Suchergebnisse

Una de las facetas legales y políticas específicas de la disputa entre España y Gran Bretaña sobre Gibraltar son las zonas marítimas a su alrededor. La disputa se extiende a las aguas alrededor de la Roca, sus zonas marítimas y la jurisdicción sobre ellas, ya que, con la excepción de las aguas del puerto, España rechaza la existencia de aguas jurisdiccionales británicas alrededor de la Roca, mientras que el Reino Unido siempre las ha reclamado y ejercido jurisdicción de facto sobre ellas. España niega la existencia de aguas pertenecientes a Gibraltar, pero, en la práctica, permite el ejercicio de la jurisdicción británica dentro de una extensión establecida unilateralmente por el Reino Unido, sin distinguir entre las aguas de la Roca y las del istmo. El Reino Unido afirma una supuesta soberanía sobre las aguas alrededor de la Roca, pero su posición inicial de que las aguas que rodean el istmo son británicas es legalmente débil. Dos factores principales explican la evidente falta de coordinación con respecto al régimen legal que rige las aguas alrededor de la Roca. El primero es estructural: está inextricablemente vinculado a los temas centrales de la disputa de soberanía, ya que las aguas son legal y judicialmente inseparables de las otras disputas sobre la cesión de la ciudad, puerto, peñón e istmo, así como de la doctrina de la ONU. en descolonización. El otro factor es temporal: la falta de canales institucionales u otros canales de diálogo para alentar a las partes a abordar cuestiones prácticas de coexistencia y jurisdicción en las aguas. Esto explica la imposibilidad de llegar a un entendimiento sobre las aguas e incluso para alcanzar un modus vivendi simple y provisional sobre el régimen que rige la navegación en ellas. Con el Brexit, sin embargo, se han abierto otras perspectivas de futuro para eventuales acuerdos y coordinación en las aguas, a través del Protocolo sobre Gibraltar del Acuerdo de Retirada de Reino Unido de la UE y los Memorandos de cooperación. La posición de la "costa seca" española no es tan legalmente sólida con respecto a las aguas como a otros aspectos de la disputa, y además debilita la reclamación de España en su conjunto. Esta teoría es de alguna manera incompatible con la práctica española y, además, parece ser bastante joven, ya que se estableció en la década de 1960 durante la dictadura y posteriormente continuó en la democracia española. En este artículo se afirma que el problema de las aguas en torno a Gibraltar es el de la duda histórica sobre la extensión de las aguas del puerto en el frontal oeste del Peñón y el istmo: determinar el alcance hoy de las aguas del puerto y rada de Gibraltar, una vez admitido en 1968 por Reino Unido su no aplicación a las aguas más al norte denominadas "Puerto Canning". Asegurar una mayor coherencia entre la teoría y la práctica españolas en relación con la posición de España en las aguas de la bahía fortalecería la consistencia y la credibilidad de su reclamación sobre las aguas en la disputa de Gibraltar, que parece haber surgido en respuesta a la teoría de la 'costa seca' aplicada por el Reino Unido a España en ese momento Con este planteamiento, España podría considerar reformular la teoría de la costa seca, con una interpretación restrictiva del Tratado de Utrecht que considere no cedida la montaña completa, en particular la cara de levante del Peñón. De esta forma podría ofrecerse una base jurídica diferente a la teoría de la 'costa seca', con una mayor coherencia, ya que la españolidad no derivaría de la no cesión de aguas en Utrecht, sino de que el territorio del este no se cedió –como tampoco se cedió el istmo- por lo que la costa del este de la montaña y sus aguas son españolas. Esta reformulación de la 'costa seca' consistiría en la práctica en la afirmación de costa española en el istmo y este del Peñón, con consecuencias similares a las de la tesis española tradicional: negar espacios marítimos al Gibraltar británico fuera de los espacios en el interior de la Bahía. De esta forma, la reformulación que proponemos daría coherencia a la posición histórica tradicional española, que interpreta el Art X como una cesión que "no reconoce otros derechos y situaciones relativos a los espacios marítimos de Gibraltar que no estén comprendidos en el Tratado de Utrecht". Con esta lectura restrictiva del Tratado de Utrecht, se salvaguardaría en el futuro para los intereses españoles una hipotética expansión británica de espacios marítimos al este de Gibraltar. También el articulo considera la situación en descolonización de Gibraltar y la aplicabilidad la III Resolución de la III Conferencia de Naciones Unidas sobre Derecho del Mar. Igualmente se subraya la vinculación de la controversia en las aguas con la necesidad de tratamiento democrático dentro de España y con Reino Unido de los intereses esenciales británicos, que son los estratégicos, militares, de inteligencia y seguridad. Esta cuestión es probablemente la esencia última de todo el problema, y tiene un déficit democrático estructural, pues hay que contemplar involucrar a las Cortes españolas en el debate real sobre las bases militares británicas, ya que la situación de privilegio militar y estratégico de los británicos no puede mantenerse a costa de la seguridad de los españoles. En suma, con la propuesta que se realiza se pretende una argumentación coherente con la posición tradicional española sobre las aguas de la «Costa Seca», mediante una revisión interpretativa del Tratado