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The aim of this article is to identify differences in doctrinal projection at the level of the North Atlantic Alliance. The article has been designed as a comparative study of the doctrinal projections specific to information operations (InfoOps), mainly with regard to the doctrines and operations manuals of the United States of America, as the originator of most of these documents, NATO doctrines and domestic doctrines. On an initial examination of the three doctrinal projections, it can be observed that there are differences in the InfoOps approach, both in terms of surface elements, recognized by identifiable markers, and differences in perspective, which allow and encourage interpretation. There is therefore a need to clarify the nature of InfoOps and its correct understanding from a conceptual and practical point of view, and to achieve coherence between the doctrines for information operations of NATO member states and the allied doctrine.

Utilitarianism as an innovative and original stream of ethical and political thought has enriched the philosophical discourse of the last three centuries. Utilitarian thinkers claim that maximization of pleasure correlated with minimization of pain is the correct way to create an objective catalog of rules or behaviors that result in the formation of the highest utility for a society and its individuals. From a methodological perspective, there are differences among the utilitarian philosophers on issues such as: happiness, pleasure or utility guide to diametrical disaccord on an ethical or institutional area. The present analysis of the utilitarian thought represents some of the interesting differences in interpretation of this doctrine. However, utilitarianism does not include logical or intellectually strong arguments for the protection of an individual's rights against the interest of people at large. Thus, this doctrine during the 18th and the 19th centuries postulated the political egalitarianism. Nowadays, utilitarianism has lost its strong ethical position. In the past, utilitarianism was a political instrument to protect most of the people in a society from an arbitrary reigning of small elite groups. In recent times, this thought legitimizes the coercion of the majority will regardless of the fact that other smaller groups may have different political views. Such thinking allows to objectify the individual man which is only identified with instrumentality to maximization of utility. The author analyzes the writings of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, and compares their doctrines with the scientific literature and forwards a basic thesis on the universal principles of utilitarianism. The author argues that the actual rules of political ethics under conditions of limitation theory of utility append the law of inviolability of the natural rights of an individual.

Utilitarianism as an innovative and original stream of ethical and political thought has enriched the philosophical discourse of the last three centuries. Utilitarian thinkers claim that maximization of pleasure correlated with minimization of pain is the correct way to create an objective catalog of rules or behaviors that result in the formation of the highest utility for a society and its individuals. From a methodological perspective, there are differences among the utilitarian philosophers on issues such as: happiness, pleasure or utility guide to diametrical disaccord on an ethical or institutional area. The present analysis of the utilitarian thought represents some of the interesting differences in interpretation of this doctrine. However, utilitarianism does not include logical or intellectually strong arguments for the protection of an individual's rights against the interest of people at large. Thus, this doctrine during the 18th and the 19th centuries postulated the political egalitarianism. Nowadays, utilitarianism has lost its strong ethical position. In the past, utilitarianism was a political instrument to protect most of the people in a society from an arbitrary reigning of small elite groups. In recent times, this thought legitimizes the coercion of the majority will regardless of the fact that other smaller groups may have different political views. Such thinking allows to objectify the individual man which is only identified with instrumentality to maximization of utility. The author analyzes the writings of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, and compares their doctrines with the scientific literature and forwards a basic thesis on the universal principles of utilitarianism. The author argues that the actual rules of political ethics under conditions of limitation theory of utility append the law of inviolability of the natural rights of an individual. ; Publication of English-language versions of the volumes of the "Annales. Ethics in Economic Life" financed through contract no. 501/1/P-DUN/2017 from the funds of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education devoted to the promotion of scholarship.

Abstract
This article addresses the teaching of legal research methods and doctrinal analysis within a legal studies program. I argue that learning about legal research and doctrinal analysis is an important element of legal education outside professional law schools. I start by considering the ongoing debate concerning the role of legal education both inside and outside professional law schools. I then describe the way in which the research methods courses offered by the Department of Law and Legal Studies at Carleton University attempt to reconcile the tension between "law" and legal studies. In particular, I focus on how the second-year research methods course introduces students to "traditional" legal research and doctrinal analysis within a legal studies context by deploying a number of pedagogical strategies. In so doing, the course provides students with an important foundation that allows them to embrace the multiple roles of legal education outside professional law schools.

