In: Shestak, V.A. & Silkin, D.V. (2020). Consolidated theft in the U.S. criminal law. Law and the modern economy: new challenges and prospects: III conference with international participation (9 April 2020). Saint Petersburg: Saint Petersburg State University of Economics.
Report of the Texas State Auditor's Office related to an investigation by the State Auditor's Special Investigations Unit, which led to criminal charges being filed against a former agent-dealer of a copier equipment manufacturer and distributing company who sold copier and printer equipment to the San Felipe-Del Rio Consolidated Independent School District.
Report of the Texas State Auditor's Office related to an investigation by the State Auditor's Special Investigations Unit, which led to additional criminal charges being filed against a former agent-dealer of a copier equipment manufacturer and distributing company who sold copier and printer equipment to the San Felipe-Del Rio Consolidated Independent School District.
Early laws of crimes against property clearly identified the forms of property necessary to the survival & prosperity of the community. Commercial & industrial developments in the modern era have made new & difficult demands upon the law as forms of property & means to offend have gained in number & complexity. The modern US law of theft derives directly from the common law & from supplementary English legislation. Larceny, the basic theft offense, is distinguished by trespassory taking & includes larceny by servant & by trick. Personal goods & chattels are larcenable. False pretenses, embezzlement, & receiving stolen property also fall under the laws of theft. There are trends & proposals toward consolidated theft statutes defining a single offense composed of the elements of several theft offenses. Certain offenses against property also contain elements of peril to life & limb. These offenses include robbery & extortion, arson & related offenses, & burglary. The states with their police power are equipped to legislate directly on offenses against property. The federal gov chiefly acts under its powers in connection with foreign & interstate commerce, revenue, war, & the postal system. Although Anglo-US law has developed in response to new demands, revision has not generally kept pace with underlying econ changes. Deficiencies exist, & fundamental legislative reconstruction is required. AA.
Early laws of crimes against property clearly identified the forms of property necessary to the survival and prosperity of the community. Commercial and industrial de velopments in the modern era have made new and difficult de mands upon the law as forms of property and means to offend have gained in number and complexity. The modern Ameri can law of theft derives directly from the common law and from supplementary English legislation. Larceny, the basic theft offense, is distinguished by trespassory taking and in cludes larceny by servant and by trick. Personal goods and chattels are larcenable. False pretenses, embezzlement, and receiving stolen property also fall under the laws of theft. There are trends and proposals toward consolidated theft stat utes defining a single offense composed of the elements of sev eral theft offenses. Certain offenses against property also con tain elements of peril to life and limb. These offenses include robbery and extortion, arson and related offenses, and burglary. The states with their police power are equipped to legislate directly on offenses against property. The federal govern ment chiefly acts under its powers in connection with foreign and interstate commerce, revenue, war, and the postal system. Although Anglo-American law has developed in response to new demands, revision has not generally kept pace with un derlying economic changes. Deficiencies exist, and fundamen tal legislative reconstruction is required.—Ed.
The escalation in armed attacks on Nigeria's oil industry and the massive expansion in oil theft generated a veritable industry in the study of the political economy of war dominated by public-choice strands. Critical scholarship on the Niger Delta challenges this work for its neglect of history in explaining the shift from peaceful protest in the 1990s to armed struggle. Yet taking history seriously need not blind us to the 'critical breaks'. Nigeria's transition to civilian rule in 1999 brought state and non-state actors into a complicit union as rebellion and oil bunkering consolidated a pre-existing parallel economy.[L'économie politique du pétrole et la « rébellion » dans le Delta du Niger, fief du Nigéria]. L'escalade dans les attaques armées sur l'industrie pétrolière du Nigéria et l'expansion massive dans le vol de pétrole ont généré une véritable industrie dans l'étude de l'économie politique de la guerre, dominée par quelques choix publics. L'étude critique sur le Delta du Niger conteste ce travail pour sa négligence de l'histoire pour expliquer ce passage de la manifestation pacifique dans les années 1990 à la lutte armée. Pourtant prendre l'histoire au sérieux ne doit pas nous aveugler sur « les ruptures critiques ». La transition du Nigéria vers un régime civil en 1999, a amené les acteurs de l'Etat et ceux qui ne relèvent pas de l'État à se fondre dans une union de complicité dès lors que la rébellion et le vol de pétrole avaient consolidé une économie parallèle préexistante.Mots-clés :le pétrole ; la sécurité ; le Delta du Niger ; l'économie politique ; le militantisme ; l'identité
South Africa has experienced a recent increase in thefts of heritage objects from museums and galleries around the country. While the exact number of incidences is not known, the increase in thefts is nonetheless apparent, and has revealed the weaknesses of the systems currently in place to respond to these crimes. The South African Heritage Resources Information System (SAHRIS) is an integrated, online heritage resources management tool developed by the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) in 2011 in terms of Section 39 of the National Heritage Resources Act (NHRA), No. 25 of 1999. The system's combined heritage resources and site and object management functionality has been expanded to provide an integrated, responsive tool for reporting heritage crimes and tracking the progress of the resultant cases. This paper reviews existing legislative frameworks and crime reporting and monitoring systems relevant to fighting heritage crime, and identifies current gaps in those responses. SAHRIS is presented as an innovative tool to combat heritage crime effectively in the South African context by offering a centralised, consolidated platform that provides the various stakeholders involved in reporting heritage crimes and locating and retrieving stolen objects with a means to coordinate their responses to such instances.
