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SUMMARYThe higher degree of description is reached when a field becomes amenable to the use of the axiomatic method. In economics this state has been reached only recently in the establishment of a numerical utility. In general, it is difficult to know what to describe and how to measure; both require precise concepts. Current economic descriptions lack both very often, in particular the whole area of psychological factors, decisions, etc., escape the essentially physical descriptions of economic phenomena.Good predictions are the ultimate test of theory but also false theories often have a surprising power to predict. Thus, this matter is much more complicated than normally assumed.Even descriptive theories can be interpreted as 'normative' provided they are convincing to the user. The implied norm is often a prohibition, as for example, in the statement that one should not try to build a perpetuum mobile. If a state of society is commonly accepted which sanctions private property, then the norm follows that one ought not to steal. This is different from normative value statements that derive solely from other norms.

There is general agreement that a firm's scarce marketing resources should be managed for the purpose of long-term profitable growth. Putting that premise into practice is difficult, as only the short-term impact of marketing actions can be readily observed. Persistence modeling has become a well-accepted tool for long-run impact detection. Its consistent use across a broad range of settings has resulted in novel empirical generalizations on the long-run effectiveness of several marketing instruments and has contributed unique insights on, among others, (i) the marketing-finance interface, (ii) the role of new media, and (iii) the mediating role of a broad set of mindset metrics. Moreover, the recent addition of a more normative focus has added considerably to the actionability of these insights.

Abstract
Investigating the genesis and justification of norms in a theoretical way requires a clear-cut distinction between normative and descriptive discourse. From a philosophical perspective, the descriptive-normative dichotomy can itself be understood either in a descriptive (or 'reportive') or in an normative (or 'stipulative') way. In the first case such a dichotomy is understood as the factual border between descriptive and normative discourse in a given language; exploring this border is a hermeneutic enterprise. In the other case it is understood as a boundary between descriptive and normative discourse to be implanted in a language which is developed in order to fit certain purposes, in particular theoretical purposes; this implanting procedure is a matter of regimentation. In this paper I will deal shortly with the first question of hermeneutics and then in more detail with the second question of regimentation. In the final part of the paper I will distinguish different types of naturalistic fallacies resulting from disregarding descriptive-normative dichotomies.