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Choices of political institutions have been subject to increasing examination in recent years. The literature on these choices generally argues that they are driven primarily by politicians' power interests, with impartial values playing at most a subservient role. Yet there are circumstances in which that may not be the case, in which values do come more to the fore. This article examines two propositions: that a principal legacy of significant democratic dissident activity is that it enhances the direct role of impartial values in initial choices of political institutions; and that the values involved have a specifically dissident hue. It begins by exploring theoretically the reasons for expecting these patterns. It then examines the propositions empirically through analysis of institutional choice in East-Central Europe in 1989 and 1990. The third section expands the analysis, first by using Linz and Stepan's typology of nondemocratic regimes to consider the circumstances under which the posited mechanisms may operate, and then by tentatively exploring evidence from a broad range of cases. The article concludes that the circumstances in which dissident values matter significantly in institutional choices are rare but nevertheless generalizable. The analysis therefore provides a valuable addition to our understanding of institutional choice processes as well as of dissident legacies.

'Choice of Law' provides an in-depth sophisticated coverage of the choice-of-law part conflicts law (or private international law) in torts, products liability, contracts, forum-selection and arbitration clauses, insurance, statutes of limitation, domestic relations, property, marital property, and successions. It also covers the constitutional framework and conflicts between federal law and foreign law and explains the doctrinal and methodological foundations of choice of law and then focuses on its actual practice, examining not only what courts say but also what they do

Both cultural & technological determinism are considered inappropriate for analyzing the relationships between technology, values, & social change, because they prevent close examination of opposing interests & specific strategies of social groups involved in introduction of new technology. Regarding choice of new technology, values function to delimit the range of possible alternatives, while more immediate interests may strongly influence final decision making. Successful implementation of technological innovations will in part depend on the latter's compatibility with strongly valued social practices. The impact of new technology on values should be seen as mediated by changes it may bring about in the concrete social relations affected. In this context, a distinction is made between specific & diffuse technologies. In the case of specific technology, articulation of different interests is mostly rather clear; assessment of the impact of diffuse technology on both social relations & cultural values is more difficult. Technological innovation of the latter kind provides new behavioral alternatives for some groups, while limiting those of others. The consequent emergence of new patterns of social practices may in turn lead to a change in attitudes & values. AA.

Most empirical applications of rational choice employ a typical value assumption—that actors are motivated to pursue private and instrumental goods. When is this typical value assumption warranted, and when is it not? This article proposes guidelines for thinking about the use of value assumptions in rational choice theory. When instrumental and immanent values are substitutable, use of the typical value assumption is justifiable. However, in cases where there is imperfect substitutability—in which actors face production constraints, significant role conflict, or in which immanent values are nonrandomly distributed—the typical value assumption should be reexamined.

Intro -- COWLES COMMISSION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS -- DEDICATION -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION -- 1. THE TYPES OF SOCIAL CHOICE -- 2. SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS -- CHAPTER II - THE NATURE OF PREFERENCE AND CHOICE -- 1. MEASURABILITY AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARABILITY OF UTILITY -- 2. A NOTATION FOR PREFERENCES AND CHOICE -- 3. THE ORDERING OF SOCIAL STATES -- 4. A DIGRESSION ON RATIONALITY AND CHOICE -- CHAPTER III - THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION -- 1. FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CHOICE -- 2. POSITIVE ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES -- 3. THE INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES -- 4. THE CONDITION OF CITIZENS' SOVEREIGNTY -- 5. THE CONDITION OF NON-DICTATORSHIP -- 6. THE SUMMATION OF UTILITIES -- CHAPTER IV - THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE -- 1. THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION -- 2. THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPENSATION -- CHAPTER V - THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS -- 1. THE NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES -- 2. TWO INDIVIDUALS AND THREE ALTERNATIVES -- 3. PROOF OF THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM -- 4. INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM -- CHAPTER VI - THE INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- 1. STATEMENT OF THE ASSUMPTIONS -- 2. THE POSSIBILITY THEOREM UNDER INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- 3. QUASI-ORDERINGS AND COMPATIBLE WEAK ORDERINGS -- 4. AN EXAMPLE -- 5. A ONE-COMMODITY WORLD -- 6. GROUP CHOICE IN THE THEORY OF GAMES -- 7. DISTRIBUTIONAL ETHICS COMBINED WITH INDIVIDUALISM -- CHAPTER VII - SIMILARITY AS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL WELFARE JUDGMENTS -- 1. COMPLETE UNANIMITY -- 2. THE CASE OF SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES -- 3. THE IDEALIST POSITION AND THE CONCEPT OF CONSENSUS -- 4. KNOWLEDGE AND THE MEANING OF SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES -- 5. PARTIAL UNANIMITY -- 6. THE DECISION PROCESS AS A VALUE -- REFERENCES.

This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy. In this regard, the author eschews a strong methodological commitment or technical formalism; the approach is instead based on the presentation of political facts and illustrated via numerous real-life examples. This allows the reader to get acquainted with the philosophical and political dispute surrounding voting and collective decision-making and its links to social choice theory

In his celebrated 1951 work, Social Choice and Individual Values, economist Kenneth Arrow asked how the values of individuals might be aggregated into a social choice. Today, we live in a world in which choice is celebrated as a virtually undiluted good. Indeed, in the agrifood sector in much of the world, there is considerable evidence that the range of choices has increased markedly in the last 30 years. In much of the world today, we can choose from a vast array of items in the local supermarket, as well as from a range of restaurants that differ on price, quality, and ethnic or regional specialties. Consumer choice is also seen as a means of promoting fair trade, animal welfare, geographically specific food and agricultural products such as wines and cheeses, and fair labor practices, as well as protecting the environment and biodiversity, among other things. In short, choice is seen as both "revealing preferences" of consumers as well as their ethical stances with respect to various issues facing the world today. But all this assumes that choices are individual. It not only accepts the methodological individualism common to mainstream economics and psychology as a research strategy, but assumes that it provides an adequate means of understanding and organizing the world. However, if we reject that individualism as both research strategy and social project, and grant that humans are social beings, then appropriate food choices are learned through a complex process of interaction. One might say that the Arrow points the other way: individual choices are and must be based on socially held, shared values. Governing this process requires rethinking and revisioning the future of agriculture and food.