Suchergebnisse

Changes in the roles of the government and the private sector in the provision of public services along with budget constraints are resulting in an increasing use of the concession approach for financing and managing roads. In the last few years, many of these contracts set up incentives linked to bonuses to encourage the concessionaire to render a better service to the users. Road safety is one the aspects on the basis of which concessionaires can be rewarded according to their performance. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether road safety incentives are being defined in the right way nowadays in different European countries and also identify what incentives would need to be implemented to achieve a socially optimal road safety level. To that end, we develop a specific incentive for road concession contracts that encourages companies to achieve the optimal level. We apply this methodology to three case studies of concessions recently awarded in order to determine to what extend the incentives they set up are closer or farther to the optimum.

This paper studies the relationship between a government and private companies for the exploitation of an oilfield by means of concession-like contracts, i.e. concessions and Production Sharing Agreements. At this aim, we develop and solve a dynamic stochastic optimization problem in a real option framework. The model takes into account crucial as well as actual features of the real world, such as: the twofold goal of governments who must mediate between social interests and revenue maximization from concessions; the incentive for the private party to "over exploit" natural resources and uncertainty over future payoffs. The results obtained can help policy makers in pursuing the delicate task of setting the "right" terms of concession-like contracts, meaning that policy makers can have at least a benchmark to start interacting with private parties. This phase is particularly difficult for a number of reasons, such as the need to trade contrasting interests off, high risk of corruption and the fact that negotiations are made difficult by the high level of uncertainty due to incomplete or even faulty information.

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and firm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose BOT concessions. This result stems from a trade-off between the government's shadow costs of financing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period. The incentives to choose BOT concessions increase as a function of informational asymmetries between governments and potential BOT concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession project characteristics to the public authority at the termination of the concession.

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and firm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose BOT concessions. This result stems from a trade-off between the government's shadow costs of financing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period. The incentives to choose BOT concessions increase as a function of informational asymmetries between governments and potential BOT concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession project characteristics to the public authority at the termination of the concession.

The special legal nature of the concession contract (as one of the legal transactions) which represents a legal framework where the public and private interests meet (two parties cooperate for mutual benefit) is characterised by intertwining of general rules of obligation law and special legal institutes that originate from the sphere of public law. The legal nature of the contractual relationships that arise between administrative and private entities requires special regulation of individual institutes that should reflect the public interest as an important guiding principle for concluding these contracts, and a special legal position of a public law entity as a holder of this public interest. Despite adoption of the new Public-Private Partnership Act in the legislative regulation of the concession contract that still remains variously regulated in previously adopted special provisions of sectoral laws, there are still some deficiencies and dilemmas that are more or less effectively dealt with in the contractual practice. For the legal positions that are classically civil at first sight, the legislator or court practice have laid down special modified rules of civil law in most developed countries. In the course of time, these rules became part of public law / administrative law. Thus, the French legal order has best developed the rules of the public contractual law and the legal institute of the administrative contract that the Slovenian administrative theoreticians try more and more to introduce also into our legal order.

KEY WORDS: • concession contract • concession partnership • public-private partnership • public interest • party equality principle • law of obligations

Anfang 1999 wurden in Südafrika die ersten langfristigen staatlich-privaten Partnerschaftsverträge für Wasserversorgung und sanitäre Einrichtungen abgeschlossen. Diese Verträge beinhalten private Managementexpertise und hohe private Investitionen. Der Prozess zur Vorbereitung dieser Vereinbarungen war lang und schwierig. Zahlreiche Hindernisse mussten überwunden werden. Die Autoren legen am Beispiel von zwei Fallstudien (Nelspruit und Dolphin Coast) dar, wie und warum diese Verträge entwickelt wurden und welche Schlussfolgerungen daraus gezogen werden können, um ähnliche Vereinbarungen in Zukunft zu erleichtern. (DÜI-Hlb)

ABSTRACT: The supply of natural gas and electricity continued to be a difficult goal for many household consumers in Romania, despite sufficient natural resources. The cause was represented by the existence of a monopoly over the provision of those two services, but, due to the liberalization of the market for the supply of natural gas and electricity, several benefits are to be implemented in this area. In this sense, both the primary and the secondary legislation have been already amended, and the future domestic and non-domestic customers expect the unblocking of the situation in the shortest possible time, issue that implies the efficient mobilization of all public authorities and of the system distribution operators. Therefore, we will analyze these new legal provisions and how they will influence the already concluded concession contracts, but also whether they will improve the quality of life of the applicants. KEYWORDS: concession contract, public service, natural gas, applicant, operator