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AbstractThis study implements and tests a market timing trading rule using the public information contained in discount rate changes as signals to enter or exit the stock market. The trading rule entails entering the market on an initial discount rate cut and remaining fully invested through any subsequent cuts. Alternatively, an initial discount rate increase signals an exit from the market and remaining out of the market through any subsequent increases. It is presumed that short‐term Treasury instruments are held in out‐market periods. We test and report the results of this market timing strategy in comparison to a benchmark buy‐and‐hold strategy through the use of various investment performance measures. Analysis of ex‐post returns indicates that the market timing trading rule produces higher risk‐adjusted returns than a buy‐and‐hold‐the‐market strategy. Even without a risk adjustment, the returns of the strategy exceed those of the passive buy‐and‐hold strategy in the three subperiods analyzed. The strategy's predictive accuracy for timing the market clearly exceeds the minimum predictive accuracy suggested by earlier market timing literature. Finally, the results of the statistical analysis indicate that the strategy is successful in outguessing the market as defined in the classical Treynor and Mazuy illustration.

Political marketing is an inter-disciplinary study. Goods which are produced in politics is a power. In marketing, power is presented in various classifications (promises) via politician signs (brand/mark) to political market. In a political market, the advertisement is considered as the basic element due to powerful controls dominating on public media is subjected to suspicion. As power realizing needs attention to internal funds of human experience, and individuals communicate through interchanging signs in harmful relationships, it is necessary to pay attention toward creation process and applying signs and meaning in every social relationship. The author believes that political marketing could result in a better choice merely in an abstract competitive market, while when there is no competitive market, marketing techniques makes a cheat on people. Therefore, how it is possible to prevent from tempting in a non-competitive market? The author believes that rival producers can prevent from marketing monopolized through focusing on the lifestyle of voters. This hypothesis will be tested in the realized sociology framework.