Suchergebnisse

part Part I Personhood and Personality in International Law -- chapter 1 Jan Klabbers (2005), 'The Concept of Legal Personality' -- chapter 2 Hans Aufricht (1943), 'Personality in International Law' -- part Part II States, Peoples and Cities -- chapter 3 Oleg I. Tiunov (1992-1993), 'The International Legal Personality of States: Problems and Solutions' -- chapter 4 Budislav Vukas (1991), 'States, Peoples and Minorities as Subjects of International Law' -- chapter 5 Yishai Blank (2005-2006), 'The City and the World' -- part Part III Individuals -- chapter 6 Hersch Lauterpacht (1947), 'The Subjects of the Law of Nations' -- chapter 7 Marek St. Korowicz (1956), 'The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals' -- part Part IV International Organizations -- chapter 8 Clarence Wilfred Jenks (1945), 'The Legal Personality of International Organizations' -- chapter 9C.F. Amerasinghe (1995), 'International Legal Personality Revisited' -- chapter 10 David J. Bederman (1995-1996), 'The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel' -- part Part V Non-humans and Non-state Actors -- chapter 11 Karsten Nowrot (2006), 'Reconceptualising International Legal Personality of Influential Non-state Actors: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibilities' -- chapter 12 Anthony D'Amato and Sudhir K. Chopra (1991), 'Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life' -- part Part VI Possibilities -- chapter 13 Jens David Ohlin (2005), 'Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human Rights?' -- chapter 14 Janne E. Nijman (2007), 'Paul Ricoeur and International Law: Beyond "The End of the Subject". Towards a Reconceptualization of International Legal Personality'.

In the article, the author considers the features of the legal personality of children due to their participation in relations of a diversified type (civil, family, procedural, labor), reveals the features of their legal capacity and capacity, presents the relationship between the subjective rights of the child and the specifics of his intersectoral relations arising in connection with his participation in a variety of relationships. The article formulates a conclusion about the need to take into account in the process of legal regulation of relations with the participation of children precisely the norms of a sectoral type, since they determine not only the content of his special legal capacity, but also allow specifying the meaning of the individual criteria of the child (age, gender, health status, social status and etc.) in the content of its legal personality.

Explores the European Union's legal personality, highlighting the uncertainty characterizing it given the ambiguity of treaty texts & contradictions arising from a lack of consensus on formal recognition of that personality. After showing that the treaties establishing the EU did not explicitly cite a legal personality, discussed is the implicit conferment of a legal personality to the EU in international public law via the precedent set by International Court of Justice regarding the United Nations. Limits set by international public law on the legal personality of international organizations are examined before looking at the EU's practice in international relations, which is manifest in treaty-making power & the active & passive right of legation. Given the implicit nature of the EU's legal personality, formal recognition of it is advocated. D. Edelman

This monograph traces the intellectual history of the international legal personality of individuals. It demonstrates how many international lawyers still rely on the idea that states are the only subjects of international law, whereas practice shows that the question of the international legal rights and duties of any entity is strictly empirical.

This monograph traces the intellectual history of the international legal personality of individuals. It demonstrates how many international lawyers still rely on the idea that states are the only subjects of international law, whereas practice shows that the question of the international legal rights and duties of any entity is strictly empirical.