Suchergebnisse

This paper explains why large-scale reform of a civil-law prosecution system will be abandoned, fail, or succeed in exceptional cases, focusing on the strategic interaction between an incumbent president and prosecutors, through a comparative analysis of the South Korea and Russia cases. A civil-law prosecution system could hardly be reformed, although there were several attempts to correct the politicization of the prosecution service, in new presidential democracies. An incumbent president sometimes considers major reform against the prosecutors, but he or she tends to abandon it and seek to form alliance with them, expecting short-term political benefits under intense political competition. Moreover, although a president strongly pushes for large-scale prosecution service reform, he or she also cannot easily achieve this goal, since the prosecutors' willful initiation of criminal proceedings will cause his or her momentum to decline. Indeed, only Putin exceptionally succeeded in major reform of the prosecution system under weak political competition, among South Korean and Russian Presidents after democratization.

Is a federal prosecutor's decision whether to pursue violent crime charges political? While prosecutors frequently assert their decision-making independence, their selection and operational constraints suggest a very different story. We assess whether political factors related to the prosecution priorities of the president, Congress, and the local public affect federal prosecutors' decisions to pursue or decline charges in violent crime matters. To empirically examine this, we utilize data from 89 U.S. Attorneys offices from 1996 to 2011. The results provide rich new insight into when and why federal prosecutors' decisions to pursue or decline prosecutions are driven by the preferences of the president, Congress, and the local public. The findings also have important broader implications for the role of political factors in a U.S. criminal justice system believed by many to be in crisis.

A man sets himself on fire in front of the White House in a dispute with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He has been working as an informant for the FBI in a high-profile terrorism prosecution and is unhappy with the $100,000 he has been paid so far. He has also been recently convicted of bank fraud. As a result, the government declines to call him as a witness, given the damage his actions have on his credibility and trustworthiness. This incident underscores the difficulty inherent in relying on paid informants to drive a prosecution, where material considerations such as money and legal assistance are often the price the government pays for an informant's services. In the years since September 11, 2001, informants have been at the heart of many major terrorism prosecutions. The entrapment defense, perhaps the only legal tool available to defendants in such prosecutions, has proven ineffective. This is evident when one considers the context of generally heightened suspicion of the Arab and Muslim communities in the United States. Further, a closer look at several of these prosecutions reveals repeated instances of suggestive and provocative activity by informants geared at obtaining a conviction, calling into question whether a genuine threat to U.S. national security actually existed in the first place. This Article argues that the government should cease its current practice of using informants to generate terrorism prosecutions.

This paper explores corruption in Indonesia using a number of measures and indexes. It discusses the role of different officials in Indonesia's political landscape, as well as the country's changing attitudes and policies toward corruption. Despite increasing prosecution and public embarrassment, there is little evidence that corruption in Indonesia is on the decline. The piece concludes by examining necessary reforms.

Journalism has long been presumed to serve as a check on the powerful, shedding light on wrongdoing; however, as local newspapers reach market failure, extant theory predicts corruption will go unchecked. We operationalize corruption as federal prosecutions for public corruption (PPCs), defined by the US Department of Justice as crimes involving the abuse of public trust by federal, state, and local public officials. We examine changes in the local news media ecosystems: first, whether declines in local newspaper employment and circulation are associated with changes in PPCs; and second, whether efforts to supplement watchdog journalism with nonprofit journalism might mitigate associated declines in federal PPC. Our findings suggest nonprofit interventions in failing local commercial news markets may be an important safeguard for keeping public officials accountable.

Public corruption undermines the rule of law that is crucial to the maintenance of governmental legitimacy and peaceful co-existence. As political divisiveness has grown, politicians have called public corruption investigations "witch hunts" and part of partisan politics, rather than a search for justice. Contemporary attacks on law enforcement charge that they are acting with political motivation which further undermines the legitimacy of these investigations. It is important for research to delve into how the investigative processes maintain their fact-finding missions in support of the rule of law. This study addresses how public corruption investigations occur and how the investigations themselves are conducted. First, federal prosecution data are used to understand the frequency of investigations over the last thirty years. Second, interviews with 40 former investigators and prosecutors examines the process, protocols, tools and resources needed for successful corruption investigations. Investigations require interagency cooperation (especially at different levels of government) and particular attention to the use of investigative tools that ensure the legitimacy of the law in the eyes of the accused, the courts and the general public. In addition, a decline in public corruption cases is seen in recent years with the US prosecution effort diverted to immigration cases.