South Africa has experienced a recent increase in thefts of heritage objects from museums and galleries around the country. While the exact number of incidences is not known, the increase in thefts is nonetheless apparent, and has revealed the weaknesses of the systems currently in place to respond to these crimes. The South African Heritage Resources Information System (SAHRIS) is an integrated, online heritage resources management tool developed by the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) in 2011 in terms of Section 39 of the National Heritage Resources Act (NHRA), No. 25 of 1999. The system's combined heritage resources and site and object management functionality has been expanded to provide an integrated, responsive tool for reporting heritage crimes and tracking the progress of the resultant cases. This paper reviews existing legislative frameworks and crime reporting and monitoring systems relevant to fighting heritage crime, and identifies current gaps in those responses. SAHRIS is presented as an innovative tool to combat heritage crime effectively in the South African context by offering a centralised, consolidated platform that provides the various stakeholders involved in reporting heritage crimes and locating and retrieving stolen objects with a means to coordinate their responses to such instances.
In the past few months, virtual commercial operations have been consolidated. For example, transferences made though "digital purses", which clearly proves a transformation with no return of our common social-economic coexistence. Since March of 2020, we have faced a new form of assets acquisition, payment of services, and even new ways of working. This "evolution" to the virtual world has brought many benefits. However, it has also generated countless difficulties. One of the most relevant and significant problems are the criminal activities committed through computer systems, which have been properly regulated by our national legislator in the Law 30096 —Law of Informatic Crimes—, modified by the Law 30171. The present article will approach informatic fraud and identity theft, which are the most frequent crimes in this new socialeconomic coexistence. Likewise, we will analyze the link between informatic crimes and economic criminality. ; En los últimos meses se han consolidado las operaciones comerciales virtuales como las transferencias realizadas a través de los monederos digitales, lo que demuestra claramente una transformación sin retorno de nuestra convivencia socioeconómica común. Desde marzo del 2020 hasta la fecha, nos enfrentamos a un nuevo modo de adquisición de activos, pago de servicios e incluso formas de trabajo. Esta "evolución" hacia el mundo informático y virtual ha aportado muchos beneficios. Sin embargo, también ha generado innumerables dificultades. Uno de los problemas más relevantes y significativos son las actividades delictivas cometidas a través de los sistemas informáticos, las cuales han sido debidamente reguladas por nuestro legislador nacional en la Ley 30096, Ley de Delitos Informáticos, modificada por la Ley 30171. El presente artículo abordará los delitos de fraude informático y suplantación de identidad, que son los más frecuentes en esta nueva convivencia socioeconómica. Asimismo, se analizará la vinculación entre los delitos informáticos y la criminalidad económica.
Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- About the Author -- About the Technical Reviewer -- Dedication -- BRIEF CONTENTS -- CONTENTS IN DETAIL -- FOREWORD by Thomas W. Shinder, MD -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- About Penetration Testing -- What This Book Is About -- How This Book Is Organized -- What You'll Need to Run the Tools -- 1 PREPARATION -- A Hybrid Approach -- Getting Permission -- Summary -- 2 ACCESS METHODS -- Azure Deployment Models -- Obtaining Credentials -- Mimikatz -- Best Practices: Usernames and Passwords -- Usernames and Passwords -- Best Practices: Management Certificates -- Finding Management Certificates -- Best Practices: Protecting Privileged Accounts -- Encountering Two-Factor Authentication -- Summary -- 3 RECONNAISSANCE -- Installing PowerShell and the Azure PowerShell Module -- Service Models -- Best Practices: PowerShell Security -- Authenticating with the PowerShell Module and CLI -- Authenticating with Management Certificates -- Best Practices: Service Principals -- Authenticating with Service Principals -- Best Practices: Subscription Security -- Gathering Subscription Information -- Gathering Information on Networking -- Consolidated PowerShell Scripts -- Summary -- 4 EXAMINING STORAGE -- Best Practices: Storage Security -- Accessing Storage Accounts -- Where to Find Storage Credentials -- Accessing Storage Types -- Summary -- 5 TARGETING VIRTUAL MACHINES -- Best Practices: VM Security -- Virtual Hard Disk Theft and Analysis -- Exploring the VHD with Autopsy -- Cracking Password Hashes -- Password Hash Attack Tools -- Using a VHD's Secrets Against a VM -- Resetting a Virtual Machine's Credentials -- Summary -- 6 INVESTIGATING NETWORKS -- Best Practices: Network Security -- Avoiding Firewalls -- Cloud-to-Corporate Network Bridging -- Summary -- 7 OTHER AZURE SERVICES -- Best Practices: Key Vault.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
