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There is heightened interest in reforming government regulation of financial institutions to make better use of market discipline and data. We strongly support such reforms, which are being implemented to some degree by the Federal Reserve System. However, market oriented reforms will not work unless government policies are credible in putting market participants, especially those at the largest financial institutions, at risk of loss. Establishing credible policies requires that governments address the time-consistency problem head-on. As a result, we recommend policies that establish credibility by directly reducing the incentive that policy-makers have to protect the creditors of financial institutions. Other policies, which do not address the fundamental reasons why policy-makers bail out creditors, are therefore likely to be circumvented when large banks get into trouble.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "GAO's work has repeatedly shown that mission fragmentation and program overlap are widespread in the federal government. Implementation of federal crosscutting programs is often characterized by numerous individual agency efforts that are implemented with little apparent regard for the presence and efforts of related activities. GAO has in the past offered possible approaches for managing crosscutting programs, and has stated that the Government Performance and Results Act could provide a framework for addressing crosscutting efforts. GAO was asked to examine the actions and plans agencies reported in addressing the crosscutting issues of drug control, family poverty, financial institution regulation, and public health systems. GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2003 performance plans for the major agencies involved in these issues."

This study assesses how effective governance institutions and de jure financial openness influence the attitude of policy makers in pursuing further financial development by allowing the use of cryptocurrency. In other words, we examine the relationships between a) de jure openness to cryptocurrency and institutional strength and b) de jure openness to cryptocurrency and de jure capital openness. Our main method of estimation is a cross-sectional ordered probit model using institutional and macroeconomic data drawn from several sources, including the Chinn-Ito index, the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the World Bank's World Development Indicators, among others, over the period 2010-2018. To measure the de jure openness to cryptocurrency, we compose an index of 218 economies by using the current legal and regulatory status of cryptocurrency compiled in 2018. Our results show that effective governance institutions are associated with a less restrictive regulatory stance on cryptocurrency, whereas financial openness is not found to be significant. The results imply that a certain level of institutional quality may be necessary before opening up to new forms of financial technology. As cryptocurrency is recognized as a risky speculative financial instrument, its current state of many unknowns can prevent policy makers from conducting a thorough surveillance to avoid system-wide vulnerabilities.