de Utrecht y de la práctica española. ; One of the specific legal and political facets of the dispute between Spain and Great Britain over Gibraltar is the maritime areas around it. The dispute extends to the waters surrounding the Rock, its maritime zones and the jurisdiction over them, since, with the exception of the waters of the port, Spain rejects the existence of British jurisdictional waters around the Rock, while the UK has always claimed them and exercised de facto jurisdiction over them. Spain denies the existence of waters belonging to Gibraltar but, in practice, allows the exercise of British jurisdiction within an extension unilaterally established by the United Kingdom, without distinguishing between the waters of the Rock and those of the isthmus. The UK asserts an alleged sovereignty over the waters around the Rock, but its initial position that the waters surrounding the isthmus are British is legally weak. Two main factors explain the evident lack of coordination regarding the legal regime that governs the waters around the Rock. The first is structural: it is inextricably linked to the central issues of the sovereignty dispute, since the waters are legally inseparable from the other disputes over the transfer of the city, port, rock and isthmus, as well as from the UN doctrine of decolonization. The other factor is temporary: the lack of institutional channels or other channels of dialogue to encourage the parties to address practical issues of coexistence and jurisdiction in waters. This explains the impossibility of reaching an understanding about the waters and even to reach a simple and provisional modus vivendi on the regime that governs navigation in them. With Brexit, however, other future prospects have been opened for possible agreements and coordination in the waters, through the Protocol on Gibraltar of the United Kingdom's Withdrawal Agreement from the EU and the Memoranda of cooperation. The position of the Spanish "dry coast" is not as legally solid with respect to the waters as with other aspects of the dispute, and furthermore weakens the claim of Spain as a whole. This theory is somewhat incompatible with Spanish practice and, furthermore, it seems to be quite young, since it was established in the 1960s during the dictatorship and subsequently continued in Spanish democracy. This article affirms that the problem of the waters around Gibraltar is that of the historical doubt about the extent of the waters of the port on the western front of the Rock and the Isthmus: determining the scope of the waters of the port and roadstead today of Gibraltar, once admitted in 1968 by the United Kingdom its non-application to the northernmost waters called "Puerto Canning". Ensuring greater coherence between Spanish theory and practice in relation to Spain's position in the waters of the bay would strengthen the consistency and credibility of its claim on the waters in the dispute in Gibraltar, which seems to have arisen in response to the theory of the 'dry coast' applied by the United Kingdom to Spain at that time. With this approach, Spain could consider reformulating the theory of the dry coast, with a restrictive interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht that considers the entire mountain, in particular the east face of the Rock, not to be ceded. In this way, a different legal basis could be offered to the 'dry coast' theory, with greater coherence, since the Spanish title would not derive from the non-cession of waters in Utrecht, but from the fact that the eastern territory was not ceded –nor was the isthmus given up– so the eastern coast of the mountain and its waters are Spanish. This reformulation of the 'dry coast' would consist in practice of the affirmation of the Spanish coast in the isthmus and east of the Rock, with consequences similar to those of the traditional Spanish thesis: denying maritime spaces to British Gibraltar outside the spaces in the interior of the Bay. In this way, the reformulation that is proposed would give coherence to the traditional Spanish historical position, which interprets Art X as a transfer that "does not recognize other rights and situations related to the maritime zones of Gibraltar that are not included in the Treaty of Utrecht". With this restrictive reading of the Treaty of Utrecht, a hypothetical British expansion of maritime spaces east of Gibraltar would be safeguarded in the future for Spanish interests. The article also considers the situation in decolonization of Gibraltar and the applicability of the III Resolution of the III United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Likewise, the link of the controversy in the waters with the need for democratic treatment within Spain and with the United Kingdom of the essential British interests, which are strategic, military, intelligence and security, is underlined. This question is probably the ultimate essence of the whole problem, and it has a structural democratic deficit, since it is necessary to contemplate involving the Spanish Cortes in the real debate on the British military bases, since the situation of British military and strategic privilege it cannot be maintained at the expense of the security of Spain and its citizens. In short, the proposal made is intended to make an argument consistent with the traditional Spanish position on the waters of the "Dry Coast", through an interpretative review of the Treaty of Utrecht and of the Spanish practice.