No one doubts that prosecutors may sometimes decline prosecution notwithstanding factual guilt. Everyone expects prosecutors to prioritize enforcement based on resource limitation and, occasionally, to decline prosecution on a case-by-case basis when they deem justice requires it. Recently, however, some state prosecutors have gone further, asserting the right to refuse categorically to enforce certain state laws. Examples include refusals to seek the death penalty and refusals to prosecute prostitution or recreational drug use. When may a single actor render inert her state's democratically enacted law in this way? If the answer is anything other than "never," the vast reach of American state criminal law demands a pertinent framework for ascertaining legitimacy. In offering one, this Article provides the first extended analysis of the normative import of the locally elected status of the state prosecutors who make such pledges. If legitimacy is the problem, local elections can be the solution. That is, there may well be something suspect about unilateral prosecutorial negation of democratically enacted law. Yet that same negation can be justified as distinctly democratic when the elected prosecutor can wrap it in popular sanction. This Article first unspools a once-robust American tradition of localized, populist nonenforcement of criminal law, best seen in jury nullification. It then draws upon democratic theory to construct a normative basis for reviving that tradition in the context of state prosecutors' categorical nonenforcement. These moves uncover a before-now unappreciated connection: At least where the prosecutor ties her categorical nullification to the polity's electorally expressed will, she accomplishes wholesale what nullifying juries could once do retail. I thus dub that wholesale action "populist prosecutorial nullification." Building upon that analogy and my normative analysis, I set out a novel framework for evaluating state prosecutors' categorical nonenforcement that is keyed to the concept of localized popular will, while accounting for populism's well-known downsides.

There have been sharp fluctuations in the political regimes that Latin America has experienced in recent years. And the developments in several Latin American countries over the past years have revealed the dominance of leftist parties on the political scene. This dominance began to recede after the right-wing parties advanced in large countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Chile and Paraguay. These developments came as a result of the decline of the democratic approach of the left-wing parties, or as a result of the prosecutions of corruption scandals, as happened in Brazil during the era of President (De Silva) 2003-2011, who failed to face the prosecutions, which affected the bright image of the Latin left.
De Silva was not the first leftist to win the rule of their country in South American countries. He was preceded - during the last two years - by the presidents of Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Mexico, Honduras, and Colombia, whose rule (Gustavo Petro) won as its first left-wing president. This was not the only round won by the symbols of the left by ruling the countries of the southern continent, but they also won in a previous round in the first decade of this century, such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Jose Mojica in Uruguay, and Evo Morales. in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Detailed contents -- Part 1 Understanding crime and criminology -- 1 Understanding crime and criminology -- What is criminology? -- An interdisciplinary subject -- Defining criminology -- Understanding crime -- Crime and the criminal law -- Crime as a social construct -- Historical variation -- Criminology in Britain -- Further reading -- 2 Crime and punishment in history -- Introduction -- Emergence of a modern criminal justice system -- Policing -- The 'new police' -- Resistance and reform -- Into the twentieth century -- The victim and prosecution -- Formalisation of the prosecution process -- The courts -- Decline of the profit motive -- Punishment -- Capital punishment -- Transportation -- Imprisonment -- Probation -- Crime and violence in history -- Levels of crime -- Perceptions of crime -- Questions for further discussion -- Further reading -- Websites -- 3 Crime data and crime trends -- Introduction -- Measuring crime -- Official statistics -- England and Wales: Criminal Statistics -- United States: Uniform Crime Reports -- Assessing official statistics -- Impact of legislation -- Understanding 'attrition' -- Limitations of official statistics -- Victimisation surveys -- The Crime Survey for England and Wales -- Local crime surveys -- Other victimisation surveys -- Assessing victimisation surveys -- Comparing official statistics and victimisation surveys -- Crime trends -- Data on offenders -- Self-report studies -- Assessing the self-report method -- Questions for further discussion -- Further reading -- Websites -- 4 Crime and the media -- Introduction -- Academic study of the media -- Media representations of crime -- Newsworthiness -- The crime content in the media -- Violent crime in the news -- Are the media criminogenic? -- Media effects -- Media and fear of crime -- Moral panics

• "Although New Cases and Deaths Decrease, He Urges Safeguards Against Plague's Recurrence"• "Landlords Face Criminal Prosecution if Houses Are Kept Unheated – Many Are Summoned"• The shortage of caskets has been made worse by the Government's commandeering of coffins for use in army camps• 3,663 new cases/314 deaths• Dr. Copeland: "Our worst trouble now is in Queens and the outlying sections of Brooklyn. The epidemic is through in Manhattan and Bronx. There will be a steady decline every day now in cases and deaths."• An issue of warning by Dr. Copeland has stated using alcohol to treat influenza unless under a doctor's order will not help• The hospital at the Lodging House will be closed tomorrow as it is no longer needed; the Willard Parker and Polyclinic hospitals will be able to care for the sick that remain ; Newspaper article ; 11

