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This paper presents initial findings from the expert survey data collection conducted as part of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) during 2022-2024, with a focus on post-communist democracies. The study examines the prevalence and interplay of political clientelism and programmatism—two key partisan mobilization strategies—across the region. Utilizing data from DALP I (2008-2009) and DALP II (2022-2024), the paper explores the progression of these strategies over time. Additionally, the analysis investigates partisan reliance on different sub-strategies of clientelism—specifically electoral and relational—and their relationship with various voter groups, drawing on data from DALP II. The findings reveal significant variation in the mobilization profiles of both party systems and political parties, with some major parties effectively combining clientelism and programmatism. Notably, relational clientelism emerges as the dominant form of linkage in clientelistic politics within the post-communist space, overshadowing the more globally researched exchange of benefits for electoral services.

Drawing on an analysis of austerity reforms in Greece and Portugal during the sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards, we show how the nature of the linkages between parties and citizens shapes party strategies of fiscal retrenchment. We argue that parties which rely to a greater extent on the selective distribution of state resources to mobilise electoral support (clientelistic linkages) are more reluctant to agree to fiscal retrenchment because their own electoral survival depends on their ability to control state budgets to reward clients. In Greece, where parties relied extensively on these clientelistic linkages, austerity reforms have been characterised by recurring conflicts and disagreements between the main parties, as well as a fundamental transformation of the party system. By contrast, in Portugal, where parties relied less on clientelistic strategies, austerity reforms have been more consensual because fiscal retrenchment challenged to a lesser extent the electoral base of the mainstream parties.

This article is closed access. ; Drawing on an analysis of austerity reforms in Greece and Portugal during the sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards, we show how the nature of the linkages between parties and citizens shapes party strategies of fiscal retrenchment. We argue that parties which rely to a greater extent on the selective distribution of state resources to mobilize electoral support (clientelistic linkages) are more reluctant to agree to fiscal retrenchment because their own electoral survival depends on their ability to control state budgets to reward clients. In Greece, where parties relied extensively on these clientelistic linkages, austerity reforms have been characterized by recurring conflicts and disagreements between the main parties, as well as a fundamental transformation of the party system. By contrast, in Portugal, where parties relied less on clientelistic strategies, austerity reforms have been more consensual because fiscal retrenchment challenged to a lesser extent the electoral base of the mainstream parties.

Recent work suggests that there is a close and positive relation between poverty, electoral competitiveness, and the development of clientelistic linkages among political parties and the electorate. The prevailing argument is that high levels of electoral competitiveness in poor districts incentivize all parties competing there to buy votes. This article suggests that, even when facing these contextual incentives, parties will not be able to engage in clientelistic relations with voters unless they have the organizational ability to do so. We call this ability "clientelistic capacity" and develop an argument to explain its variation among Mexico's three main parties. We test our claims using a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of a party in municipal government on enrollment in Seguro Popular, a public program targeted to the poor. We demonstrate that parties with clientelistic capacity enroll more persons in the program.

Using the framework of linkage theory, we examine local parties, by means of mail questionnaires to party activists in one county of New Jersey. Three aspects are investigated : level of activism, satisfaction of activists, and decision-making structures. Activists concentrate on campaigns, derive most satisfaction from electoral work, and leave decision making to party leaders. Relationships among higher activism, greater satisfaction, and more democratic structures are positive, but only to a moderate degree. We conclude, with Schlesinger, that U.S. parties primarily are agencies of electoral, not participatory or clientelistic, linkage, and consider the possible implications of this fact for the long-range liability of local parties and the American political system.

Did the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party of Thailand, the first party in the country's history to gain parliamentary dominance in 2001, represent a departure from traditional clientelistic Thai parties or was it old wine in a new bottle? This article argues that the TRT represented a new hybrid party that successfully established programmatic linkages in rural parts of the country by systematizing its use of informal social networks in local communities. By routinizing recruitment, training, and evaluation of its parliamentary candidates and their vote-canvassing networks, the TRT imparted midlevel politicians with the incentives and ability to promote the party's policy agenda to rural voters and to cultivate new policy-oriented linkages alongside traditional clientelistic ones. By identifying specific organizational mechanisms by which the TRT combined programmatic and clientelistic linkages with rural voters, this study contributes to literature that examines hybrid party strategies as well as informal party organization.

Though a general consensus exists regarding the significance of perceived performance in voters' evaluations of incumbent governments, much of the research underlying this consensus has been carried out across political systems with little internal variance in the degree of democracy. We propose that in emerging regimes, where such uniformity in terms of the territorial diffusion of democracy is not a given, characteristics of subnational political regimes can prevent electoral linkages from forming. Specifically, we argue that in subnational contexts where some minimal level of political competition has taken hold, performance-based linkages such as those driving economic voting should surface. However, in subnational dominant-party systems, where clientelistic linkages between voters and political bosses tend to prevail, economic performance and other aspects of an incumbent's governance record will be less consequential for the voting calculus of citizens, in both provincial and national elections. We find support for this theoretical framework in Argentina and Mexico, two democratic countries characterized by highly uneven subnational political contexts. By highlighting how subnational regime characteristics facilitate or undermine electoral accountability mechanisms, we cast light on the very real representational consequences of uneven democratization in emerging regimes.

What explains that programmatic parties may combine their policy offers with clientelistic dispensation? Prevailing knowledge suggests that parties top-down diversify linkages, targeting their program at wealthier voters while providing particularistic inducements to poorer ones. Yet, these frameworks fail to explain the variety of strategies used by politicians to link voters within the municipal context, where voters' socioeconomic status and electoral competition are less likely to vary. I argue that programmatic parties may engage in clientelism at the municipal level when they receive bottom-up demands. Leveraging evidence from 97 in-depth interviews conducted during multiyear fieldwork in three Chilean municipalities, this article shows why and how programmatic parties outsource the cost of clientelism to neighbourhood associations in exchange for targeted distribution to solve the groups' demands. By showing that clientelism in programmatic-oriented settings is demand-driven, the article draws attention to territorially-rooted local groups as key actors that help to explain the variety of strategies parties use to link with voters.

An informational theory of electoral clientelism -- Clientelistic linkages in Peru and the limits of conventional explanations -- Convoking voters and establishing electoral viability -- Influence from the citizens' point of view -- Analyzing campaigns.