Suchergebnisse

Central bank cooperation depends on a few crucial parameters: the extent to which central bankers agree on theory (end means relationships); the extent to which they can agree on goals (social purpose); the capacity (technical and institutional) to achieve their collective goals; and whether the broader political environment facilitates or impedes cooperation. This article explores these questions by first providing an overview of central banks and bankers. Among the G-10 countries, central bankers are likely to share political independence, relatively long term horizons, and (increasingly) academic backgrounds. These conditions may be conducive to high levels of cooperation in the future. Second, I explore the "easiest" form of cooperation -- information sharing -- and conclude that this is an area in which central bank cooperation will become increasingly routinised. Cooperation to address global financial stability is a more difficult cooperative dilemma, with tensions between the need for efficient regulatory management and the inclusion of a broader range of cooperating institutions. In the area of exchange rate and monetary policy coordination, consensus among the major exchange rate authorities regarding the effectiveness of coordinated exchange market interventions has withered, though this does not preclude a new consensus from emerging in the future. One of the most significant challenges to central bank cooperation in the future will be how to include rising monetary and financial powers, particularly China, into the cooperative management of international monetary conditions

This paper reviews 80 years of cooperation among central banks. Diverse modes of collaboration are identified, ranging from simple exchange of relevant information to mutual financial support and coordination of monetary actions. Central bank cooperation got off to a rocky start in the 1930s, following the creation of the Bank for International Settlements in 1930, but it improved in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s. Most early cooperation was among European central banks, although need for a trans-Atlantic dimension was soon evident. By the end of the 20th century both the problems addressed and the participants were drawn from around the world. The alleged dangers of central bank cooperation are found to have been exaggerated

During the Great Recession, central banks went well beyond their normal operations and provided liquidity in unlimited amounts, in foreign currency and to foreign banks. Central bank cooperation took the form of a swap network, and amounted to an episode of global monetary policy. However, though bank cooperation will continue to contribute to global governance, the swap network should not be made permanent and given an institutional basis to provide international lending of last resort. Swaps are a monetary policy tool and should continue to be decided on by central banks like all other monetary policy tools,to avoid impinging on their independence, which a difficult historical process has shown to be the best basis for price stability. In comments appended to this Policy Contribution, Edwin Truman, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics, concludes in favour of making the swap network permanent, while William Dudley, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stresses the importance of central banks around the world being able to coordinate closely so that there can be a viable, credible backstop on a global basis.

AbstractThe literature on interwar monetary history has argued that the lack of central bank cooperation contributed to the pervasive economic outcome of the 1930s. The reasons for this failure are still an object of debate. In this paper, we revisit the attitude of individual central banks to the attempts led by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to institutionalize central bank cooperation. We present original archival evidence to show that the 1931 crisis in central Europe emerged as an exogenous shock, prompting the BIS to become an international lender of last resort and to increase the resources at its disposal. However, the BIS relied on member central banks' discretionary behaviour, which was far from supportive. Whilst the literature has mainly focused on the core central banks' negative attitude towards BIS lending of last resort operations, we observe a general reticence to foster the BIS's structural and autonomous capacity to provide stabilization loans. Whilst politics also played a role in periphery countries, a major claim of this paper is that central banks shared a significant concern about profit‐making reserve management, thereby limiting the BIS's available resources and capacity to lend. We conclude that these structural weaknesses profoundly hindered a multilateral response to the crises of the 1930s.

Abstract
The functioning of multi-nation monetary unions with several central banks is conditioned by many factors and considerations, such as the capacity to deal with crises, the political will and operational skill to foster financial integration and to develop a mix of rules and discretion in the cooperation between the central banks. The Scandinavian monetary union (SMU) between 1873 and 1931 is a case in point for illustrating the importance of these factors and considerations. We examine the policies implemented in the Scandinavian countries to deal with asymmetries of payments flows and with financial crises at three levels: in an account of major crises that required lending of last resort, in a study of the clearing and settlement mechanism established in the union, and in a survey of contemporary economists' views on lending of last resort and cooperation in the SMU.