payout ratio of firms and the size of the dividend increase. Using means tests and analysis of variance, the findings indicate that the abnormal stock price reaction to a dividend increase is greater for small firms.

The thesis of the paper is that the hierarchical structure of organizations contributes to the explanation of the well-known firm size-wage effect. A theoretical analysis elaborates why and how wages may depend on hierarchical position and span of control. It is argued that wage premiums for supervisors add to the explanation of the firm size-wage effect, but that an effect of span of control should not be expected. In empirical analyses, both hypotheses are confirmed. The hierarchical structure of organizations explains at least 4 and at most 48 per cent of the wage gap between large and small firms.