Suchergebnisse

This paper examines the question of the respective percentage of Arab, Jewish, and 'other' populations in historic Palestine and Israel using Israeli statistics as correlated to historical events. Analysis of actual percentages demonstrates that birth rates of both Arabs and Jews from 1948 in Palestine/Israel have been in decline, and that for territory in the pre-1967 area, there is no demographic 'danger' of Arabs – both Christian and Muslim populations – outnumbering Israelis on the basis of natural population growth. An important factor is also Jewish immigration which has been factored into the overall growth rate. The official growth rate for the Arab population has been skewed due to the 1967 influx (in which populations from the West Bank began to be counted as resident in Jerusalem) as well as the annexation of the Golan Heights and several thousand fugitives from the disbanded South Lebanon Army entering in 2000; if such aberrations are taken into account, it can be shown that the natural growth rate among the Arab population is entirely average and family size is in general decline. On the other hand, if the population of Arabs living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is added to the total, it can be seen that the ratio of Arabs to Jews in all of historic Palestine increased from 8:10 to 9:10 and can be reasonably expected to create a situation where the total number of Arabs will surpass the number of Jews in the next ten years.

The theory of demographic revolution / demographic transition is the main theoretical construction underlying modern concepts of demographic processes and their historical evolution. It enjoys wide and well-deserved recognition. At the same time, this theory can hardly be considered complete, as it is not free of contradictions and unsolved issues.The theory in its present form does not sufficiently recognize the demographic revolution as a unity of three revolutions — in mortality, fertility and migration — and pays them unequal attention.The theory underestimates the relative autonomy and interdependence of demographic processes, which leads to an exaggeration of the role of economic, political or cultural determinants of demographic shifts and to a downplaying of the role of these shifts as causes of economic, political and cultural changes. The theory of demographic revolution did not sufficiently integrate modern concepts of the behaviour of complex systems, their capacity for self-organization and homeostatic self-regulation.Only when this has been done will the theory be able to rid itself of its inherent "pessimistic eschatology", and its explanatory potential be fully realized.

The theory of demographic revolution / demographic transition is the main theoretical construction underlying modern concepts of demographic processes and their historical evolution. It enjoys wide and well-deserved recognition. At the same time, this theory can hardly be considered complete, as it is not free of contradictions and unsolved issues.The theory in its present form does not sufficiently recognize the demographic revolution as a unity of three revolutions — in mortality, fertility and migration — and pays them unequal attention.The theory underestimates the relative autonomy and interdependence of demographic processes, which leads to an exaggeration of the role of economic, political or cultural determinants of demographic shifts and to a downplaying of the role of these shifts as causes of economic, political and cultural changes. The theory of demographic revolution did not sufficiently integrate modern concepts of the behaviour of complex systems, their capacity for self-organization and homeostatic self-regulation.Only when this has been done will the theory be able to rid itself of its inherent "pessimistic eschatology", and its explanatory potential be fully realized.

The theory of demographic revolution / demographic transition is the main theoretical construction underlying modern concepts of demographic processes and their historical evolution. It enjoys wide and well-deserved recognition. At the same time, this theory can hardly be considered complete, as it is not free of contradictions and unsolved issues.The theory in its present form does not sufficiently recognize the demographic revolution as a unity of three revolutions — in mortality, fertility and migration — and pays them unequal attention.The theory underestimates the relative autonomy and interdependence of demographic processes, which leads to an exaggeration of the role of economic, political or cultural determinants of demographic shifts and to a downplaying of the role of these shifts as causes of economic, political and cultural changes. The theory of demographic revolution did not sufficiently integrate modern concepts of the behaviour of complex systems, their capacity for self-organization and homeostatic self-regulation.Only when this has been done will the theory be able to rid itself of its inherent "pessimistic eschatology", and its explanatory potential be fully realized.

This paper investigates the impact of demographic deterioration on Greek labour supply, and the possible labour shortages that it may entail. Through a disaggregated approach by occupation and region, the paper predicts, for the year 2000, the new entry to and exit from the labour force, as well as labour requirements. Various methods are used, such as temporal shifts of youth and workers by age brackets for predicting net demographic additions to the labour force, shift and share analysis for decomposing employment changes, and the manpower requirements approach for predicting employment through output and productivity projections. The occupational and regional predictions are mostly done by top‐down calculations. Finally, a formula is invented for measuring the occupational and regional intensity of demographic deficits. Despite the predicted demographic deficits in almost all regions of the country, immigrants and other additional workers to the job market will fill the demographic gap, but many of them will also remain unemployed.

