Ending Dark Money in Arizona
In: 44 Seton Hall Legislative Journal 61 (2019).
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In: 44 Seton Hall Legislative Journal 61 (2019).
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We study the consequences of campaign finance disclosure laws in a model of informative campaign finance. Campaign spending can affect electoral outcomes and also signal policy information to politicians. Under mandatory disclosure donors may engage in spending that runs counter to their electoral interests in order to signal good news regarding their preferred policy. When donors can use dark money the electoral price to influence policy increases to account for the possibility that donors use public spending to signal, but secretly offset the electoral costs with dark money. Our results suggest that observable spending will tend to increase for moderate candidates and decrease for extreme candidates when dark money is allowed. We also illustrate how different social pressures affect patterns of campaign spending.
We provide a model of dark money in elections. An ideologically extreme donor with private information about candidate ideology and quality can advertise on behalf of a candidate. Advertising reveals information about candidate quality to voters, who can learn from either donor-funded or neutral advertising. Voters update negatively about candidate ideology when ads are known to be donor-funded. Dark money suppresses source information and allows donors to advertise candidate quality while simultaneously concealing the ideological motivations behind ad funding. However, dark money leads voters to become skeptical of all advertising, which can disadvantage donors.
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In: The journal of politics: JOP
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Democracy for Hire, S. 437-457
In: 28(2) Kings Law Journal 239 (2017).
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In: DePaul Law Review, Forthcoming
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In: Routledge Studies in Crime, Security and Justice
Introduction: public policing's greed and dark money -- Theorizing the flow of dark money in policing: from gifts to the greedy institution -- Mapping the police funding terrain: donors, sponsors, foundations, paid detail, forfeiture and beyond -- Glossing over the greedy institution: views from inside police foundations -- Corporate-police partnerships and the extension of greed -- Shadow figures: paid detail policing as private funding and the new brokers -- Framing dark money as community benefit -- Controversies and holes in private police funding policy -- Conclusion: the future of private sponsorship and funding of police.
Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction: Deceiving Democracy -- 2 The Campaign of 2016 -- 2.1 Charter Schools in Massachusetts and Union-Privatizer Proxy Wars -- 2.2 The Charters Campaign of 2014-2016 -- 2.3 Messages in Conflict and the Battle Over the Word Public -- 2.4 Dark Money in the Question 2 Campaign -- 2.5 The Politics of the Charters Campaign -- 2.6 Media and Money -- 2.7 Conclusion -- 3 Boardroom Progressives or Rich People's Movement? -- 3.1 Boardroom Progressives -- 3.2 Rich People's Movements -- 3.3 Conclusion -- 4 Secret Funders: Oligarchs United -- 4.1 The Walton Family-Outside Money -- 4.2 The Boston Privatizers-Inside Money -- 4.3 Individual Givers -- 4.4 Funding Conduits -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 5 Political Fronts -- 5.1 Umbrella Groups -- 5.2 Political Incubator: Teach for America -- 5.3 Home Grown Advocacy: Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research -- 5.4 Specialty Groups -- 5.5 Conclusion -- 6 Upstream Money and Downstream Money: The Hidden Flow of Funds -- 6.1 What 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) Organizations Can Do -- 6.2 How to Do Politics with a 501(c)(3) -- 6.3 How to Do Politics with a 501(c)(4) -- 6.4 Conclusion -- 7 Democrats for Education Reform and the Inside Job -- 7.1 Ideology -- 7.2 Funding -- 7.3 Leadership -- 7.4 Operations: Dark Money and Anti-Union -- 7.5 Conclusion -- 8 Racial Perceptions, Racial Realities -- 8.1 Grassroots or Astroturf? -- 8.1.1 Signature Gathering -- 8.1.2 Canvassing -- 8.1.3 Phones -- 8.1.4 Mailing -- 8.1.5 Vanishing Volunteers -- 8.2 The Commercialized Campaign -- 8.3 Conclusion -- 9 After 2016: Money Never Sleeps -- 9.1 A Dark Money Post-Mortem -- 9.2 Lessons Learned, Lessons Ignored -- 9.3 Resurrection -- 9.4 Conclusion -- 10 Conclusion: Defeating Dark Money in School Privatization-And Everywhere Else -- Bibliography -- Index.
In: Springer eBook Collection
1. Introduction: Deceiving Democracy -- 2. The Campaign of 2016 -- 3. Boardroom Progressives or Rich People's Movement? -- 4. Secret Funders: Oligarchs United -- 5. Political Fronts -- 6. Upstream Money and Downstream Money: The Hidden Flow of Funds -- 7. Democrats for Education Reform and the Inside Job -- 8. Racial Perceptions, Racial Realities -- 9. After 2016: Money Never Sleeps -- 10. Conclusion: Defeating Dark Money in School Privatization—And Everywhere Else.
Judges, even when popularly elected, are not representatives; they are not agents for their voters, nor should they take voter preferences into account in adjudicating cases. However, popularly elected judges are representatives for some election law purposes. Unlike other elected officials, judges are not politicians. But judges are policy-makers. Judicial elections are subject to the same constitutional doctrines that govern voting on legislators, executives, and ballot propositions. Except when they are not. The same First Amendment doctrine that protects campaign speech in legislative, executive, and ballot proposition elections applies to campaign speech in judicial elections – but not in quite the same way. Independent committees have the same right to spend in judicial elections as they do in other elections. But significant independent spending can result in the imposition of a constitutional restriction on the behavior of an elected judge who benefited from that spending. This restriction is without parallel for elected legislators or executives who benefit from similar independent spending.
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