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This article tells the story of how advertising, by leveraging the success of its self‐regulatory system, challenged the assumption that statutory control should remain for broadcast advertisements. Five years later a new, singular system exists with the flexibility to confront a changing media landscape. It has business support, regulator approval and consumer confidence.

[EN] Safety and security concerns play a key role during the design of civil UAs (aircraft controlled by a pilot who is not onboard it) by the producers and the offer of different services by the operators. At present, European countries have fragmented regulations about the manufacture and use of civil drones, therefore the European institutions are trying to approach all these regulations into a common one. In this sense, not only law but also ethics can give guidelines to the industry in order to obtain better reports from their clients. With our results, we would like to give advice to the European industry, as well as give new insights to the academia and policymakers ; The European Project AiRT has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 732433. Reference: H2020-ICT-2016-2017. ; De-Miguel-Molina, M.; Santamarina Campos, V.; Segarra-Oña, M.; De-Miguel-Molina, B. (2018). Regulation, Co-Regulation and Self-Regulation of Civil Unmanned Aircrafts in Europe. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology. 12(5):498-501. http://hdl.handle.net/10251/104547 ; S ; 498 ; 501 ; 12 ; 5

AbstractIn Europe, the food safety policy combines the regulatory interventions of member states with private standards. The Hygiene Package, which came into force on the 1 January 2006, is characteristic of this model. The aim of our article is to show that whilst we can learn about co‐regulation by examining the standards and principles on which it is based, we will gain an even better understanding by examining its actual implementation. From a sociological standpoint, we look at how the Hygiene Package was received and implemented in French slaughterhouses. (1) After setting out the structure of slaughterhouses in France and the ways in which veterinary services are organised, (2) the article looks at how inspection services have been affected by the introduction of the Hygiene Package, particularly with regard to the changes in relationships within the inspection service, between veterinarians and official auxiliaries and (3) it then examines the evolution in roles and responsibilities between veterinary services and food business operators.

In Europe, the food safety policy combines the regulatory interventions of member states with private standards. The Hygiene Package, which came into force on the 1 January 2006, is characteristic of this model. The aim of our article is to show that whilst we can learn about co-regulation by examining the standards and principles on which it is based, we will gain an even better understanding by examining its actual implementation. From a sociological standpoint, we look at how the Hygiene Package was received and implemented in French slaughterhouses. (1) After setting out the structure of slaughterhouses in France and the ways in which veterinary services are organised, (2) the article looks at how inspection services have been affected by the introduction of the Hygiene Package, particularly with regard to the changes in relationships within the inspection service, between veterinarians and official auxiliaries and (3) it then examines the evolution in roles and responsibilities between veterinary services and food business operators.

In federal countries the allocation of renewable energy (RE) deployment is simultaneously regulated by national and subnational governments. We analyze the efficiency of federal coregulation when different types of policy instruments - price and quantity - are assigned to government levels. Using an analytical model with two regulatory levels, we specify conditions that ensure first-best allocation of RE deployment in equilibrium. These efficiency conditions refer to how the financial burden of the national RE support scheme should be shared among subnational jurisdictions. Under realistic assumptions national price-based regulation is efficient if burden shares are proportional to population shares, regardless of the subnational policy instrument. Contrary, under national quantity-based regulation efficiency conditions depend on the subnational policy instrument. While with subnational price-based regulation burden shares should be oriented towards first-best RE deployment shares, with subnational quantity-based regulation burden shares should be oriented towards population shares.

In federal countries the allocation of renewable energy (RE) deployment is simultaneously regulated by national and subnational governments. We analyze the efficiency of federal coregulation when different types of policy instruments - price and quantity - are assigned to government levels. Using an analytical model with two regulatory levels, we specify conditions that ensure first-best allocation of RE deployment in equilibrium. These efficiency conditions refer to how the financial burden of the national RE support scheme should be shared among subnational jurisdictions. Under realistic assumptions national price-based regulation is efficient if burden shares are proportional to population shares, regardless of the subnational policy instrument. Contrary, under national quantity-based regulation efficiency conditions depend on the subnational policy instrument. While with subnational price-based regulation burden shares should be oriented towards first-best RE deployment shares, with subnational quantity-based regulation burden shares should be oriented towards population shares.

In federal countries the allocation of renewable energy (RE) deployment is simultaneously regulated by national and subnational governments. We analyze the efficiency of federal coregulation
when different types of policy instruments - price and quantity - are assigned to government levels. Using an analytical model with two regulatory levels, we specify conditions that ensure first-best allocation of RE deployment in equilibrium. These efficiency conditions refer to how the financial burden of the national RE support scheme should be shared among subnational jurisdictions. Under realistic assumptions national price-based regulation is efficient if burden shares are proportional to population shares, regardless of the subnational policy instrument. Contrary, under national quantity-based regulation efficiency conditions depend on the subnational policy instrument. While with subnational price-based regulation burden shares should be oriented towards first-best RE deployment shares, with subnational quantity-based regulation burden shares should be oriented towards population shares.

The Internet poses grave new threats to information privacy. Search engines collect and store our search queries; websites track our online activity and then sell this information to others; and Internet Search Providers read the very packets of information through which we interact with the Internet. Yet the debate over how best to address this problem has ground to a halt, stuck between those who call for a vigorous legislative response and those who advocate for market solutions and self-regulation. In 1995, the European Union member states began to build a third approach into their data protection laws, one in which government and industry work together to develop and enforce privacy rules. This "co-regulatory" model could provide a way to transcend the frozen U.S. debate. But it has received little attention in the United States and almost no analysis in the law review literature. This Article identifies the threats to online privacy; evaluates whether the two main alternatives—government regulation, and the market/self-regulation—can adequately address these threats; surveys the theoretical literature on co-regulation; and, finally, describes and analyzes the statutes through which E.U. member states have implemented the new approach. It provides the first comprehensive analysis of these laws in a U.S. law review and develops an original way of categorizing and understanding them.

PurposeThe aim of this paper is to analyze the changing role of business in a globalized society, focusing on transnational corporations as private authorities which have gained power in global governance. The paper will aim to address the following issues: the development of CSR as a voluntary framework based on self‐regulation instruments through which corporations can manage their social and environmental impacts; corporations' exercise of power and authority in developing CSR standards globally through inter‐firm cooperation; and CSR as a mechanism to transform business culture through the development of co‐regulatory instruments between corporations and their stakeholders.Design/methodology/approachThis paper describes the emergence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a new governance framework, essentially created by the pressure of global civil society on corporations. The research focuses on the analysis of new forms of business political activities: self‐regulation and co‐regulation.FindingsThe findings describe how transnational corporations have become private authorities, competing or collaborating with global civil society or public authorities to develop a new framework of social and environmental regulations to manage their responsibilities and exercise their global power.Practical implicationsThis paper highlights the need for regulatory tools to transform global governance. CSR requires the development of public accountability mechanisms for private authorities, an issue that can be resolved by developing global governance networks between public and private actors.Originality/valueThis paper explains why CSR has taken shape through the creation of self‐regulation management standards and co‐regulating norms and instruments where transnational corporations are a major driving force.