Using data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey, we investigate the determinants of the individual union membership decision, focusing on the role of dispositional-as opposed to situational-factors. We argue that the battery of items in Schwartz's (1992) theory of basic personal values is relevant in the context of unionism and can be used to test the validity of certain elements of existing theories. We further claim that the use of basic values in this context is an effective way of operationalizing the role of societal interests embedded in the rational choice explanations for union membership. The econometric work-which features a three-way outcome variable identifying current, former and never-members-reveals that, along with socio-demographic, ideological, firm-level and sectoral characteristics, basic values are closely related to union membership status. While higher self-transcendence and conservation scores are associated with a greater likelihood of being a current member, higher openness-to-change and self-enhancement scores have the opposite effect. Adapted from the source document.
This study used basic personal values to elucidate the motivational meanings of "left" and "right" political orientations in 20 representative national samples from the European Social Survey (2002–2003). It also compared the importance of personal values and sociodemographic variables as determinants of political orientation. Hypotheses drew on the different histories, prevailing culture, and socioeconomic level of three sets of countries—liberal, traditional, and postcommunist. As hypothesized, universalism and benevolence values explained a left orientation in both liberal and traditional countries and conformity and tradition values explained a right orientation; values had little explanatory power in postcommunist countries. Values predicted political orientation more strongly than sociodemographic variables in liberal countries, more weakly in postcommunist countries, and about equally in traditional countries.
Do the political values of the general public form a coherent system? What might be the source of coherence? We view political values as expressions, in the political domain, of more basic personal values. Basic personal values (e.g., security, achievement, benevolence, hedonism) are organized on a circular continuum that reflects their conflicting and compatible motivations. We theorize that this circular motivational structure also gives coherence to political values. We assess this theorizing with data from 15 countries, using eight core political values (e.g., free enterprise, law and order) and ten basic personal values. We specify the underlying basic values expected to promote or oppose each political value. We offer different hypotheses for the 12 non-communist and three post-communist countries studied, where the political context suggests different meanings of a basic or political value. Correlation and regression analyses support almost all hypotheses. Moreover, basic values account for substantially more variance in political values than age, gender, education, and income. Multidimensional scaling analyses demonstrate graphically how the circular motivational continuum of basic personal values structures relations among core political values. This study strengthens the assumption that individual differences in basic personal values play a critical role in political thought. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of this study is to clarify whether personal values explain delinquents' and non-delinquents' general attitudes towards legal norms. We expect that 10 basic personal values form a circular scale common to all individuals, both delinquents and non-delinquents, that people's ratings of the importance of these 10 values predict their norm acceptance in a sinusoidal way, with higher predictability for delinquents, and that the correlations of personal values with norm acceptance are highest for those delinquents with a broad spectrum of offences. Finally, we expect that gender does not have an impact on these profiles, whereas controlling for age does. Our analyses are based on four studies on community crime prevention. The results are in line with the above expectations.
Falling levels of electoral participation in established democracies have raised serious concern. We investigate the role of basic personal values in identifying those who do not vote. We argue that voting in specific elections offers non-voters less opportunity to affirm, protect, or attain the values they cherish than it offers to voters. We hypothesize that people who do not vote attribute less importance than voters to those values that the contesting parties actually endorse (actual value congruence) and that the parties are perceived as endorsing (perceived value congruence). Study 1 (Italian national elections of 2001, n = 1,782) confirmed the hypothesis for actual congruence between own and coalition endorsed values. Study 2 (2008 elections, n = 543) confirmed the hypothesis both for actual and perceived value congruence. In both studies, value congruence explained substantial variance in voter abstention beyond the effects of socio-demographic variables.