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Using data from a New Zealand survey of top business leaders, we explore the relevance of interview data for illuminating the structures and processes of the capitalist class. We are able to show from this survey that family groups are still very important units of corporate power analysis; directors, not managers, tend to make the larger decisions; board members are more concerned with the development of policy than its implementation ; directors major concern in decision making is to major shareholders; and directors have frequent contact with major shareholders and other business interests.

Front cover; Title page; Copyright; Contents; Foreword; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Introduction; 1. Historical Background; 2. The First Century CE Cultural Background for the Concept of Corporate Decision-Making; 3. Theological Concepts Entering into Corporate Decision-Making; 4. Scripture Passages Directly Relating to Corporate Decision-Making; 5. Reflection of the New Testament Pattern in Christian Documents from 95 CE to 350 CE; Conclusion; Appendix: Flow Chart of Church Decision-Making-Phil Siefkes; Bibliography; Back cover.

Front cover -- Title page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1. Historical Background -- 2. The First Century CE Cultural Background for the Concept of Corporate Decision-Making -- 3. Theological Concepts Entering into Corporate Decision-Making -- 4. Scripture Passages Directly Relating to Corporate Decision-Making -- 5. Reflection of the New Testament Pattern in Christian Documents from 95 CE to 350 CE -- Appendix: Flow Chart of Church Decision-Making-Phil Siefkes -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Back cover

PurposeThis paper aims to explore how stakeholders are voluntarily granted influence in corporate decision making.Design/methodology/approachThe stakeholder governance practices of 46 companies were explored in a multiple comparative case analysis, drawing on publicly available sources.FindingsThe research finds that stakeholders are granted a voice regarding operational, managerial as well as strategic issues. The power granted to stakeholders varies from non‐participation to co‐decision making. The majority of engagements found are a combination of low power and low scope of participation, which are limited in their potential to align the views of those inside and outside the corporate boundaries.Research limitations/implicationsThe data used in this research relied on publicly available sources, such as company reports, articles and web sites.Practical implicationsBy seeing an array of different stakeholder governance mechanisms managers can reflect on their own approach to stakeholders and see how other companies use stakeholder engagement for scenario planning and innovation.Originality/valueThe paper is the first to empirically analyse a broad range of companies regarding their voluntary stakeholder engagement mechanisms. This design allows the creation of a heuristic for stakeholder governance as well as for identifying clusters.

Recently in this Journal, Cutting and Kouzmin postulated a three‐phase group decision‐making process. This paper demarcates, within that framework, a set of contending corporate board decision‐making perceptions. It's premise is that how directors determine how investigations should be conducted, evidence should be assessed, and the truth should be decided depends on their epistemological and ontological predisposition. The philosophy of the social sciences offers four contending epistemological and ontological lens used to describe, analyze, evaluate and judge their corporate world. Each is fundamentally flawed. What is needed, then, are reflexive and pluralized corporate governance structures and processes that can accommodate a variety of epistemological and ontological imperatives. The broad conclusion drawn is that good corporate governance requires directors to recognize the limitations of their understanding of corporate governance reality, to treat all truth claims skeptically, and never to resort to self‐deception or self‐delusion just to avoid unpleasant corporate governance truths.