This third edition provides legal analysis of international corporate, banking, and sovereign debt restructuring, from the perspective of creditors and debtors, providing practical guidance to help practitioners, policy-makers, and academics in the UK and US to understand current developments in debt restructuring.
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For a long time, German restructuring and insolvency law had no pre-insolvency restructuring scheme binding on dissenting creditors. Only in opened insolvency proceedings a restructuring plan could be used for debt restructuring. Now the German legislators has taken means to improve German law in three ways: first, by updating the German Bond Act (also known as the German Debenture Act), especially through permitting the change of the bond conditions by a majority vote of the creditors if the conditions allow for such majority vote; second, by improving German insolvency law through the "Act for the Further Simplification of Company Restructuring (ESUG)" which enables the debtor to start early restructuring preparation proceedings ("protective umbrella proceedings"); and, third, by announcing the introduction of new pre-insolvency restructuring proceedings as a reaction to the EU Directive proposed by the European Commission on 22 November 2016.
In: International law reports, Band 195, S. 227-238
ISSN: 2633-707X
227State immunity — Jurisdictional immunity — Exceptions — Acta jure gestionis — Acta jure imperii — Once a trader always a trader — State of emergency — Law-making — Legislature regulating legal relations initially established by acta jure gestionis qualifying as acta jure imperiiEconomics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Hellenic Republic — Public debt — Bonds — Greek sovereign debt crisis — Sovereign debt restructuring — Collective Action Clauses — Secondary market — Bond exchange — Financial stabilityRelationship of international law and municipal law — Compatibility with Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany — General principle of international law — Article 25 of German Basic Law — Right to a lawful judge — The law of Germany
This paper examines the causes, processes, and outcomes of the two Belize sovereign debt restructurings in 2006–07 and in 2012–13 that occurred outside of an IMF-supported program. It finds that the motivation for the two debt restructurings differed, as the former was driven by external liquidity concerns while the latter was motivated by a substantial increase in the coupon rates and future fiscal solvency concerns. Despite differential treatment between residents and non-residents, both 2006–07 and 2012–13 debt exchanges were executed through collaborative engagement, due in part to the exi
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Many jurisdictions around the world are seeking to develop an effective mechanism for rescuing financially distressed but viable businesses. In the UK a number of different mechanisms exist which can be used to restructure distressed companies. The purpose of this paper is to assess the debt restructuring mechanisms currently available to companies in English law and to consider the proposed reform of the UK regime, announced by the Government in August 2018. It is argued that reform is needed, and that in general the proposals to introduce a restructuring moratorium and a restructuring plan which includes a cross class cramdown are to be welcomed. However, these reforms will need to be introduced with care in order to ensure that an appropriate balance is maintained between the interests of the company and the interests of the creditors and that, ultimately, the UK's regime remains fit for purpose for the future.
Many jurisdictions around the world are seeking to develop an effective mechanism for rescuing financially distressed but viable businesses. In the UK a number of different mechanisms exist which can be used to restructure distressed companies. The purpose of this paper is to assess the debt restructuring mechanisms currently available to companies in English law and to consider the proposed reform of the UK regime, announced by the Government in August 2018. It is argued that reform is needed, and that in general the proposals to introduce a restructuring moratorium and a restructuring plan which includes a cross class cramdown are to be welcomed. However, these reforms will need to be introduced with care in order to ensure that an appropriate balance is maintained between the interests of the company and the interests of the creditors and that, ultimately, the UK's regime remains fit for purpose for the future.
After the huge debt increases in the 1940s, due to the WWII, and in the 1980s due to the emerging markets' debt crises, the debt overhang problem is once again at the center of the academic and political debate because of the recent debt crisis that affected the European countries in 2009. The debt overhang theory explains how an high level of debt distorts the optimal investment decisions and reduces government's incentives, in the debtor country, to undertake the necessary "adjustment policies". A huge literature focuses on the negative effects deriving from a debt overhang condition. In particular, this kind of literature has been mostly used to describe and to study poor and less developed countries. Nowadays instead, the situation is quite different with the Greek case that represents a very peculiar and never experienced situation. Chapter 1 of the thesis starts with an introduction of the sovereign debt overhang problem. Then, since the aim is to study the possible policy interventions able to solve it, the focus is posed on sovereign debt restructuring as a resolution mechanism. A relief intervention can be considered, indeed, as a way to reduce the debt burden for a country struggling with an high level of debt. Descriptions of the restructuring process, of the macroeconomic consequences and of the Greek case are then provided in this chapter in addition to some stylised facts and an event analysis useful to communicate the main messages. In the past, several different strategies of debt restructuring have been implemented and the consequences they produced were often different case by case. It is then interesting to study the effectiveness of the several options that can be used to restructure public debt. For this reason, a very simple theoretical model is developed in Chapter 2 in order to study three different strategies that can be used to solve a sovereign debt overhang problem. In particular, two strategies are based on a debt restructuring process, via face value reduction or rescheduling, whereas a third one is based on conditional-additional official lending. This strategy relies on the idea that the debtor country can benefit of new lending from the official sector, in order to undertake a larger amount of investment. The aim of the model is to represent schematically the functioning of the three restructuring processes to gain insights into their differences and to study their consequences in term of incentives to invest in a "troubled country". An empirical evidence of the debt overhang hypothesis is then provided in Chapter 3. The combination of the sovereign debt crisis of 2009 and the fiscal consolidation policies implemented as a result, makes indeed interesting to study this hypothesis in Europe. The Chapter exploits then a panel dataset for the European countries, between 1995 and 2015, in order to examine the extent to which increased levels of public debt have led to reduced public investment. We start the analysis from basic POLS models and then we expand it gradually to FE, IV and GMM estimation models. The results validate the debt overhang hypothesis and remain robust across various model specifications.
AbstractThe Eurozone sovereign debt crisis began in the spring of 2010. Seven years on seems like an appropriate point at which to critique how the crisis has been handled and to assess whether policy changes will be required should it flare up again. In particular, there are a number of lessons to be learned from the Greek debt restructuring of 2012.