Baby boom or baby bust?
In: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 3-34
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In: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 3-34
In: Wirtschaftsdienst, Band 104, Heft 7, S. 438-438
ISSN: 1613-978X
In: Foreign affairs, Band 83, Heft 3, S. 64-79
ISSN: 0015-7120
World Affairs Online
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 83, Heft 3, S. 64
ISSN: 2327-7793
In: American economic review, Band 95, Heft 1, S. 183-207
ISSN: 1944-7981
What caused the baby boom? And can it be explained within the context of the secular decline in fertility that has occurred over the last 200 years? The hypothesis is that: (a) The secular decline in fertility is due to the relentless rise in real wages that increased the opportunity cost of having children; (b) The baby boom is explained by an atypical burst of technological progress in the household sector that occurred in the middle of the last century. This lowered the cost of having children. A model is developed in an attempt to account, quantitatively, for both the baby boom and bust.
In: Kazoku shakaigaku kenkyū, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 5-6
ISSN: 1883-9290
In: The women's review of books, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 21
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 8727
SSRN
Working paper
Blog: Reason.com
The obstacles to having more babies can't be moved by tax incentives or subsidized child care.
In: Dissent: a quarterly of politics and culture, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 15-19
ISSN: 1946-0910
Are young women in Japan on a wildcat baby strike? In 2005, for the first time since Japan began collecting population statistics in the late 1800s, the nation's birth rate dropped below its death rate, marking a new low in the ongoing "baby bust," which first came to public attention in 1990. The fewer children there are, the more crushing the weight of the health and pension systems are on each individual citizen. And a baby bust means not only fewer future workers, but also fewer future consumers to buy the products Japanese factories make.
Blame for this baby bust tends to fall on young women. In 1999, sociologist Masahiro Yamada described a generation of young people who live with their parents well into adulthood, spending their earnings on a new computer or a designer bag or a car. These "parasite singles" can be male or female, but in the popular image, it is the young women who are the ones rejecting the austerity of marriage and children, preferring conspicuous consumption. Mari Ozawa, a sociologist and women's activist, noted in 2004 how deeply ingrained the link between the dropping birth rates and the social advancement of women had become in the popular imagination. She questioned the real basis for this link, which is a standard sociological explanation in industrialized nations, and also the frantic imperatives to "reverse the tide" of the declining birth rate, favoring an approach that tries to "navigate" the conditions of the baby bust. Others have emphasized that it is not women's empowerment but a lack thereof that contributes to a decline in births. This refusal to reproduce suggests a deep dissatisfaction with contemporary Japanese society. Can this be read as a political refusal? How can one read a collective "tide" that is not based on collective action but on individual decisions?
In: Population and development review, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 359
ISSN: 1728-4457
In: Population: revue bimestrielle de l'Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques. French edition, Band 53, Heft 4, S. 731-752
ISSN: 0718-6568, 1957-7966
Résumé Grossbard-Shechtman (Shoshana), Granger (Clive W.J).- TYavail des femmes et mariage : du baby-boom au baby-bust Les études des déterminants de l'offre de travail ne tiennent pas compte, en général, des caractéristiques du marché matrimonial. On s'inspire ici de la théorie économique du mariage de Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, qui considère l'influence qu'exerce l'état du marché matrimonial sur la valeur individuelle du temps passé en mariage. Des travaux pionniers de Louis Henry et d'autres, ont montré que les changements dans la taille des cohortes se répercutent sur l'équilibre du marché matrimonial. Par conséquent, on fait l'hypothèse que des changements de taille des cohortes se répercutent aussi sur la valeur du temps des femmes en mariage. Puisque la plupart des femmes sont mariées ou ont l'intention de se marier, l'analyse implique que des femmes nées lorsque les naissances sont en augmentation auront un taux d'activité plus élevé. L'hypothèse a été vérifiée en utilisant des séries chronologiques sur les taux d'activité des femmes aux États-Unis et d'autres variables connues pour leur effet sur l'offre de travail. Les phases de croissance rapide du taux d'activité féminine coïncident avec l'augmentation rapide des arrivées sur le marché matrimonial et donc l'émergence de déséquilibres à l'avantage des hommes. De tels accroissements rapides de population ont caractérisé le baby-boom après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale mais aussi une période plus ancienne de hausse de la natalité à la fin des années 1930. La lente progression du taux d'activité féminine observée ces dernières années correspond à l'arrivée à l'âge adulte des cohortes moins nombreuses nées pendant le baby-bust.
In: Population: revue bimestrielle de l'Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques. French edition, Band 53, Heft 4, S. 731
ISSN: 0718-6568, 1957-7966
In: The futurist: a journal of forecasts, trends and ideas about the future, Band 28, Heft 6
ISSN: 0016-3317
In: Policy review: the journal of American citizenship, Heft 132, S. [np]
ISSN: 0146-5945
Discusses divergence in US & Canadian population profiles over the last quarter century, focusing on Canada. Attention is given to developed country fertility decline; the Canadian-US fertility gap & marriage patterns; & the impact of income & labor force trends, government programs & policies, & values & religion on fertility. The implications of Canadian-US fertility divergence are considered. Figures. M. Ruben