The article discusses some aspects of the evolution of organized crime in Ukraine from the early 1960s to the 1970s to the 2000s. The spread of legal nihilism among the general population was noted as a formative feature of the historical preconditions and social base of organized crime in the USSR. The attention is focused on the formation of a unified conglomerate "criminality – economy – politics", which is still the dominant form of organized crime in the post-Soviet space. In the future, private business, formed in the face of opposition to the state government, legalized and defined the rules by which the economy developed in the future. Political and economic elites of the USSR were integrated into this sphere, capitalizing on their position. The most common organized crime in Ukraine in 1990 was identified as racketeering, drug trafficking, car theft, arms trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, illegal financial transactions, economic smuggling, etc. Emphasis is placed on broad territorial control and control over sectors of the economy established by crime. The author notes that the structures of organized crime of that period were characterized by a clear hierarchical construction - from simple hierarchies of the type "leader – executor" to complex structures of mafia type, which were further integrated into legal institutions – authorities, industrial and financial groups, etc. The author points out that in the second half of the 1990s the state authorities, in particular, law enforcement, largely supplanted the traditional racket from the criminal environment by taking its place, the main areas of activity at that time were drug business, banking fraud, arms trafficking, illegal export oil and non-ferrous metals, smuggling of nuclear materials and waste. The author concludes that the collapse of the socialist economy, the disintegration of the USSR, institutional failure and the criminalization of the politicum led to widespread criminalization of public life in the early 1990s. The street gangs consolidated into powerful criminal associations that began to realize not only their economic but also their political interests. Their representatives took the place of local and central authorities, and the proceeds of crime were transformed into legal businesses. ; У статті розглянуто окремі аспекти еволюції органі-зованої злочинності в Україні з 1960-х до 2000-х років. Відзначено поширення правового нігілізму серед широ-ких верств населення як формуючу ознаку історичних передумов та соціальної бази організованої злочинності в часи СРСР. Акцентовано увагу на формуванні єдиного конгломерату «криміналітет – економіка – політика», що досі виступає домінуючою формою організованої злочин-ності на пострадянському просторі. Приватний бізнес, сформований в умовах протистояння державній владі, легалізувався і визначив правила, за якими розвивається економіка. У цю сферу інтегрувалися політичні та госпо-дарські еліти СРСР, що капіталізували своє становище. Найбільш поширеними явищами організованої злочин-ності в Україні в 1990-х рр. визначено рекет, наркобізнес, викрадення автомобілів, торгівлю зброєю, викрадення людей для отримання викупу, незаконні фінансові опера-ції, економічну контрабанду тощо. Наголошено на широ-кому територіальному контролі та контролі над галузями економіки, які встановлювалися киміналітетом. Автор зазначає, що для структур організованої злочинності того періоду характерною була чітка ієрархічна побудова (від простих ієрархій типу «ватажок – виконавці» до склад-них структур мафіозного типу, які згодом інтегрувалися у легальні інститути – органи влади, промислово-фінан-сові групи тощо). Автор вказує на те, що у другій поло-вині 1990-х років органи державної влади, зокрема пра-воохоронні, значною мірою витіснили з кримінального середовища традиційний рекет, зайнявши його місце. Ос-новними сферами діяльності тоді були наркобізнес, бан-ківське шахрайство, торгівля зброєю, нелегальний екс-порт нафти та кольорових металів, контрабанда ядерних матеріалів та відходів. Автор доходить висновку, що роз-пад соціалістичної економіки, дезінтеграція СРСР, інсти-туційна неспроможність та криміналізація політикуму призвели до широкої криміналізації суспільного життя на початку 1990-х років. Вуличні банди консолідувалися у потужні кримінальні об'єднання, що почали усвідом-лювати свої не лише економічні, а й політичні інтереси. Їх представники зайняли місця в органах влади на місце-вому та на центральному рівнях, а отримані злочинним шляхом капітали трансформувалися у легальний бізнес.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
The accelerating development of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has stirred up the public debate around the most effective approaches and instruments to safeguard personal privacy. The unprecedented risks that AI poses to privacy rights require that policymakers and legislators conduct a thorough review of the existing measures and normative frameworks aimed at data protection. Most of them were established before the recent rise of AI and need, therefore, to be partly reconsidered. The rapid expansion and pervasiveness of AI, which is applied to almost every industrial sector with far-reaching social implications, make such a review a daunting challenge. A far-sighted proactive regulatory approach that takes into consideration possible future developments of AI technologies can be seen as the most appropriate. In practice, however, this approach is hard to pursue due to the extreme difficulty, at least at this stage, in predicting the trajectory of AI systems. In dealing with the impact of AI on data privacy, regulators should therefore apply a great deal of flexibility based on a continuously updated understanding of the ongoing technological dynamics in the AI realm. The existing consolidated body of human rights principles, of which respect for personal privacy is a key part, remains the essential source of inspiration for any regulatory effort and enforcement action. Preventing technological advancement from compromising privacy rights or eroding long-lasting commitments to protect fundamental rights of citizens should be a top priority for decision-makers. The challenge is how to obey such imperatives while avoiding to stifle innovation that can potentially bring great benefits for citizens' welfare and everyday life.Privacy risks and regulatory challenges Privacy risks have long been under the limelight especially after the advent