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Damaged durable goods
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 121-133
ISSN: 1756-2171
I analyze a durable‐goods monopolist's incentives to introduce a damaged good (a stripped‐down version of the original good) in an infinite‐horizon framework. The damaged good helps the monopolist to mitigate the Coasian time‐inconsistency problem. However, it may lead to a welfare reduction: low‐valuation buyers are induced to purchase the low‐quality damaged good early rather than buy the high‐quality original good later, and when the players are patient the surplus loss from quality reduction outweighs the gain from earlier consumptions. This welfare result contrasts with the previous literature based on a static framework.
Durable-Goods Monopolists
In: Journal of political economy, Band 90, Heft 2, S. 314-332
ISSN: 1537-534X
Durable goods and conformity
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 452-468
ISSN: 1756-2171
A consumer's demand for a durable good is governed not only by his individual preferences but also by preferences of other market participants. This interdependence of preferences arises from the inevitable resale of durable goods. If most people prefer goods with certain features, original buyers conform and choose goods with these features even if they do not like them. Using a matching model, we show there is always conformity in equilibrium. The incentive to conform is strongest for long‐lived durables and for people who trade frequently. If average preferences are sufficiently strong, there is always too little conformity in equilibrium.
Mergers in durable goods industries
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 68, Heft 3-4, S. 691-701
"This paper is concerned with the study of durability as an aspect of competition and market structure that contributes to determining the incentives for mergers. We find that relative to the incentives in industries that produce non-durable goods the durability of the good produced by an industry enhances the incentive for mergers in the presence of intertemporal consistency problems. Further, the analysis indicates that in durable good markets a good antitrust policy should combine a restriction to rent solely with a prudent merger policy." [author's abstract]
Government Spending and Durable Goods
This paper shows that the fiscal multiplier for purchases of durable and investment goods is very small - much smaller than the multiplier for nondurable goods. Standard models predict small durables multipliers because private sector purchases of durable goods are highly intertemporally substitutable and therefore easily crowded out. Empirical estimates based on U.S. data confirm this result. In aggregate time series data output rises by about 50 cents less if the government purchases 1$ of durable rather than nondurable goods. At the industry level, spending on durable goods leads to smaller sectoral expansions than spending on nondurable goods. The findings of this paper suggest that infrastructure spending which is frequently part of fiscal stimulus packages is relatively ineffective at raising aggregate demand.
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Crime and Durable Goods
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Working paper
Înzestrarea populatiei cu bunuri de folosintă îndelungată: anul
ISSN: 1584-8736
Government Spending and Durable Goods
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6244
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Taxation and Durable Goods Monopoly
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Working paper
DURABLE‐GOODS MONOPOLY WITH MAINTENANCE
In: Bulletin of economic research, Band 59, Heft 3, S. 231-246
ISSN: 1467-8586
ABSTRACTA two‐period durable‐goods monopoly product model with a competitive maintenance market is examined. Three types of monopoly solutions are calculated and contrasted to the social optimum: rentals, committed sales and uncommitted sales. Among other things, it is shown that contrary to the conventional wisdom a seller with committed power does not wish to commit 'to act like a renter' when maintenance is performed by buyers. This is due to the different objective functions of the buyer and seller. Furthermore, unlike earlier works, it is shown that the socially optimal amount of maintenance/repair does not occur in any sales case.
Stock of Durable Goods in Households
In: Wiadomości statystyczne / Glówny Urza̜d Statystyczny, Polskie Towarzystwo Statystyczne: czasopismo Głównego Urze̜du Statystycznego i Polskiego Towarzystwa = The Polish statistician, Band 63, Heft 10, S. 37-55
ISSN: 2543-8476
The aim of the article is to discuss the stock of durable goods in households and consumer behaviours in the market for domestic appliance, RTV, and ICT devices. The research dealt with: equipment of households with durables taking into account the age and the number of products possessed, stock of modern goods, the scale of unsatisfied needs in this respect, the factors determining the choice of durables, consumers' attitudes towards market novelties in this group of products as well as the opinions on the exchange of possessed goods for the new ones. The analyses were based on the data from the survey of household budgets of Statistics Poland for 2015 and the results of surveys conducted with the CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interview) method by the Institute for Market, Consumption and Business Cycles Research in the years 2012—2015 within the research project of the National Science Centre entitled Consumption in an innovative economy.
The findings of the research indicate improvement in the condition of households equipment. More and more modern goods are owned, which affects the increase in the standard of equipment and, consequently, the value of the property possessed.