This paper examines the effect of macroeconomic variables, demographic factors toward current account balance in Nigeria. It analyzed the connection between each of domestic savings and investment on current account balance by examining the role and direction of the selected demographic variables. The Toda-Yamamoto approach to causality was used to analyze the study. The result shows that the direction of causality was from both domestic saving and investment to current account balance. However, there is no reverse causation from the current account balance to domestic saving and investment. Thus, the selected demographic variables had no significant causation towards current account balance, investment, and domestic saving. The government needs to finance the desired investment through increased domestic saving without undue reliance on foreign resources

The share of the population that is 65 or older keeps on rising over the years in the U.S. According to the 2017 US population projection, the rate of growth of older population is much faster than other age groups. The growing aging population will affect the economy in many ways, especially in fiscal balance of regional governments. The main goal of the study is to examine the fiscal implication of increasing old-age population in U.S states. The old-age dependency ratio is used to measure aging population, which derived by diving the population 65 years and over by the 18 to 64 years population and multiplying by 100. The old-age dependency ratio increases government spending on primary education, public welfare (Medicaid), health and hospital, and highways and roads. The old-age dependency ratio increases property tax and corporate income tax while it has negative effects on individual income tax, other tax (taxes on motor vehicle licenses), charges (tolls on highway, tuition paid to state universities etc.), and all other revenue. All told, a one percent point increases in the old-age dependency ratio would decrease state fiscal balance by $104/person.

In this paper, we revisit the issue of the impact of demographic change on the Japanese saving-investment balance. Using updated government projections, we show that the ageing of the population under way will steadily lower Japan's saving rate from 31 per cent of GDP today to 20 per cent of GDP in 2040. Japan's investment rate will remain close to its current level of 29 per cent. Thus, Japan's saving-investment balance, or current account, will steadily decrease from its current level and will turn negative in 2025. In addition, we project the impact of demographic change on the evolution of Japanese consumption per capita, or 'living standards.' Despite the population ageing, we project that per-capita consumption will grow until 2010. However, under certain scenarios, consumption per capita falls in most years after 2010.

Pri usporedbi demografskih procesa i promjena u zapadnoeuropskim zemljama i u Hrvatskoj često se u nas površno tvrdi da se radi o "identičnim procesima." Međutim, demografsko-statistička analitička usporedba pojedinih agregatnih i parcijalnih demografskih procesa u navedenim zemljama i u Hrvatskoj pokazuje da o identičnim procesima možemo govoriti samo kada je u pitanju dugoročni smjer promjene tih procesa, kao što je primjerice proces prirodne promjene stanovništva koji obilježava smanjivanje stopa nataliteta/ fertiliteta i proces starenja stanovništva koji obilježava porast staračkog stanovništva u ukupnom stanovništvu. Kod usporedbe mnogih drugih agregatnih i parcijalnih demografskih procesa u zapadnoeuropskim zemljama i u Hrvatskoj, napose kada je u pitanju srednjoročna i kratkoročna promjena, analiza pokazuje da se ne radi o identičnim procesima ni prema smjeru promjene, ni prema veličini, ni prema intenzitetu, ni prema strukturi promjene određenog demografskog procesa. U ovom ćemo radu nastojati te konstatacije potkrijepiti relevantnim podacima i pokazateljima za Hrvatsku i izabrane zapadnoeuropske zemlje. ; In this paper, main demographic processes and demographic balance in Croatia and in 18 Western European countries, mostly EU members, have been compared. The conclusion was that demographic processes in Croatia differed from the ones in the said Western European countries during previous two and a half decades. Among the analysed countries, Croatia was the only one with a permanent yearly decrease in the total population number during previous two and a half decades, while the analysed Western European countries have synchronously recorded a constant increase in the total population number. The analysis of the structure of the demographic balance of Croatia and the said countries shows – according to its basic components – a significantly different structure. In Croatia, above all, both summary components of the demographic balance are negative, so that the decrease in the total population number has been synchronously conditioned by natural population decrease and negative migration balance. However, this structure is different in the analysed Western European countries. It is evident that the increase in the total population number in these countries has been synchronously conditioned by positive migration balance and positive natural change, i.e. natural population increase. These aggregate and structural characteristics of the final result of demographic balance and its structures in Croatia and in the said countries have had an entirely different influence on future demographic movements and changes of the structures in Croatia and in the said countries: in Croatia, projections indicate that unfavourable demographic changes will become intensified in the future; while in Western European countries, they foresee a further increase in the total population number, in particular population capable for work, which is related to future positive structural demographic changes.