2.3 Water Diversion2.4 Tide Level; 3 Discussions; 3.1 Freshwater Sources-Dry Season Shortage; 3.2 Salinity Distribution in Relation to Freshwater Availability; 3.3 Water Diversion-Present and Future Case; 3.4 Sea Level Rise-Equivalent to Increase in Salinity and Decrease in Discharge; 4 Future Scenarios; 5 The Way Forward; Acknowledgment; References; Chapter 3: Río de la Plata: A Neotropical Estuarine System; 1 General Introduction; 1.1 Geographical and Morphological Features; 1.2 Biodiversity; 1.3 Management; 2 Major Anthropogenic Driving Forces at RDLP; 2.1 Food Supply

Abstract
Around the world, governments, industry, and other actors are creating plans to save coasts from environmental crisis. Louisiana is one prominent example: levees and other measures protect oil and gas infrastructure from inundation as the wetlands buffer rapidly erodes—in large part due to that same industry. The state's primary answer to land loss is a $50 billion Coastal Master Plan. To illuminate such responses in Louisiana and globally, this article reviews emerging literature and frames an anthropology of coastal planning around three themes: (1) novel orientations toward time and space, (2) the reproduction of power and capital in the name of protection and restoration, and (3) the elision of other forms of land loss and defense by reductive above-ground/underwater planning paradigms.

"In 1920, the 18th Amendment made the production, transportation and sale of alcohol not merely illegal--it was unconstitutional. Smugglers, along with many others, ran operations along the U.S. coastline until Prohibition was repealed in 1933. This history describes how rumrunners battled both corrupt Coast Guard members and the "Dry Navy" in their enterprise to keep America wet"--

Front Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Citation -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1. Liquor, Religiosity and Dry Politics -- 2. Bootleggers, Alcohol Agents and Survival Economics -- 3. Trouble in Paradise -- 4. Durant, Mississippi: The Town That Wouldn't Die -- 5. "Hell-Hole of the Delta" -- 6. Politics, Payola and Raids -- 7. The Black Market Tax -- 8. Mississippi Liquor Wholesalers -- 9. The Gold Coast of Rankin County -- 10. The Mississippi Gulf Coast -- 11. A Liquor Storm Brewing -- 12. It's Legal-Now What? -- 13. Alcoholic Beverage Control -- Afterword -- Appendix I. 2013 Mississippi Code, Title 67-Alcoholic Beverages -- Appendix II. Liquor Lexicon -- Appendix III. Statistics Relating to Alcohol Production and Consumption -- Appendix IV. A Modern Take on "Local Option," by Bill Minor -- Appendix V. Soggy Sweat's Whiskey Speech -- Appendix VI. A Disturbing Suspicion, by Hodding Carter -- Bibliography -- About the Author.

Baltic Dry Index (BDI) reflects the prices of sea transport performed by Capesize, Panamax, Supramax and Handysize bulk carriers only. The prices of the transport with vessels of smaller tonnage are not considered in the calculation of BDI, therefore principally it should be assumed that BDI does not refer to a tonnage different from the observed. On the other hand, the demand for maritime transport services depends on the state of international trade of goods. Generally, the international market of goods is common for all ship types and tonnages. In the production processes starting from the extraction of raw materials till the sale of finished products to end customers; it can be done by several transport carriages in succession, which provide the intermediate production stages. Transport demand is secondary and depends on international trade, but on the other hand, this demand is multilevel. From an economic point of view, it is important to study the interrelationships between maritime transport providing the intermediate production stages, from the extraction of raw materials till the sale of the final goods.

This article describes flood management in poor communities of Semarang, a second-tier city on the north coast of Central Java, Indonesia. Using ethnographic material from participant observation and interviews, the article argues that flood management upholds an ecological status quo - a socioecological system that perpetuates the potential of crisis and structures of vulnerability. While poor residents have developed coping mechanisms, such community efforts follow the logic of maintaining a precarious minimum of safety. Designed in 2009, Dutch-Indonesian anti-flood infrastructure (polder) is supposed to put an end to tidal flooding, locally called rob. As a short-term project, the polder promises to regulate water levels and improve the lives of local residents. While it wants to make flood control transparent and accountable to riverside communities, the project ultimately fails to escape the institutional logic of chronic crisis management. By investigating the temporality and politics of the polder project, this article aims at contributing empirical and theoretical insights to scholarship on socioecological conflicts and crisis. (ASEAS/GIGA)

This article describes flood management in poor communities of Semarang, a second-tier city on the north coast of Central Java, Indonesia. Using ethnographic material from participant observation and interviews, the article argues that flood management upholds an ecological status quo – a socioecological system that perpetuates the potential of crisis and structures of vulnerability. While poor residents have developed coping mechanisms, such community efforts follow the logic of maintaining a precarious minimum of safety. Designed in 2009, Dutch-Indonesian anti-flood infrastructure (polder) is supposed to put an end to tidal flooding, locally called rob. As a short-term project, the polder promises to regulate water levels and improve the lives of local residents. While it wants to make flood control transparent and accountable to riverside communities, the project ultimately fails to escape the institutional logic of chronic crisis management. By investigating the temporality and politics of the polder project, this article aims at contributing empirical and theoretical insights to scholarship on socioecological conflicts and crisis.