Suchergebnisse

The Austrian Code of Civil Procedure does not contain special rules for collective redress, so traditional tools of multiparty practice such as joinder, consolidation, or, in certain cases, assignment or the appointment of a curator, had to be adapted for mass cases. In response to an increase in mass litigation, a draft of a group procedure was prepared by the Austrian Ministry of Justice in 2007, which provided for a new group proceeding for cases involving three or more claimants and a large number (probably more than fifty) claims and similar questions of law and fact. Any questions not resolved in the group proceeding have to be determined in individual lawsuits. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]

The Austrian Code of Civil Procedure does not contain special rules for collective redress, so traditional tools of multiparty practice such as joinder, consolidation, or, in certain cases, assignment or the appointment of a curator, had to be adapted for mass cases. In response to an increase in mass litigation, a draft of a group procedure was prepared by the Austrian Ministry of Justice in 2007, which provided for a new group proceeding for cases involving three or more claimants and a large number (probably more than fifty) claims and similar questions of law and fact. Any questions not resolved in the group proceeding have to be determined in individual lawsuits.

Examines the extraterritorial effect of collective redress litigation, looking at the way in which many collective redress issues span frontiers, and thus involve complex transnational dynamics. Includes detailed analysis of the law and jurisprudence with significant practical impact in this area.

AbstractCollective redress mechanisms for consumer claims seek both to allow legal systems to accommodate mass litigation without being overwhelmed and to enable litigation to be viable where individual claims would not be economic. The article maps a number of recent reforms and reform proposals relating to consumer collective redress at national level and comments on EU developments. It notes that there is insufficient recognition of the differences between schemes geared at managing mass litigation as opposed to those aimed at facilitating otherwise non-viable claims. There are however signs that a European style of collective redress procedure is developing, which emphasize the role of public authorities and consumer organizations as gatekeepers to collective redress. The EU is unlikely to be able to impose collective redress procedures on national civil procedures, but the EU could prompt Member States to reflect on the need for national reforms. There may be limited scope for an EU mechanism to address the problem of individually non-viable consumer claims. This would however have to address certain fundamental issues such as the opt-out mechanism, cy-près distribution and funding if consumer organizations are to be encouraged to bring such actions. At a legal doctrinal level, it is interesting to note the influence of comparative studies on policy development within Member States as well as at the EU level.

After more than a decade of studies, workshops and surveys, European Commission has accompanied a "Proposal of Directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interest of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/CE" to the "New Deal for Consumers" with the goal of protecting European consumers from the infringements of the Union law in an economic globalization and digitalization era. At this date this Proposal has been amended by European Parliament in its first reading and it starts the final stage of the Directive with the European Union Council, which has also approved its general approach on the matter. The 2018 Study from Commission highlights that only nineteen Member States have a collective compensatory redress tool in their procedural legislation. Consequently, it was necessary to set out a similar procedure in all the countries in order to standardize the protection of the interest of consumers. Europe has always feared the abuses seen in the class action system in USA. For this reason, it has tried to find a good balance between access to justice right and the safeguards to avoid the unmeritorious claims. In some cases, the safeguards are suitable mechanisms to reach the fair play and avoid the exclusive interest of lawyer companies. But in others the safeguards restrict the access to justice right. This happens when Directive rules that only qualified entities are able to represent the interest of the group of consumers. The access to justice is a fundamental right that must weigh more in this careful conflict of rights of interest. The consumers have to be able to be represented by other consumer in the same situation, especially when there are other efficient mechanisms to avoid the abuse of attorneys. This is the argument offered in this article, after studying the class action system and its background in Europe.

This Policy Brief summarizes the findings of a joint project between Oxford University and the Catholic University of Leuven aimed at evaluating different mechanisms for delivering collective redress. 1. Incoherence in addressing market failures. The cohort of case studies assembled in this project shows that EU Member States vary enormously in how they address the simple issues that arise in most consumer disputes (unfair contract terms, overcharges, etc.), particularly with regard to public and private enforcement. Where Member States rely on private parties pursuing litigation, the results can be notably slow, expensive, ineffective in providing remedies, and fail to address systemic issues. 2. Need for a coherent, modernized approach to market behaviour and enforcement. National systems for addressing market regulatory behaviour badly need attention at policy and governmental levels, since almost no State has taken a sensible joined-up approach to either the relationship between public and private enforcement (including ADR and self-regulation) or how to affect behaviour (hence the concept of Ethical Business Regulation as a balanced policy). 3. Requirements for control of market oversight. The objectives of an effective regulatory system should run in the following sequence: 1. Establishing clear rules and their interpretation 2. Identification of individual and systemic problems 3. Cessation of illegality 4. Decision on whether behaviour is illegal, unfair, or acceptable 5. Identification of the root cause of the problem 6. Identification of what actions are needed to prevent the reoccurrence of the problematic behaviour, or reduction of the risk 7. Application of the actions (a) by identified actors (b) by other actors 8. Dissemination of information to all (a) firms (b) consumers (c) other markets 9. Redress 10. Sanctions 11. Ongoing monitoring, oversight, amendment 4. Private enforcement. The EU has harmonized class actions for injunctive relief, and some Member States have introduced them for damages, but national models all differ. There have been relatively few (damages) class actions in Europe. The countries that have the highest usage figures are Italy and Poland, where lawyers and consumer associations try to bring class cases but suffer a high failure rate for certification. 5. A shift to new technologies. The 'new technologies' of regulatory redress and consumer ombudsmen (in the UK sense, not the Nordic sense) are far more effective, quick, and cheap than the 'old technology' of collective litigation. These case studies demonstrate that unequivocally. The new technologies deliver the goals of affecting future behaviour, redress, and efficiency, which the old technology does not.