of commercial internet that makes ample use of data collection and processing. The rise of AI has greatly deepened concerns about data privacy. Gargantuan amounts of data are collected and generated by AI systems. To feed and train their datasets, technology platforms aggregate information from a wide spectrum of sources such as traditional and social media, websites, internet navigation and shopping, and smartphone data. As a result, the individuals' control over how their personal data are collected and used is continuously at risk. By scraping personal data to train algorithms, platforms may disclose or memorise information about a person's life without their consent. This may facilitate, for example, phishing attacks, identity theft, or distorted uses of facial recognition, and introduce or reinforce bias in the screening of job candidates, the provision of benefits or loan granting. Effective protection of personal data in the use and development of AI technologies requires rules and mechanisms that enable users to exercise adequate control on how their data are collected, stored and processed, and bind companies to delete data that can be misused. This is indeed the focus of the regulatory efforts undertaken by countries and international organisations, as will be discussed below. Regulating AI also requires deeper attention to the whole data ecosystem that feeds AI. The supply chain for the data includes different stages, from data collection to the development of pre-trained models to the refining and optimisation of those models for specific tasks and applications. Understanding how data is handled at each stage of the AI supply chain is crucial to identifying the most appropriate mechanisms to improve AI models, ensure privacy protection and avoid bias. So far, the debate on AI regulation, both in the US and in the EU, has focused on transparency requirements regarding algorithmic systems, with scarce attention being paid to the data lifecycle. Filling this gap may help not only devise better methods and procedures to grant individuals greater control over their personal data but also distribute roles and responsibilities between AI developers and deployers. An essential first step is removing or obfuscating personally identifiable information from training datasets. Measures of access control are also fundamental to ensure that only authorised personnel can access and process sensitive data. Checks for algorithmic fairness and bias can help prevent AI models from making decisions that unfairly impact particular groups or individuals. Testing for demographic parity, equal opportunity and other fairness metrics is important. Transparency of AI models can facilitate audit decisions on data protection. There is also the need for continuous monitoring of AI models to prevent violation of privacy or unintended use of sensitive data. Technological innovation can also play a significant role in establishing more secure AI development and deployment practices and implementing effective measures tailored to specific AI systems and processes. Notably, the US government has mandated federal agencies to use privacy-enhancing technologies to protect personal information, acknowledging that they have the potential to ensure more effective handling of sensitive personal data.[1]Regulatory efforts and cooperation initiatives As the EU and US share fundamental human rights principles, regulatory alignment across the Atlantic on protection of personal privacy in the development and use of AI may seem a realistic prospect. However, Washington and Brussels have adopted considerably different approaches to AI regulation in general, and privacy protection in particular. While the EU's regulatory process has produced several pieces of legislation, the US has so far opted for voluntary guiding principles. The US government has shied away from imposing federal privacy rules on the handling of AI-driven data. The Executive Order on Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence issued by the White House in October 2023 simply calls on Congress to pass bipartisan data privacy legislation, while mandating federal agencies to develop guidelines to evaluate the effectiveness of existing privacy-preserving mechanisms in the AI realm.[2] By contrast, the EU has enacted an articulated and robust legislative body on data governance and privacy risks associated with AI, including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),[3] the most comprehensive legislative piece on privacy in the world, and the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act),[4] enacted in July 2024, which provides a risk-based approach banning the most harmful AI systems. The transatlantic dialogue on AI regulation has developed in various frameworks, notably within the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The TTC is working on the implementation of a joint roadmap to establish common AI benchmarks and standards based on a large convergence on fundamental principles, including those related to personal privacy.[5] The G7's major achievement so far has been the approval of Guiding Principles on Artificial Intelligence and a voluntary Code of Conduct for AI developers under the so-called Hiroshima AI process launched by the Japanese Presidency of G7 in 2023.[6] Privacy protection is emphasised as a central principle in both documents. The G7 has focused, in particular, on data privacy in the context of transborder flow of data, a key aspect of data governance that requires, by definition, close international cooperation. The operationalisation of the Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) concept, first launched by former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2019, which aims to reconcile the promotion of free flow of data across borders with the protection of individual privacy, has become a central subject of dialogue within the G7.