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On July 15, 1997, the U.S. Army War College hosted a delegation from the Chinese Academy of Military Science. During the delegation's visit, Academy representatives and members of the U.S. Army War College faculty engaged in discussions ranging from professional military education to national security and military strategy. The highlight of the visit, however, was a speech delivered to the U.S. Army War College Corresponding Studies Class of 1997 by the Chinese delegation's leader, Lieutenant General Li Jijun. As relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China continue to improve, elements of the People's Liberation Army have demonstrated their sincere willingness to work toward better professional relationships with their U.S. military counterparts. In his address, General Li set the cornerstone for a future relationship between the Academy of Military Science and the U.S. Army War College that will further those goals. General Li graciously agreed to the publication of his address. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1181/thumbnail.jpg

Gegenstand der Untersuchung ist der Stellenwert unterschiedlicher Faktoren im Prozeß der militärstrategischen Meinungsbildung und Entscheidungsfindung in der Sowjetführung. Hierzu zeichnet der Verfasser den Lebenszyklus eines militärstrategischen Konzepts nach, das als "eher defensiv orientierte Strategie" die sowjetische Verteidigungspolitik beeinflußt hat. Der Lebenszyklus dieses Konzepts reicht von seiner Entstehung in den Jahren 1981 bis 1985 über seine Ausformulierung in den frühen Perestroika-Jahren bis 1987 und seine partielle Umsetzung 1987/88 bis zur Abkehr von der "eher defensiv orientierten Strategie" 1989/90. Der Verfasser zeigt, daß die defensive Wende in der sowjetischen Verteidigungsstrategie im wesentlichen auf drei Faktoren zurückgeführt werden kann: den Einfluß der internationalen Beziehungen, den Aufschwung alternativer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungskonzepte in der UdSSR selbst (Abkehr vom Rüstungswettlauf) sowie einen institutionellen Wandel, der den Militärs ihre Exklusivität bei der Formulierung militärstrategischer Zielsetzung streitig machte. (BIOst-Wpt)

Since independence, the educational system in the Arab world in general, and Tunisia in particular, has continued to alienate itself from the mainstream society. Deeply rooted in a colonial past, education has failed to effect social, economic, and political change. this paper focuses on the status of education, and by extension Arabic language, in Post-independent Tunisia. Using Pierre Bourdieu's theory of Cultural Reproduction, and Antonio Gramsci's theory of Cultural Hegemony. The method used is descriptive; to describe the research topic problems qualitatively to draw conclusions objectively according to primary data. The historical method is analyzing past events, interpreting them, and presenting the results to highlight their present and future effects.The finding sets out to argue that educational institutions are sites of power play.

Jefferson Davis evaluated the Confederacy's national resources and capabilities and decided that in order to win its independence the Confederacy was going to have to fight mostly on the strategic defensive. Davis maintained mostly a defensive outlook throughout the Civil War but shifted to strategic offensives a few times when he believed or was persuaded that an exceptional offensive was likely to contribute to winning independence. During and after the war Davis called his strategic approach the "offensive-defensive." Although it is a cumbersome term, the "offensive-defensive" strategy remains a valid phrase to describe the strategy Davis used to conduct of the war.

In 2020, the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) withdrew support for President Nicolás Maduro even though Washington had recently intensified the "war on Venezuela," which included sanctions and military threats. The PCV's decision was in response to Maduro's business-friendly "defensive strategy" in the face of the imperialist aggression, which was more severe than that directed against other progressive Latin American governments, particularly after 2015. Maduro appeared to view the PCV and other critics on the left through the same lenses that he did critics on the right and, in the process, what Mao called "contradictions among the people" ended up becoming "antagonistic contradictions." There are tools, albeit imprecise ones, to determine whether the type of political retreat engineered by Maduro accorded with existing objective-subjective conditions in Venezuela. Unfavorable objective and subjective conditions also influenced Marx and Lenin to advocate defensive or "non-offensive" strategies at different times in their lifetimes, vehemently rejected by other leftist leaders.

THE CHANGES IN SOVIET FOREIGN, SECURITY, AND DEFENSE POLICY IN THE SECOND-HALF OF THE 1980'S CHALLENGED THE CONVENTIONAL WISON OF SOVIETOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE. THESE CHANGES WERE A MATTER OF INTENSE DEBATE AMONG WESTERN ANALYSTS, AND THE WIDELY DIVERGENT CONCLUSIONS REFLECTED THE ANALYSTS' DIFFERENT APPROACHES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND METHODS IN TREATING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. THIS ESSAY REASSESSES THOSE EXPLANATIONS BY FOCUSING ON THE INTERNAL SOVIET POLICY PROCESSES THAT LED TO SOME CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN THE AREA OF SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY. IT ANSWERS THE QUESTION OF WHAT CAUSED THE SEA CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY FROM PLANNING A TOTALLY OFFENSIVE STRATEGY TO DESIGNING A MUCH MORE DEFENSIVE ONE, FOCUSING ON THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN BATTLEFIELD BECAUSE THIS WAS THE AREA WHERE THE GREATEST CHANGE OCCURRED.