Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This paper studies political career incentives in a nondemocratic historical setting to assess early political institutions. We construct a novel panel database of governors of Imperial Russia in 91 provinces between 1895 and 1914. Measuring an imperial governor's performance by his ability of peacekeeping, we test whether the central authorities in the Russian Empire resorted to career incentives to improve the performance of provincial governors. We find that the central administration promoted better performing governors only in the peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main ones (gubernias). In addition, we show that political connections had no significant effect on career prospects.

This study tries to determine to what extent the Chinese bureaucracy is merit-based. By triangulating quantitative and qualitative survey data from a sample of Chinese cadres (n=286), the authors aim to answer the research question: 'What is the behavioral impact of the incentive structure the cadre management system helps to shape, and does the incentive matrix support a meritocratic work environment?'. The findings demonstrate that the promotion of local leading cadres is primarily based on their superiors' recognition and appreciation. A principal-component analysis reveals that what impresses the superiors includes both patronage and merit factors, although patronage has a slight edge over merit. This study also suggests that good interpersonal skills are essential for both merit- and patronage-oriented career advancement. (J Contemp China/GIGA)