[7] Of paramount importance is also the OECD's research and standard-setting work. The OECD's AI principles, initially adopted in 2019 and updated in May 2024, to which 46 countries have adhered, emphasise international cooperation to promote AI regulation, including in order to preserve personal privacy.[8] The OECD has provided the platform for confronting stakeholders' perspectives on how various jurisdictions have addressed AI's privacy challenges and for promoting a dialogue between the AI and privacy communities. In July 2024, the OECD also started a pilot phase to monitor the application of the G7 Code of Conduct.[9] All major regulatory initiatives to deal with privacy risks associated with AI have been accompanied by a dialogue with AI actors and stakeholders. Such a dialogue is key to identifying the privacy risks and the possible technical and regulatory measures to address them. In July 2023, seven leading AI companies announced at the White House their adherence to eight voluntary commitments on how to develop AI in a safe and trustworthy way.[10] The document includes the promise to improve the testing and transparency of AI systems and to provide information on emerging risks.[11] Self-regulation processes such as the one promoted through the White House commitments can play a crucial complementary role with respect to the regulatory efforts undertaken by governments and international organisations and significantly contribute to trust building around data handling and flow.A complex and multi-faceted process Building a safe and trustworthy AI ecosystem where privacy rights are adequately protected is a complex challenge that requires convergent efforts by governments, international organisations and major AI actors. Dialogue with stakeholders of the various industrial sectors has also become of growing importance as the pervasive nature of AI technologies has brought into sharp relief the ever-expanding variety of challenges and opportunities involved. The growing concerns about the risks arising from AI developments highlight the need for new mechanisms that grant individuals increased control over their personal data and ensure greater transparency and accountability in the handling of data by AI developers and deployers. A better understanding of the lifecycle of data collected and generated by advanced AI systems can lay the groundwork for the adoption of effective privacy-protection measures and the sharing of roles and responsibilities between AI developers and deployers. AI advanced technologies can provide valuable instruments to enhance privacy, in particular for the handling of sensitive personal data. AI developers and deployers should make a pro-active and transparent use of available technologies that can contribute to protecting private rights through tailor-made measures. Convergent efforts across the Atlantic to advance AI regulation remain of paramount importance. Despite their different approaches to regulation, the EU and the US have a deep-rooted attachment to human rights that facilitates cooperation on privacy issues. The Trade and Technology Council provides a valuable platform for developing common solutions at the transatlantic level that may serve as blueprints in wider cooperation frameworks. The implementation of the G7 Code of Conduct can be another key component of international cooperation to promote innovation while protecting privacy rights through the involvement of private AI actors. The G7 has also established as a valuable platform to promote the implementation of the DFTT initiative aimed at ensuring the free flow of data across borders through appropriate safeguards for privacy and other public interests. The operationalisation of DFTT can pave the way for greater interoperability of legal frameworks based on privacy-related criteria of trust.Ettore Greco is Executive Vice President of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and also Head of the Multilateralism and Global Governance programme of the institute.[1] White House, Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, 30 October 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/10/30/executive-order-on-the-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-development-and-use-of-artificial-intelligence.[2] Ibid.[3] European Council website: The General Data Protection Regulation, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/data-protection/data-protection-regulation.[4] European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of 13 June 2024 Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj. See also the website developed by the Future of Life Institute: EU Artificial Intelligence Act, https://artificialintelligenceact.eu.[5] Trade and Technology Council (TTC), TTC Joint Roadmap on Evaluation and Measurement Tools for Trustworthy AI and Risk Management, 1 December 2022, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/node/11380.[6] G7, Hiroshima Process International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems, 30 October 2023, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/node/12130.[7] G7 Digital and Technology Ministers, G7 Digital and Technology Track – Annex 2: G7 Roadmap for Cooperation on Data Free Flow with Trust, 28 April 2021, https://g7.utoronto.ca/ict/2021-annex_2-roadmap.html; Aidan Arasasingham and Matthew P. Goodman, "Operationalizing Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT)", in CSIS Briefs, April 2023, https://www.csis.org/node/104969.[8] OECD AI Policy Observatory website: OECD AI Principles, https://oecd.ai/en/ai-principles.[9] OECD, OECD Launches Pilot to Monitor Application of G7 Code of Conduct on Advanced AI Development, 22 July 2024, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/press-releases/2024/07/oecd-launches-pilot-to-monitor-application-of-g7-code-of-conduct-on-advanced-ai-development.html.