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This book is an exploration of the security and defense policies of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg with the specific goal of discovering opportunities for greater Benelux security cooperation which could serve as the foundation of a European Defense Community.

Bilateral defense cooperation agreements, or DCAs, are now the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation. These formal agreements establish broad defense-oriented legal frameworks between signatories, facilitating cooperation in such fundamental areas as defense policy coordination, research and development, joint military exercises, education and training, arms procurement, and exchange of classified information. Although nearly a thousand DCAs are currently in force, with potentially wide-ranging impacts on national and international security outcomes, DCAs have been largely ignored by scholars. Why have DCAs proliferated? I develop a theory that integrates cooperation theory with insights from social network analysis. Shifts in the global security environment since the 1980s have fueled demand for DCAs. States use DCAs to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and establish security umbrellas with like-minded states. Yet, demand alone cannot explain DCA proliferation; to cooperate, governments must also overcome dilemmas of mistrust and distributional conflicts. I show that network influences increase the supply of DCAs by providing governments with information about the trustworthiness of partners and the risk of asymmetric distributions of gains. DCAs become easier to sign as more states sign them. I identify two specific network influences - preferential attachment and triadic closure - and show that these influences are largely responsible for the post-Cold War diffusion of DCAs. Novel empirical strategies further indicate that these influences derive from the proposed informational mechanism. States use the DCA ties of others to glean information about prospective defense partners, thus endogenously fueling further growth of the global DCA network.

AbstractBilateral defense cooperation agreements, or DCAs, are now the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation. These formal agreements establish broad defense-oriented legal frameworks between signatories, facilitating cooperation in such fundamental areas as defense policy coordination, research and development, joint military exercises, education and training, arms procurement, and exchange of classified information. Although nearly a thousand DCAs are currently in force, with potentially wide-ranging impacts on national and international security outcomes, DCAs have been largely ignored by scholars. Why have DCAs proliferated? I develop a theory that integrates cooperation theory with insights from social network analysis. Shifts in the global security environment since the 1980s have fueleddemandfor DCAs. States use DCAs to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and establish security umbrellas with like-minded states. Yet, demand alone cannot explain DCA proliferation; to cooperate, governments must also overcome dilemmas of mistrust and distributional conflicts. I show that network influences increase thesupplyof DCAs by providing governments with information about the trustworthiness of partners and the risk of asymmetric distributions of gains. DCAs become easier to sign as more states sign them. I identify two specific network influences—preferential attachmentandtriadic closure—and show that these influences are largely responsible for the post-Cold War diffusion of DCAs. Novel empirical strategies further indicate that these influences derive from the proposed informational mechanism. States use the DCA ties of others to glean information about prospective defense partners, thus endogenously fueling further growth of the global DCA network.

After decades of US military assistance in the Middle East--providing expensive weapons systems and conducting military exercises--why are the military capabilities of US allies in the region still lacking? Why does it matter? And what can be done to remedy the status quo? Bilal Saab addresses these vexing questions through a set of in-depth case studies. Identifying the pitfalls of diverse assistance programs, Saab convincingly demonstrates the importance of institution building in efforts to achieve effective security cooperation in a region that remains of great strategic significance.

After decades of US military assistance in the Middle East—providing expensive weapons systems and conducting military exercises—why are the military capabilities of US allies in the region still lacking? Why does it matter? And what can be done to remedy the status quo? Bilal Saab addresses these vexing questions through a set of in-depth case studies. Identifying the pitfalls of diverse assistance programs, Saab convincingly demonstrates the importance of institution building in efforts to achieve effective security cooperation in a region that remains of great strategic significance

Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Experiments confirm that external threats lead to higher cooperation. The psychological literature suggests proximate explanations in the form of group processes, but does not explain how these processes can evolve and persist. The authors provide an ultimate explanation, in which cooperation is a rational response to an external threat. In the model, groups vary in their willingness to help each other against external attackers. Attackers infer cooperativeness of groups from members' behavior under attack and may be deterred by a group that bands together against an initial attack. Then, even self-interested individuals may defend each other when threatened in order to deter future attacks. A group's reputation is a public good with a natural weakest-link structure. The model extends to cooperative and altruistic behavior in general.

Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Experiments confirm that external threats lead to higher cooperation. The psychological literature suggests proximate explanations in the form of group processes, but does not explain how these processes can evolve and persist. The authors provide an ultimate explanation, in which cooperation is a rational response to an external threat. In the model, groups vary in their willingness to help each other against external attackers. Attackers infer cooperativeness of groups from members' behavior under attack and may be deterred by a group that bands together against an initial attack. Then, even self-interested individuals may defend each other when threatened in order to deter future attacks. A group's reputation is a public good with a natural weakest-link structure. The model extends to cooperative and altruistic behavior in general. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]