A Monetary Analysis of Balance Sheet Policies
In: The Economic Journal, Band 125, Heft 589, S. 1888-1917
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In: The Economic Journal, Band 125, Heft 589, S. 1888-1917
Under ordinary circumstances, the fiscal implications of central bank policies tend to be seen as relatively minor and escape close scrutiny. The global financial crisis of 2008, however, demanded an extraordinary response by central banks which brought to light the immense power of central bank balance sheet policies as well as their major fiscal implications. Once the zero lower bound on interest rates is reached, expanding a central bank's balance sheet becomes the central instrument for providing additional monetary policy accommodation. However, with interest rates near zero, the line separating fiscal and monetary policy is blurred. Furthermore, discretionary decisions associated with asset purchases and liquidity provision, as well as with lender-of-last-resort operations benefiting private entities, can have major distributional effects that are ordinarily associated with fiscal policy. In the euro area, discretionary central bank decisions can have immense distributional effects across member states. However, decisions of this nature are incompatible with the role of unelected officials in democratic societies. Drawing on the response to the crisis by the Federal Reserve and the ECB, this paper explores the tensions arising from central bank balance sheet policies and addresses pertinent questions about the governance and accountability of independent central banks in a democratic society.
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Under ordinary circumstances, the fiscal implications of central bank policies tend to be seen as relatively minor and escape close scrutiny. The global financial crisis of 2008, however, demanded an extraordinary response by central banks which brought to light the immense power of central bank balance sheet policies as well as their major fiscal implications. Once the zero lower bound on interest rates is reached, expanding a central bank's balance sheet becomes the central instrument for providing additional monetary policy accommodation. However, with interest rates near zero, the line separating fiscal and monetary policy is blurred. Furthermore, discretionary decisions associated with asset purchases and liquidity provision, as well as with lender-of-last-resort operations benefiting private entities, can have major distributional effects that are ordinarily associated with fiscal policy. In the euro area, discretionary central bank decisions can have immense distributional effects across member states. However, decisions of this nature are incompatible with the role of unelected officials in democratic societies. Drawing on the response to the crisis by the Federal Reserve and the ECB, this paper explores the tensions arising from central bank balance sheet policies and addresses pertinent questions about the governance and accountability of independent central banks in a democratic society.
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In: MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5168-16
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13100
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In: CESifo working paper series 4907
In: Monetary [policy] and international finance
We estimate the effects of exogenous innovations to the balance sheet of the ECB since the start of the financial crisis within a structural VAR framework. An expansionary balance sheet shock stimulates bank lending, stabilizes financial markets, and has a positive impact on economic activity and prices. The effects on bank lending and output are smaller in the member countries that have been more affected by the financial crisis, in particular those countries where the banking system is less well-capitalized.
We estimate the effects of exogenous innovations to the balance sheet of the ECB since the start of the financial crisis within a structural VAR framework. An expansionary balance sheet shock stimulates bank lending, stabilizes financial markets, and has a positive impact on economic activity and prices. The effects on bank lending and output turn out to be smaller in the member countries that have been more affected by the financial crisis, in particular those countries where the banking system is less well-capitalized.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4907
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In: CEIS Working Paper No. 230
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In: IMF Working Paper No. 17/172
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In: IMF working paper no. WP/17/172
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In: Panoeconomicus: naučno-stručni časopis Saveza Ekonomista Vojvodine ; scientific-professional journal of Economists' Association of Vojvodina, Band 67, Heft 5, S. 627-655
ISSN: 2217-2386
Post Great Recession vector autoregression analysis revealed that the reserves? creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) until 2015 had an impact on the perceived credit risk that was either statistically insignificant or opposite to the expected one. The ECB?s unconventional measures returned the real GDP growth merely to an equilibrium of nil growth. In the United States, unconventional balance sheet policies of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) significantly increased the real GDP by between 3.2% and 5.3% and reduced the initial rise of the perceived credit risk. We argue that the plausible reason for the discrepancy between the Fed and the ECB?s outcomes were the contrasting goals of both central banks. The major conclusion is that creation of money by the central bank may support the economy after a crisis, but it cannot deliver long-run prosperity. The positive effects of balance sheet policies were found to be short-lasting.
In: Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper No. 350
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