[10] White House, Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Secures Voluntary Commitments from Leading Artificial Intelligence Companies to Manage the Risks Posed by AI, 21 July 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/07/21/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-secures-voluntary-commitments-from-leading-artificial-intelligence-companies-to-manage-the-risks-posed-by-ai; Voluntary AI Commitments, September 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Voluntary-AI-Commitments-September-2023.pdf.[11] For an assessment of the implementation of the commitments undertaken by the seven companies one year on see Melissa Heikkilä, "AI Companies Promised to Self-Regulate One Year Ago. What's Changed?", in MIT Technology Review, 22 July 2024, https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/07/22/1095193.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
As Israel intensifies its bombing of Lebanon and the spectre of a generalised conflict that may involve Iran and the United States hovers ominously over the region, Western governments seem passive viewers of a decade-long drama for which they actually bear great responsibility. Israel claims to defend itself against enemies determined to destroy it, from Hamas in Palestine to Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Islamic Republic of Iran. These are undoubtedly implacable enemies. However, it is equally true that over the decades Israel has barely missed an opportunity to foment the radicalism of its adversaries, marginalising the more pragmatic voices, and that the United States and Europe have not put up any barriers.The peace process that never was In February 1994, a man named Baruch Goldstein fired on a group of Muslim worshippers gathered in prayer at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, killing 29 Palestinians and wounding 125.[1] Goldstein was a naturalised American-Israeli linked to the most extreme fringes of Zionism, which pushed for the annexation of Palestinian land occupied by Israel after the June 1967 six-day war – East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – and the forced removal of its inhabitants.[2] The massacre revealed how controversial the peace process initiated in Oslo was.[3] The opposition front spanned extremists like Goldstein but also the centre-right Likud party, whose leader Benjamin Netanyahu was and would forever remain opposed to a Palestinian state. The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, a main architect of Oslo, by an orthodox extremist in 1995 further consolidated Israel's internal fractures.[4] The last glimmers of hope were extinguished with the electoral victory in early 2001 of the new Likud leader Ariel Sharon, who had gone the extra mile to sabotage the new peace negotiations at Camp David and Taba.[5] Hamas, which had always denounced Oslo as a deception, launched a campaign of kamikaze attacks that resulted in the Second Intifada.The delegitimisation of the Palestinian cause The uprising increased the credibility of Hamas as a genuine anti-occupation resistance force, in contrast to a Palestinian Authority (the embryonic state formed in Oslo) that was weak, corrupt and compromised with Israel. But for the Palestinian cause the Second Intifada was a disaster. Hamas's terrorist tactics contributed to the delegitimisation of Palestinian claims in the eyes of the United States and Europe. This perception was reinforced as the Islamist group – ousted from the West Bank after winning parliamentary elections in 2006 but in control of Gaza since 2007 – progressively tightened ties with Iran and its anti-American axis of resistance.[6] This is the context in which the right to self-defence invoked by Israel has become all-encompassing. The presence of Hamas in Gaza has justified the almost total subordination of the Strip to Israel, which controls its air and sea space, land entrances with the exception of the border with Egypt, and its energy, water and food supply.[7] It has also provided cover to Israel's continuous military operations in Gaza, which according to the United Nations caused the death of more than 6,400 Palestinians (many of them civilians), compared to about three hundred Israelis killed, between 2008 and September 2023.[8] Self-defence was also invoked when in August 2006 Israel once again invaded Lebanon in the attempt to destroy Hezbollah. Over 1,100 people died in the campaign, of which about 250 were militiamen.[9] Finally, self-defence underpinned Israel's vehement opposition to any form of diplomatic engagement with Iran by the West, including on the nuclear front.Western defence of Israel's right to defence The United States and Europe have largely accepted the Israeli narrative of being just defending itself. Thanks to the formidable influence of the pro-Israel lobby (a mix of Zionists of all political hues, evangelicals and neo-conservatives), no US politician can fail to declare full and unconditional support for Israel if they hope to pursue a political career of high profile, lest they suffer from the accusation of being anti-Semites.[10] Most EU states have followed unquestioningly, with Germany going as far as to make Israel's security – in this overextended interpretation – a Staatsräson, or raison d'état. In so doing, the Europeans (Germans included) gave up on more than twenty years of sensible, autonomous diplomacy initiated with the Venice Declaration, which for the first time upheld the dual right of Israel to live in security and of the Palestinians to self-determination.[11] Protected by the US veto in the UN Security Council and rewarded with diplomatic support, arms supplies (especially from the United States and Germany), partnership agreements with both the United States and the EU in every field (from defence to research), Israel has acted with impunity.