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"Widespread disagreement about moral issues is a prominent aspect of contemporary pluralistic societies. Surveys indicate that in the United States opinion is split close to 50/50 on the morality of abortion, the death penalty, same-sex relationships, and physician-assisted suicide. It is also a subject with a long philosophical history, going back to Plato and Aristotle and drives contemporary debates about moral relativism, scepticism and objectivity. Should we be concerned about the extent of moral disagreement? What causes it? What are the onsequence of moral disagreement? In this thorough and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of moral disagreement and its philosophical and political implications Richard Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions: Relativism and moral disagreement Moral realism Peer disagreement, moral knowledge and the problem of conciliationism Non-cognitivism and moral disagreement Moral uncertainty Moral disagreement and coercion New directions. Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics, metaethics and political philosophy as well as philosophical topics that are closely related such as relativism, scepticism and objectivity. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as political philosophy, ethics and public policy and philosophy of law"

Philosophers have been puzzled for quite some time by the fact that intelligent and generally reasonable individuals who are equally well-informed and familiar with the same bodies of evidence still disagree with one another. Legal theorists wonder why this is puzzling for philosophers in the first place as disagreement is the very foundation of their work. This book, placed at the intersection of philosophical epistemology and jurisprudence, deals with the theoretical challenges that disagreements between judges create. The philosophical debate is applied to German and American legal disputes. How can such disagreements be integrated into the general philosophical debate on »peer disagreement« and into the legal theory of judicial decisionmaking? How should one deal with such disagreements under the existing legal framework but also in terms of legal policy?

AbstractThis paper develops a puzzle about non-merely-verbal disputes. At first sight, it would seem that a dispute over the truth of an utterance is not merely verbal only if there is a proposition that the parties to the dispute take the utterance under dispute to express, which one of the parties accepts and the other rejects. Yet, as I argue, it is extremely rare for ordinary disputes over an utterance's truth to satisfy this condition, in which case non-merely verbal disputes are extremely rare. After examining various responses to the puzzle, I outline a solution using the framework of truthmaker semantics.