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This article discusses a new constitutional right, a right to (drinking) water in Slovenia, especially elements of the public service for the supply of drinking water. This change of the Constitution was triggered by the 2011 proposal of the EU Directive on concession, which had proposed concessions for the supply of drinking water. A harsh reply from the wider public changes the mainstream of this idea. At the same time, it had triggered certain political sphere to think how to preserve the supply of drinking water out of the private interests. Corollary, in Slovenia, the supply of drinking water is taken out of the market, that way also from the EU internal market and the competition rules, which both might be contestable. Arguments are put forward to support the exclusion of the above services from overall water market, claiming that the supply of drinking water has certain distinctive elements from other public services, where the natural resources are not in foreground, especially where every individual is not only potential, but real end-user. The article emphasizes that the measure is more important for future generations and for our inheritors and adds supportive arguments in this respect.

The signing of a concession contract for the Buenos Aires water and sanitation system in December 1992, attracted worldwide attention, and caused considerable controversy in Argentina. It was one of the worlds largest concessions, but the case was also interesting for other reasons. The concession was implemented rapidly, in contrast with slow implementation of privatization in Santiago, for example. And reform generated major improvements in the sector, including wider coverage, better service, more efficient company operations, and reduced waste. Moreover, the winning bid brought an immediate 26.9 percent reduction in water system tariffs. Consumers benefited from the systems expansion and from the immediate drop in real prices, which was only partly reversed by subsequent changes in tariffs, and access charges. And these improvements would probably not have occurred under public administration of the system. Still, the authors show information asymmetries, perverse incentives, and weak regulatory institutions could threaten the concessions sustainability. Opportunities for the company to act opportunistically - and the regulator, arbitrarily - exist, because of politicized regulation, a poor information base, serious flaws in the concession contract, a lumpy and ad hoc tariff system, and a general lack of transparency in the regulatory process. Because of these circumstances, public confidence in the process has eroded. The Buenos Aires concession shows how important transparent, rule-based decision-making is to maintain public trust in regulated infrastructure.

The past three decades have witnessed the fundamental achievements of China's marketization. Through this process, state-owned enterprises have been restructured, monopoly is giving way to competition and private sectors are increasingly participating in public service provision. The concept of concession was first introduced in public utilities through the Circular on Questions Concerning the Ratification of Pilot Foreign Invested Concession Projects (1995), after which there were many experimental projects with BOTs and TOTs. In 2002, with the issuance of Opinions on Accelerating the Marketization of Urban Utilities, the concession system was officially introduced in public utility regulation. In the same year, the water pipelines were opened to foreign investment; concessions have since been extended into integrated municipal water groups. Concessions have become the major approach of public utility provision. In recent years, the accountability in concessions has raised wide concern. Problems exposed include fixed rate-of-return, state-owned assets losses, undue concession transfer, illegal concession award, unreasonable water tariff increase, and problematic service provision by private concessionaires. Commentators have claimed that an accountability gap exists in concessions. Taking water sector concessions as the subject of discussion, the author distinguishes three types of accountability: traditional bureaucratic accountability, legal accountability and public accountability. Through systematical examination of the problems, this dissertation attempts to achieve a better understanding of concession and its application in public utilities, and finds that the alleged accountability gap is attributed to traditional bureaucratic accountability and concession system per se. Four aspects of regulation in water concessions are considered: concessionaire selection; water pricing regulation; regulation by contract; and the regulatory framework. The findings suggest that under concessions, traditional bureaucratic accountability is neither adequate nor appropriate to hold the government accountable. More formal legal rules on transparency, due process and public participation should be explored. ; published_or_final_version ; Law ; Doctoral ; Doctor of Philosophy

ABSTRACT Most of the Spanish territory is marked by Mediterranean climatic characteristics, in which rain irregularity and droughts present continuous challenges to water resource managers. Since the end of the 19th century, the country has adopted a management logic based on flow regularization from dam construction and basin water transfers. However, from the Water Framework Directive adopted in 2000, European Union member states are forced to undertake more environmentally oriented management processes, with a focus on improving the ecological status of water bodies. In this sense, economic management tools have been highlighted in the national strategies for compliance with the Water Framework Directive requirements. One of those instruments is the public water use rights permit. This paper aims to present the Spanish panorama of this instrument and contribute to those interested in water management. The work shows that there are several challenges and problems faced by the Spanish management apparatus, particularly regarding continuity of private management of groundwater and insufficient knowledge of numerous wells and volumes of water used. For various reasons, the concessions system faces criticism as to defending the interests of traditional economic sectors.

The author's interest in water usage under the concession model envisaged in the domestic legislation of Republika Srpska was sparked by the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Case No. U-16/20. The analysis of this decision has paved the way for broader reflection, leading to further research which resulted in the creation of this article. Methodologically, the paper is rooted in the normative analysis of the Concessions Act and the Real Rights Act, the latter being the primary legislative act when discussing real property institutions in Republika Srpska. While the initial segment of this article addresses the specific legal regulation of certain kinds of properties and delineates the concepts of water, water assets, and water entities as subjects of property rights, the main focus is on pertinent issues related to water as the subject matter of concession. The scope of concession can encompass a vast array of economic activities. In the context of water, it typically pertains to the utilization of public water assets (e.g., water for technological processes in economic activities, water and waterfronts for hydro reservoirs, swimming pools, ponds, waterfronts for conducting certain economic tasks, and extraction of materials from waterways). Furthermore, the energy potential of water can be tapped when the objective of concession is the construction and operation of energy plants, which stand as one of the paramount economic facets of water utilization. The concluding section delves into the Constitutional Court's practices regarding the concession institution, as well as the notion of "state property" as an increasingly emphasized topic in domestic jurisprudence.