[12] The West has considered Israel an ally even though it has not aligned itself with the sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine,[13] continued to trade in advanced technology with China,[14] and relentlessly worked against the stated goals of two US administrations (Obama and Biden) and all of the EU such as the nuclear deal with Iran[15] and the two-state solution in Palestine. This dynamic was repeated on a large scale after Hamas's 7 October 2023 attack on Israel, in which close to 1,200 people were assassinated and 250 taken hostage. The United States and Europe have loudly invoked Israel's sacrosanct right to keep its population safe. But they are at a loss to explain how this right fits with the devastation inflicted on the two million people living in Gaza, where Israeli shelling has killed more than forty thousand – 16,500 of them children –, displaced 90 per cent of the population (nearly two-thirds of houses are damaged or destroyed), while journalists, relief staff and aid workers have reportedly been deliberately targeted.[16] Equally importantly, Israel and its supporters in Washington, Berlin and elsewhere have failed to explain why Israel's security justifies the continued expansion into East Jerusalem[17] and the West Bank,[18] the expropriation of homes, the theft of land, the decades-long systematic oppression of millions of human beings that the International Court of Justice has declared illegal in all respects.[19]Israel from the river to the sea Since the 1994 Hebron massacre, Israeli expansion into Palestinian lands has never stopped. Israeli domestic politics has become radicalised, to the point that today no party with any following favours negotiations with the Palestinians. On the contrary, the Knesset, Israel's parliament, has recently passed a resolution calling a Palestinian state "west of Jordan" an "existential danger".[20] Israel's existence has now been made conditional on the continuous repression of the Palestinians. Extremist parties that explicitly advocate ethnic cleansing all but drive policy towards Palestine.[21] Itamar Ben-Gvir, an open admirer of the mass murderer of Hebron, is a minister in the Netanyahu government. Another extremist minister, Bezalel Smotrich, is responsible for the 'security' of the West Bank. Unsurprisingly, violence in the West Bank has increased exponentially since 7 October: over 690 Palestinians have been killed, 159 of them children.[22] Ultimately, when it comes to the defence of Israel, what is at stake is not so much the security of the state on the 1967 borders (those generally accepted internationally), but a profoundly racist, ethno-supremacist expansionist project into East Jerusalem and the West Bank (and perhaps Gaza again). Netanyahu has embraced this project not only for ideology but also for practical advantages, as the coalition with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich has protected him from a number of trials for electoral fraud and more.[23] It is the interplay of extremist and personal ideological interests that explains the Netanyahu government's strategy: no ceasefire in Gaza, even at the cost of the remaining hostages' lives; and the opening of the northern front against Hezbollah, an action supported by the military leadership (which would have wanted a hostage deal first, though) and which could be extended to Iran. Only war can wash away the shame of 7 October (and keep the trials at bay), as shown by recent polls showing Netanyahu again leading his political opponents.[24] And only war allows Israel to continue expanding eastwards, until it controls all the land between the river and the sea.Western complicities The United States and EU governments have established that their main goals are a ceasefire in Gaza, the liberation of the hostages and the prevention of regional escalation. They have also long supported the creation of a Palestinian state and claimed that Israeli settlement activities are an impediment to peace. As Israel has not just ignored their interests but undermined them, their expected policy course would be one of combining pressure on Israel's foes with pressure on Israel itself. One would expect the United States and Europe to insist on a ceasefire in Gaza as the most pressing priority. The world's main superpower and its wealthy allies could back that with the halting of weapons transfers to Israel as well as diplomatic condemnation of its conduct in all Palestinian lands and Lebanon, where civilians are dying in the hundreds in the Israeli campaign against Hezbollah and the whole population has been terrorised by Israeli intelligence using booby traps in the form of pagers and walkie-talkies. The United States and Europe should also insist on re-opening the Gaza Strip to journalists, on the protection of medical facilities and aid workers, and on the resumption of humanitarian aid on a massive scale. Most importantly, one would expect US and European policymakers to delegitimise the racist, ethno-supremacist vision that is increasingly dominant in Israeli discourse on the Palestinians. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich should be sanctioned, and all government and civil society organisations active in supporting and expanding Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank targeted with visa freezes, financial sanctions and other restrictions. The United States and Europe will do nothing of the above, and instead will allow Israel to continue working against their stated objectives. Having long internalised the narrative of Israel's all-encompassing right to self-defence, they can only hope that Hezbollah and Iran will exercise more self-restraint than Israel, to avoid the risk – at least for the United States – of being drawn into a war they have not sought.Riccardo Alcaro is Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] For basic information on the Hebron massacre, see Institute for Palestine Studies, Hebron Massacre, 1994, 6 November 2023, https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1652605.