Suchergebnisse

Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest-group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. We examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria. (JEL D72)

Whether receiving a party endorsement increases chances of success; based on a study of nine state party conventions in 1994; US.

In this study of preprimary gubernatorial endorsements by state parties, we find that the endorsee is less likely to be challenged in a primary if the endorsement is based on state law rather than party rules; though in both situations, the percentage of contested endorsees who win has been declining. Evidence from a number of 1994 endorsing conventions shows that the gubernatorial endorsee is more likely to win nomination if (a) the party endorses a politically strong candidate, (b) the endorsing convention is reasonably united and representative of party primary voters, and (c) the endorsee receives considerable tangible support as a result of being endorsed.

We study elections with three candidates under plurality voting. A candidate is a Condorcet loser if the majority of the voters place that candidate at the bottom of their preference rankings. We first show that a Condorcet loser might win the election in a three-way race. Next we introduce to the model an endorser who has private information about the true probability distribution of the preferences of the voters. Observable endorsements facilitate coordination among voters who may otherwise split their votes and lead to the victory of the condorcet loser. When the endorser has an ideological bias towards one of the candidates, the coordination impact of endorsements remains unaltered, moreover the endorser successfully manipulates the outcome of the election in favor of his bias, even if his ideological bias is known by the voters. The results are true for any endorsement cost and any magnitude of bias as long as the electorate is large enough.