A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing
In: Michigan Law Review, Band 114
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In: Michigan Law Review, Band 114
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In: 43 Pepperdine Law Review, Forthcoming
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The Take Care Clause obligates the President to enforce the law. Yet increasingly, presidents use nonenforcement to unilaterally waive legislative provisions to serve their executive policy goals. In doing so, the President's inaction takes the practical form of a congressional repeal—a task that is solely reserved for Congress under the Constitution. Presidential nonenforcement therefore usurps Congress's unique responsibility in setting the national policy agenda. This Note addresses whether Congress has standing to sue in instances of presidential nonenforcement to realign and reaffirm Congress's unique legislative role. In answering this question, this Note examines legislative standing precedent and argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning supports a finding of congressional institutional standing. This Note further contends that it is normatively preferable for the judiciary to police the boundaries of each branch of government in instances of executive nonenforcement and apply the Constitution's mandate that the President take care that the laws be faithfully executed. This maintains separation of powers and prevents one branch from unconstitutionally aggregating the power of another.
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In: Fordham Law Review, Forthcoming
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In: University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Band 76, Heft 1
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In: Congressional quarterly weekly report, Band 15, S. 428A-P : tables
ISSN: 0010-5910, 1521-5997
In: The review of politics, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 394-409
ISSN: 0034-6705
THREE MAJOR POINTS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN PARTY LEADERS & STANDING COMMITTEES IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ARE IDENTIFIED. THESE INVOLVE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, SCHEDULING OF FLOOR ACTIVITY, & THE SUBSTANCE OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS. FOUR PRINCIPAL FACTORS INFLUENCE THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP: PERSONALITIES OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED, BASIC POLICY STANCES OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED.
In: The review of politics, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 394-409
ISSN: 1748-6858
Within Congress there are a number of forces that push toward decentralization of influence over the substantive legislative product and lack of coordination of the various legislative enterprises that are being conducted simultaneously. Chief among these forces most of the time are the standing committees of the two houses. There are also a few centralizing forces. Chief among these most of the time are the formal party leaders in the House and Senate, especially those of the president's party if the president views himself as a major figure in the legislative process and behaves aggressively in attempting to implement that self-image.
In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.31822021694476
"Supersedes the December 1993 edition"--P. [i] ; Cover title ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: 39 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 249 (2020).
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In: Forthcoming, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 25, 2023
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In: Foreign service journal, Band 64, Heft 9, S. 32-39
ISSN: 0146-3543
FOR MANY OBSERVERS, THE MOST DRAMATIC MOMENT AT THE CONGRESSIONAL IRAN-CONTRA COMMITTEE HEARINGS WAS THE PERFORMANCE OF AN OUTRAGED SECRETARY OF STATE PUTTING DIPLOMACY BACK ON A MORAL PLANE. GEORGE SHULTZ EMERGED FROM THE HEARINGS WITH HIS OPPONENTS IN DISARRAY AND A NEW MANDATE TO LEAD REAGAN'S FOREIGN POLICY.
In: Congressional quarterly weekly report, Band 31, S. 244-247
ISSN: 0010-5910, 1521-5997
In: Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Band 28, Heft 3
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