[2] Goldstein was a supporter of the Kach party (for more information, see Israel Democracy Institute website: Kach, https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-and-parties/parties/kach).[3] An explainer of the Oslo Accord can be found here: Institute for Middle East Understanding, Explainer: The Oslo Accords, 1 September 2023, https://imeu.org/article/explainer-the-oslo-accords.[4] Roger Cohen, "The Incitement in Israel that Killed Yitzhak Rabin", in The New York Times, 4 December 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/opinion/incitement-movie.html.[5] Richard Kreitner, "September 28, 2000: Ariel Sharon Visits the Temple Mount, Sparking the Second Intifada", in The Nation, 28 September 2015, https://www.thenation.com/?p=188385.[6] Edward Wastnidge and Simon Mabon, "The Resistance Axis and Regional Order in the Middle East: Nomos, Space, and Normative Alternatives", in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 21 February 2023, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2023.2179975.[7] Amnesty International, Israel's Occupation: 50 Years of Dispossession, 7 June 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/?p=68668.[8] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) oPt website: Data on Casualties, https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties.[9] Human Rights Watch, Why They Died. Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War, September 2007, https://www.hrw.org/node/255321.[10] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy", in HKS Faculty Research Working Papers, No. RWP06-011 (March 2006), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/node/178821; see also the authors' book by the same name published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux in 2007.[11] European Community, Venice Declaration, 13 June 1980, https://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf.[12] On the United States' use of its veto power in the Security Council, see Hope O'Dell, "How the US Has Used Its Power in the UN to Support Israel for Decades", in Bluemarble, last updated 22 February 2024, https://globalaffairs.org/node/39261; on Western weapons supplies to Israel, see David Gritten, "Gaza War: Where Does Israel Get Its Weapons?", in BBC News, 3 September 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68737412; on US-Israel relations, see US Department of State, U.S. Relations with Israel. Factsheet, 30 January 2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-israel-2; on EU-Israel relations, see European Commission DG Near website: Israel, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/node/3424_en.[13] Merav Amir, "The Israeli Reaction to the War in Ukraine", in IWMpost, No. 129 (Spring/Summer 2022), p. 18, https://www.iwm.at/node/4054.[14] Bill Figueroa, "The China-Israel Trade Deal", in Centre for Geopolitics Commentaries, 25 October 2022, https://www.cfg.polis.cam.ac.uk/news/china-israel-trade-deal.[15] Shira Rubin, "Israel Opposed the Iran Nuclear Deal, But Former Israeli Officials Increasingly Say U.S. Pullout Was a Mistake", in The Washington Post, 9 December 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-iran-nuclear-deal-sanctions/2021/12/08/ece28168-56c0-11ec-8396-5552bef55c3c_story.html.[16] AJLabs, "Israel-Gaza War in Maps and Charts: Live Tracker", in Al Jazeera, accessed on 24 September 2024, https://aje.io/pnauxp; on the number of displaced persons, see UN Population Fund, Occupied Palestinian Territory, last updated on 3 September 2024, https://www.unfpa.org/occupied-palestinian-territory; on material damage, see UN Satellite Centre, UNOSAT Gaza Strip 8th Comprehensive Damage Assessment, July 2024, https://unosat.org/products/3904; on journalists killed in Gaza, see International Federation of Journalists, War in Gaza: Israel Must Be Helf Accountable, https://www.ifj.org/war-in-gaza; on relief staff, see Medical Aid for Palestinians, 500 Healthcare Workers Killed during Israel's Military Assault on Gaza, 26 June 2024, https://www.map.org.uk/news/archive/post/1598; on aid workers, see Human Rights Watch, Gaza: Israelis Attacking Known Aid Worker Locations, 14 May 2024, https://www.hrw.org/node/388036.[17] Jason Burke, "Revealed: Israel Has Sped Up Settlement-Building in East Jerusalem since Gaza War Began", in The Guardian, 17 April 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/p/qbb7t.[18] Alison Killing et al., "How Extremist Settlers in the West Bank Became the Law", in Financial Times, 18 September 2024, https://ig.ft.com/west-bank.[19] International Court of Justice, Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204176.[20] Jacob Magid, "Knesset Votes Overwhelmingly against Palestinian Statehood, Days before PM's US Trip", in The Times of Israel, 18 July 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-votes-overwhelmingly-against-palestinian-statehood-days-before-pms-us-trip.[21] Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti, "The Unpunished: How Extremists Took Over Israel", in The New York Times, 16 May 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/16/magazine/israel-west-bank-settler-violence-impunity.html.[22] AJLabs, "Israel-Gaza War in Maps and Charts: Live Tracker", cit.[23] Yonette Joshep and Patrick Kingsley, "Netanyahu Will Return with Corruption Charges Unresolved. Here's Where the Case Stands", in The New York Times, updated on 26 June 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/03/world/middleeast/netanyahu-corruption-charges-israel.html.[24] James Shotter, "Benjamin Netanyahu's Polls Rebound after Aggressive Israeli Operations", in Financial Times, 24 September 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/3ae49fb5-a1c6-4e8a-ad08-1179d766550f.