The article deals with the legal aspects of the use of artificial intelligence technology. The authors note a weak statutory regulation of the use of artificial intelligence in Russia, taking into account the active and widespread introduction of this technology in various spheres of life. Developments in the field of artificial intelligence raise very serious ethic and legal issues. Several legal issues, such as the nature of artificial intelligence, the existence of legal personality, the problem of liability for damage caused by artificial intelligence, the impact on the legal profession, etc., need to be addressed. Particular attention is paid to the need of developing a legal concept of artificial intelligence in order to build an effective model of legal regulation. The article analyzes approaches to the definition of artificial intelligence in special and legal literature. The use of such concepts as neural networks, machine learning, super intelligence, supercomputers is noted. Special attention is given to the attempts of legal definitions in South Korea and the European Union. According to the results of the study, the authors proposed the following features of artificial intelligence: the presence of a technical device or cyberphysical system; ability to receive, process and transfer information; ability to work autonomously; self-learning based on the analysis of information and experience; self-awareness; thinking and the ability to make independent decisions. ; В статье рассматриваются юридические аспекты использования технологии искусственного интеллекта. Авторами отмечается слабое нормативное регулирование применения искусственного интеллекта в России с учетом активного и повсеместного внедрения данной технологии в различных сферах жизни. Разработки в сфере искусственного интеллекта поднимают очень серьезные вопросы этического и правового порядка. Среди юридических требуют решения такие вопросы, как природа искусственного интеллекта, наличие правосубъектности, проблема ответственности за вред, причиненный искусственным интеллектом, влияние на юридическую профессию и т.п. Особое внимание в работе уделено необходимости выработки юридического понятия искусственного интеллекта в целях построения эффективной модели правового регулирования. В статье анализируются подходы к определению искусственного интеллекта в специальной и юридической литературе. Отмечается использование таких понятий, как нейронные сети, машинное обучение, сверхразум, суперкомпьютеры. Отдельно упоминаются попытки легальных определений в Южной Корее и Европейском союзе. По итогам исследования авторами предложены следующие признаки искусственного интеллекта: наличие технического устройства или киберфизической системы; способность к принятию, обработке и передаче информации; способность к автономной работе; самообучение на основе анализа информации и приобретенного опыта; самосознание; мышление и способность к принятию самостоятельных решений.

By means of the investigation it manages to verify that the acquisitive prescription of authority is a very polemic institution, since we find contradictory jurisprudence in the sense, in which some courts fail indicating that to acquire the property by means of the usucapion, it is necessary that one has taken to effect a judicial or administrative process that he declares to the proprietary holder of the good, while other courts think that it us is necessary before indicated, but it is enough only that the holder is in possession for 10 years to turn into owner into reason that the usucapion is a declarative institution and therefore it is not necessary that a previous process exists. ; Mediante la investigación se llega a comprobar que la prescripción adquisitiva de dominio es una institución muy polémica, por cuanto encontramos jurisprudencia contradictoria en el sentido, en que algunos tribunales fallan señalando que para adquirir la propiedad mediante la usurpación, es preciso que se haya llevado a efecto un proceso judicial o administrativo que declare al poseedor propietario del bien, en tanto que otros tribunales consideran que no es necesario lo antes señalado, sino que basta únicamente con que el poseedor se encuentre en posesión durante 10 años para convertirse en propietario en razón que la usurpación es una institución declarativa y por tanto no es necesario que exista un proceso previo. Haciendo presente que en doctrina y en la última casación expedida por la Corte Suprema constatamos que ya no se exige para convertirse en propietario de un proceso previo amparándose en el artículo 952 del Código Civil que a la letra dice "quien adquiere un bien por prescripción PUEDE entablar juicio para que se le declare propietario…", es decir, que no es imperativo que el poseedor tenga que someterse a un proceso judicial o administrativo para adquirís la propiedad del bien.