President Obama has outlined a comprehensive strategy for the war in Afghanistan which is now the central front of our campaign against Islamic terrorism. The strategy strongly connects our prosecution of that war to our policy in Pakistan and internal developments there as a necessary condition of victory. But the strategy has also provided for a new logistics road through Central Asia. The author argues that a winning strategy in Afghanistan depends as well upon the systematic leveraging of the opportunity provided by that road and a new coordinated nonmilitary approach to Central Asia. That approach would rely heavily on improved coordination at home and the more effective leveraging of our superior economic power in Central Asia to help stabilize the region so that it provides a secure rear to Afghanistan. In this fashion we would help Central Asia meet the challenges of extremism, of economic decline due to the global economic crisis, and thus help provide political stability in states that are likely to be challenged by the confluence of those trends. ; "June 2009." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 44-57). ; President Obama has outlined a comprehensive strategy for the war in Afghanistan which is now the central front of our campaign against Islamic terrorism. The strategy strongly connects our prosecution of that war to our policy in Pakistan and internal developments there as a necessary condition of victory. But the strategy has also provided for a new logistics road through Central Asia. The author argues that a winning strategy in Afghanistan depends as well upon the systematic leveraging of the opportunity provided by that road and a new coordinated nonmilitary approach to Central Asia. That approach would rely heavily on improved coordination at home and the more effective leveraging of our superior economic power in Central Asia to help stabilize the region so that it provides a secure rear to Afghanistan. In this fashion we would help Central Asia meet the challenges of extremism, of economic decline due to the global economic crisis, and thus help provide political stability in states that are likely to be challenged by the confluence of those trends. ; Mode of access: Internet.

During World War II, the art market experienced a massive boom in occupied countries. The discretion, the inflation proof character, the absence of market intervention and the possibility to resell artworks abroad have been suggested to explain why investing in artworks was one of the most interesting opportunities under the German boot. On basis of an original database of close to 4000 artworks sold between 1944 and 1951 at Giroux, one of the most important Art Gallery in Brussels, this paper analyzes, the price movements on the Belgian art market following the liberation. Market reactions following the war are used to understand which motivations played the most important role in investors' decisions. Prices on the art market experienced a massive drop. This huge price decline is attributed to two elements: fear of prosecution for war profits and the monetary reforms set into place in October 1944. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

It is beyond peradventure that American prosecutors have ple-nary charging discretion in criminal cases; prosecutors with admissible proof beyond a reasonable doubt may nevertheless decline to seek a conviction. Such declinations are sometimes rooted in legitimate law enforcement rationales, such as the absence of sufficient enforcement resources. A prosecutor, however, might decline a meritorious prosecution simply because he or she disagrees with the applicable law or its application in the particular case. This prerogative to engage in what this Article terms "prosecutorial nullification" has been under-theorized, but raises a number of profound questions: Is prosecutorial nullification a subspecies of legitimate prosecutorial discretion, or should it be considered an extra-legal departure from established rules? What is the conceptual relation-ship of prosecutorial nullification to jury nullification and other like actions of discretion-wielding criminal justice actors? Do the unique institutional role and function of the American prosecutor provide a sufficient rationale for the power to frustrate legislative judgment and undermine (or promote) societal values and norms? This Article seeks to sharpen the definition of "prosecutorial nullification," contextualize it within the broader conversation about discretion in the criminal process, and offer a nuanced account of its relationship with prosecutorial authority, legiti-macy, and the rule of law.

After decades of decline, US prices rose about 2.5 percent a year from 1897 to World War I and then more than doubled between 1914 and 1920. Popular explanations for these events can be studied via editorials and editorial cartoons, which reflected and contributed to an outpouring of public concern. While economists then and now adduced monetary causes for the price increases, popular theories blamed the tariff, monopolies, middlemen, profiteers, supply and demand, lazy farmers, incompetent housewives, and more. These explanations supported important political positions, and they had significant consequences, because worries over the high cost of living more powerfully shaped Progressive era public policy than has been appreciated. Tariff reduction, parcel post, antitrust prosecution, cold storage legislation, farm credit, standardization of weights and measures, and other reforms were importantly motivated by worries over high prices. Thus, apparently incorrect public understanding of economic events can sometimes lead to desirable public policies.