Incidence of an Emission Tax
In: Economics of the Environment, S. 107-125
2557 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Economics of the Environment, S. 107-125
In: Economics of the Environment, S. 107-125
In: The Manchester School, Band 72, Heft 4, S. 443-462
ISSN: 1467-9957
This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations in order to analyse and to compare emissions taxes and tradeable emissions permits. Even in the context of a perfect environment, i.e. with perfect information, perfect competition…, it is shown that privately owned emissions permits have some disadvantages. An equilibrium with emissions permits would certainly be better than a laissez‐faire equilibrium since it would entail a lower pollution level. However, it is far from clear that an economy with pollution permits would be preferable over an economy with emissions taxes. While in both cases pollution would be lower, growth would be higher in an economy with emissions taxes. This is because emissions permits divert saving from 'productive' resources and have a negative impact on capital accumulation. This happens whatever the way emissions taxes are redistributed.
In: Annals of public and cooperative economics, Band 94, Heft 1, S. 343-359
ISSN: 1467-8292
AbstractThis article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms' altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms' altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.
In this paper, I analyze incomplete enforcement in a political economy model. I use a contest framework to explain changes in lobbying behavior when special interest groups anticipate the incomplete enforceability of environmental regulation. In this setting, I compare two instruments, namely an abatement standard and an emission tax. Regulation of a polluting output is proposed and two lobby groups - representing the interests of producers and environmentalists, respectively - seek to influence the government in order to prevent or support the implementation of the regulation. I develop a general framework to demonstrate that the lobbying efforts are determined not only by the stringency of the proposed policy - as determined by the level of the tax or abatement standard - but, importantly, also by its enforceability. Using common functional specifications, I then show that, when an emission tax is proposed, incomplete enforcement may not only reduce the industry's opposition to regulation compared to a situation with full enforcement, but it may, despite the possibility of untruthful reporting, also reduce expected environmental damage. When instead an abatement standard is proposed, however, the effects of regulatory stringency and enforceability are ambiguous, rendering unequivocal policy recommendations for this case impossible.
BASE
This paper studies the effect of an emission tax on the relocation decision in a duopoly with exogenous vertical product differentiation. We establish the relationship between quality difference, relocation cost, and marginal damage of emissions in a two-country-setting for three cases: An environmental tax set only by one country, non-cooperative environmental taxation in both countries, and coordinated environmental taxation. We consider two different timings: a time-consistent government, and a committed government. The higher the quality difference, the more likely it is that at least one firm relocates to the foreign country. A lower marginal damage decreases the equilibrium tax rate and lowers the incentive for relocation. If also the foreign country applies an emission tax, there is no equilibrium in which both firms relocate to the foreign country. If both governments set taxes non-cooperatively, the low-quality firm never relocates in equilibrium. If both countries set taxes cooperatively, it is more likely that both firms remain in the home country. Also, relocation of the low-quality firm only is a possible outcome of cooperative taxation. ; June 2018
BASE
This paper studies the effect of an emission tax on the relocation decision in a duopoly with exogenous vertical product differentiation. We establish the relationship between quality difference, relocation cost, and marginal damage of emissions in a two-country-setting for three cases: An environmental tax set only by one country, non-cooperative environmental taxation in both countries, and coordinated environmental taxation. We consider two different timings: a time-consistent government, and a committed government. The higher the quality difference, the more likely it is that at least one firm relocates to the foreign country. A lower marginal damage decreases the equilibrium tax rate and lowers the incentive for relocation. If also the foreign country applies an emission tax, there is no equilibrium in which both firms relocate to the foreign country. If both governments set taxes non-cooperatively, the low-quality firm never relocates in equilibrium. If both countries set taxes cooperatively, it is more likely that both firms remain in the home country. Also, relocation of the low-quality firm only is a possible outcome of cooperative taxation. ; Revised Version June 2018
BASE
In: Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Band 64, Heft 4, S. 1133-1166
SSRN
In: The Manchester School, Band 80, Heft 6, S. 650-670
ISSN: 1467-9957
This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of competition. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation. Moreover, the impacts of delegation on the scope for the optimal emission tax rate to be lower for higher degree of product differentiation are very different under alternative modes of competition. Under price (quantity) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare are lower (higher) in the case of delegation.
In: CESifo working paper series 4121
In: Public finance
We consider environmental regulation in a context where firms invest in abatement technology under conditions of uncertainty about subsequent abatement cost, but can subsequently adjust output in the light of true marginal abatement cost. Where an emission tax is the only available instrument, policy faces a trade-off between the incentive to invest in abatement technology and efficiency in subsequent output decisions. More efficient outcomes can be achieved through combined use of tax and mandated use of a given abatement technology or through combining the tax with an abatement technology investment subsidy. We compare the properties of the two potential supplements to the emissions tax.
The combination of emissions trading and emissions taxes is usually rejected as redundant or inefficient. This conclusion is based on the restrictive assumption that both policies are exclusively meant to control pollution. However, particularly taxes may pursue a variety of other policy objectives as well, such as raising fiscal revenues or promoting equity. Multiple objectives may justify multiple policies. In this case, welfare losses with respect to pollution control may be traded off by benefits from attaining other policy objectives. Consequently, pragmatic policy recommendations have to be based on an in-depth understanding of interactions in the policy mix. This article makes three contributions that are relevant in this respect. (1) The most important factors distorting pollution abatement under the policy mix are identified. This insight is required to estimate the actual extent of inefficiency in controlling pollution, and to compare it with benefits of attaining other objectives of the tax. (2) The policy mix is not only compared to the unrealistic ideal of an efficient single emissions trading scheme but also to a suboptimal heterogeneous emissions tax. It is shown that if the tax is required to address multiple policy objectives, the implementation of an emissions trading scheme in addition may in fact increase the efficiency of pollution control. (3) It is demonstrated that welfare losses can be minimized within a policy mix by modifying emissions trading design.
BASE
In: Pacific economic review, Band 18, Heft 5, S. 644-673
ISSN: 1468-0106
AbstractWe examine the welfare consequences of an emission tax with and without a border tax adjustment (BTA) for an imperfectly competitive industry, where intra‐industry trade arises between countries. BTA allows a government to impose a pollution‐content tariff on imports and refund an emission tax for export sales. We analyse the structure of an optimal emission tax with BTA when a government chooses its emission tax rate to maximize its national welfare. We show that the optimal emission tax policy with BTA achieves greater national welfare and higher environmental quality than the optimal policy without BTA.
In: Environment and development economics, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 433-443
ISSN: 1469-4395
AbstractIt is well known that an efficient pollution taxation scheme should charge each source according to its specific marginal contribution to social damages. Despite significant advances in environmental assessment, geographic information systems and data analysis, this requirement would impose technical, informational and administrative expenses that most regulators – notably in developing countries – seem unable to afford. This paper shows that it can actually be less demanding than it seems. If polluters are price-takers, for instance, in a context where the affected population concentrates at a given location, then the optimal emission tax will disregard a source's location. Otherwise, the adjustment of the optimal tax to location will depend on the extent of a polluter's market power.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4121
SSRN
Working paper
In: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Band 11, S. 29-54
ISSN: 1537-2618